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Online content delivery has witnessed dramatic growth recently with traffic con-
suming over half of today’s Internet bandwidth. This escalating demand has moti-
vated content publishers to move outside the traditional solutions of infrastructure-
based content delivery networks (CDNs). Instead, many are employing peer-to-peer
data transfers to reduce the service cost and avoid bandwidth over-provision to han-
dle peak demands. Unfortunately, the open access work model of this paradigm,
which allows anyone to join, introduces several design challenges related to security,
efficiency, and peer availability.
In this dissertation, we introduce CacheCash, a cryptocurrency-based decentral-
ized content distribution network designed to address these challenges. CacheCash
bypasses the centralized approach of CDN companies for one in which end users or-
ganically set up new caches in exchange for cryptocurrency tokens. Thus, it enables
publishers to hire caches on an as-needed basis, without constraining these parties
with long-term business commitments.
To address the challenges encountered as the system evolved, we propose a num-
ber of protocols and techniques that represent basic building blocks of CacheCash’s
design. First, motivated by the observation that conventional security assessment
tools do not suit cryptocurrency-based systems, we propose ABC, a threat model-
ing framework capable of identifying attacker collusion and the new threat vectors
that cryptocurrencies introduce. Second, we propose CAPnet, a defense mechanism
against cache accounting attacks (i.e., a client pretends to be served allowing a collud-
ing cache to collect rewards without doing any work). CAPnet features a bandwidth
expenditure puzzle that clients must solve over the content before caches are given
credit, which bounds the effectiveness of this collusion case. Third, to make it fea-
sible to reward caches per data chunk served, we introduce MicroCash, a decentral-
ized probabilistic micropayment scheme that reduces the overhead of processing these
small payments. MicroCash implements several novel ideas that make micropayments
more suitable for delay-sensitive applications, such as online content delivery.
CacheCash combines the previous techniques to produce a novel service-payment
exchange protocol that secures the content distribution process. This protocol utilizes
gradual content disclosure and partial payment collection to encourage the honest
collaborative work between participants. We present a detailed game theoretic anal-
ysis showing how to exploit rational financial incentives to address several security
threats. This is in addition to various performance optimization mechanisms that
promote system efficiency and scalability. Lastly, we evaluate system performance
and show that modest machines can serve/retrieve content at a high bitrate with
minimal overhead.
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Online content distribution has seen dramatic growth over the last decade. Video
streaming, in particular occupies more than 60% of today’s Internet traffic and is
projected to exceed 80% by 2022 [22]. To meet this huge demand, content publish-
ers typically distribute the load among geographically dispersed caches, an action
that has fostered the development of infrastructure-based content delivery networks
(CDNs) [3,23]. These centrally-organized networks have proven effective in handling
this task. However, they require publishers to over-provision the needed bandwidth
to handle peak demands [93], and to establish expensive and complex business re-
lationships with CDN providers [68, 90]. As demand for these services grows, the
need for more efficient and cheaper solutions have lead to radically different ap-
proaches [59, 132].
One such approach is the use of peer-to-peer (P2P) content distribution models,
which can reduce costs [89, 120], while also enabling access to lower latency caches.
Several studies have shown that up to ∼ 88% of the traffic can be offloaded from
infrastructure-based CDN nodes to peers during peak demand hours [59,64,89,92]. In
addition, these P2P-based paradigms can provide wide network coverage, scale easily
with demand [128], and, when managed carefully, offer a good quality of service to
end users [60, 132].
However, a major stumbling block for such models is the limited availability of
peers ready to donate time and bandwidth. It is not unusual for participants to
join the system just to receive the service and then exit without serving others [119].
Exchanging the correct service for monetary incentives has proven effective in miti-
gating this problem [62]. That is, by forming a bandwidth market, selfish peers are
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willing to serve others to collect more payments. This creates robust and flexible sys-
tems from which content publishers can build dynamic CDNs tailored to their service
specifications.
Nonetheless, previous systems relied either on centralized payment services,
or placed trust in content publishers to handle this task. Cryptocurrencies and
blockchain technologies offer a fully distributed, and trustless, way to reward peers
for the expended resources. Since Bitcoin was introduced in 2009 [107], the num-
ber of these “digital currencies” has grown into the thousands by 2019, with a total
market capital exceeding $175 billion [24]. Although early systems focused only on
providing a virtual currency exchange medium [40,107], nowadays there is increasing
interest in providing other types of distributed services on top of this medium, such
as computation outsourcing [27] and file storage [49, 130]. These newer applications
lay down a potential framework for building service-payment exchange systems using
P2P networks.
In this dissertation, we propose and implement CacheCash, a fully distributed,
cryptocurrency-based, bandwidth market. CacheCash introduces a number of mod-
ules and protocols needed to secure the content delivery process and optimize its costs.
These include ABC, a threat modeling framework that helps in investigating the full
threat space of cryptocurrency-based distributed services. CAPnet, a defense mech-
anism that protects against colluding caches and clients who try to collect rewards
without performing the promised work. MicroCash, a probabilistic micropayment
scheme that allows rewarding caches at fine-grained scale. This is in addition to var-
ious financially-based defense mechanisms, and efficiency optimization techniques, to
encourage the honest behavior while reducing the overall overhead.
1.1 Design Challenges of Monetary-Incentivised
Distributed CDNs
Despite the many advantages, the open access work model of P2P content distribu-
tion introduces multiple security and performance challenges that have hindered its
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adoption in practice. In this work, we focus on the following issues.
Impossibility of fair-exchange. Lacking a trusted party to ensure that each
entity performs as expected is one such issue. It means that the system must deal
with the impossibility of fair-exchange between mutually-untrusted parties [76, 108].
In the context of content delivery, this means that a cache may not provide a service
if paid in advance, or alternatively, a publisher may not pay after having its clients
served. Moreover, there is the risk of service noncompliance, where a cache may
deliver corrupted content while collecting full payments, or may not commit to the
service amount and quality a publisher is anticipating. Therefore, there is a need for
secure service-payment exchange protocols that reduce the risks resulted from this
inevitable type of behavior.
Cache accounting attacks. Another security challenge is that peer-assisted
work models are vulnerable to cache accounting attacks [51,95], in which a cache and
client collude to defraud the content publisher by claiming to have transferred data
(and claiming payment) when no actual work has been done. This is a particular
problem in content distribution applications that do not require subscription fees
from clients, such as ad-funded video streaming [48], or services that allow a client
to play content on multiple devices under one subscription [36], or even in situations
where a client is not interested in the content, e.g., a cache running as a client. This
has been confirmed through several empirical studies. For example, Lian et al. [95]
showed that such a collusion case allowed malicious parties in the Maze file sharing
system to collect incentive scores for free. In addition, Aditya et al. [51] documented
how a small number of colluding peers can cause significant log inaccuracies in the
Akamai Netsession interface.
Although some defenses against these attacks have been proposed [51, 113], they
do not work in typical peer-to-peer scenarios. This is because they either rely on
service activity logs from the participants themselves [51], which could be fabricated.
Or they require a knowledge of the peer computation power and link latency [113],
information that could be hard to obtain or estimate. Supporting a a P2P-based con-
tent distribution service requires an effective defense mechanism that lets untrusted,
3
anonymous nodes serve as caches.
Micropayments. Given that peer-assisted models rely on the collaborative work
of mutually-untrusted parties, micropayments (or payments in pennies) are usually
used to compensate for the service. This payment paradigm provides a great deal
of flexibility for clients who may switch servers or stop a service at anytime. It also
reduces the financial risks of the service-payment exchange process. That is, a server
loses only a small amount of money if a client does not pay for the service, and vice
versa.
However, processing these small payments individually is problematic. It can be
expensive due to high transaction fees that may exceed the few pennies received. For
example, the average base cost of a debit or credit card transaction in the US is around
21 to 24 cents, and 23 to 42 cents, respectively [19,20]. In cryptocurrencies such a fee
could be even higher, e.g., around $1 in Bitcoin as of mid April 2018 [16]. Beside this
financial drawback, handling micropayments individually can impose a huge workload
on the system, and may explode the payment log needed for accountability purposes.
Probabilistic micropayment schemes have emerged as a potential solution to ad-
dress these problems [99, 114, 115, 129]. In these models, payments take the form of
lottery tickets that are exchanged locally between parties, and only winning tickets
can be redeemed for currency. This reduces the number of processed transactions in
the system. Unfortunately, these older solutions rely on a trusted party to audit the
lottery and manage payments. Such a centralized approach may increase the deploy-
ment cost and limit the use of the payment service to systems of fully authenticated
participants [70].
Newer, fully distributed, solutions emerged by utilizing cryptocurrencies [70,111],
where they replaced the trusted party with the miners, and exploited the blockchain to
provide public verifiability of system operation. Yet, these decentralized approaches
force a payer to issue micropayments sequentially using the same escrow, which means
that a new ticket cannot be issued until it is confirmed that the previous one did
not win. In addition, these schemes rely on computationally-heavy cryptographic
primitives [70,111], and several rounds of communication to exchange payments [70].
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Consequently, there is still a need for a decentralized scheme that supports concurrent
micropayments at lower computational and bandwidth overhead. This is particularly
important in online content delivery services that may not tolerate high delays.
Handling these, and many other issues, in an efficient way is a pre-requisite for
any practical deployment of a fully decentralized CDN service.
1.2 Limitations of Existing Solutions
Several systems have exploited the idea of exchanging bandwidth for rewards to en-
courage peer availability and the honest work, e.g., KARMA [126], Floodgate [106],
Dandelion [120], and Hincent [93]. Unfortunately, these systems have several draw-
backs that have hindered their adoption in practice. Floodgate [106] and Dande-
lion [120] assume that content publishers are trusted entities to mediate service-
payment exchanges between peers and track payments. Hincent [93] is a centralized
system that relies on a trusted CDN node to register all peers, track payments, and
solve disputes. While KARMA [126] is fully distributed, it requires the exchange
of large number of messages to confirm a payment or content delivery. As a re-
sult, it incurs large delays and bandwidth overhead. Furthermore, KARMA does
not allow publishers to sponsor content retrieval for their clients, where the clients
themselves have to pay for the service. In other words, it does not support the gen-
eral work paradigm of CDNs where publishers pay caches for the distribution service,
and clients need only to deal with the publisher for any financial obligations (e.g.,
subscription fees), if any.
The evolution of cryptocurrencies [107, 131] offers a potential solution for prac-
tical, decentralized, and trustless services. As mentioned previously, this is done by
providing a distributed service on top of the currency exchange medium that cryp-
tocurrencies manage. Systems related to our work include:
• Decentralized data and file storage services, such as Storj [130] and Filecoin [49].
Although these systems allow customers to retrieve the stored files, they do not
allow publishers to sponsor the retrieval service for their clients.
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• Generalized bandwidth exchange systems, such as Torcoin [79] and Mys-
terium [35]. The former rewards end users for providing their bandwidth to
serve as relays in the Tor network, while the latter rewards the users who pro-
vide a virtual private network (VPN) service for others. These more general
solutions do not specifically target content distribution. As a result, they do
not provide tailored mechanisms for publishers to form CDNs or sponsor the
content retrieval process for their clients.
• Distributed CDN services, which to the best of our knowledge, currently include
only two systems, Gringotts [81] and NOIA [38]. Though these schemes come
the closest to the system we propose, neither is fully decentralized. Gringotts
still requires the intervention of a trusted traditional CDN node to defend
against cache accounting attacks, and the current implementation of NOIA
relies on a centralized cloud controller to authorize content managing entities.
In addition, NOIA rewards caches based on activity reports from caches and
clients without any defense against cache accounting attacks.
CacheCash attempts to address the aforementioned limitations by, first, being
a fully decentralized and trustless system. Publishers manage their caches without
any help from any trusted entity, and a distributed cryptocurrency system is used to
handle payments. Second, CacheCash defends against cache accounting attacks in a
fully decentralized way. Third, it supports a single goal of providing a CDN service.
Hence, CacheCash allows publishers to sponsor the content delivery service for their
clients, and its tools are customized based on the security and performance issues in
CDNs.
The differences between CacheCash and the systems listed above are summarized
in Table 1.1. Note that all systems that assume trusted publishers, or these that
do not allow sponsoring the retrieval service, do not suffer from cache accounting
attacks (for this, they have “N/A” in the table). Furthermore, some systems provide
bandwidth incentives, where the credit a peer collects can be exchanged for bandwidth
service only. Others provide monetary incentives, while some systems support hybrid
incentive model, both bandwidth, if a peer can reciprocate the service for the one
6

















KARMA [126] X X X Band-
width
7 N/A
Floodgate [106] X X 7 Monetary X N/A
Dandelion [120] X X 7 Hybrid X N/A
Hincent [93] X 7 X Hybrid X N/A
Storj [130] and
Filecoin [49]
7 X X Monetary 7 N/A
Torcoin [79] and
Mysterium [35]
7 X X Monetary 7 N/A
Gringotts [81] X Partial X Monetary X Requires a
trusted CDN
node
NOIA [38] X Partial X Monetary X 7
CacheCash X X X Monetary X X
providing content, and monetary, if no reciprocation is available.
1.3 Thesis Statement
Given the usefulness and advantages of decentralized CDN services, and the limita-
tions of existing solutions, more efforts are needed in order to develop secure, efficient,
and cost-effective systems. These systems need to address the previously mentioned
security and performance challenges. Towards this end, the thesis statement of this
dissertation can be formulated as follows.
Goal: Building a content distribution service that can supply to any client a
copy of the requested content that is identical to the one owned by the publisher.
Such a service needs to enable publishers to form dynamic networks of caches without
involving any trusted entity, and to sponsor content retrieval for their clients. The
developed system should reward any cache with the promised payment for the service
requests it handles, and ensure that every cache has earned its payments.
Non-goal: Several design issues related to CDN services are outside the scope
of this work. These include digital rights management, preserving clients’ privacy,
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optimizing cache selection when handling content requests, optimizing cache man-
agement, i.e., how content is distributed among caches, and supporting variable data
chunk size and variable cache set size during the content distribution process. Ad-
dressing these issues while preserving the low overhead of CacheCash is part of our
future work.
1.4 Contributions
To fulfill our thesis statement, we propose CacheCash, a cryptocurrency-based decen-
tralized content distribution network designed to address the challenges listed in Sec-
tion 1.1 and the limitations of existing solutions discussed in Section 1.2. CacheCash
bypasses the centralized approach of CDN companies for one in which end users
organically set up new caches in exchange for cryptocurrency tokens. Thus, it cre-
ates a fully distributed and trustless bandwidth market that enables publishers to
hire caches on an as-needed basis, without constraining these parties with long-term
business commitments.
In order to support such a flexible service model, CacheCash introduces a novel
service-payment exchange protocol that reduces the risks of dealing with distrusted
parties in P2P networks. This protocol utilizes gradual content disclosure and partial
payment collection to encourage honest collaboration between peers. This is achieved
by devising CAPnet, a defense against cache accounting attacks, and a highly efficient
probabilistic micropayment scheme, MicroCash, to permit fine-grained monetary re-
wards for caches at a low overhead. CacheCash’s service-payment exchange protocol
combines CAPnet and a modified version of MicroCash to ensure that caches earn
their payments, and that publishers compensate for the service properly. The security
of this protocol, which is guided by a thorough threat model built using our frame-
work ABC, is enforced using both cryptographic approaches and rational financial
incentives that make honesty the most profitable option.
In summary, the contributions of this dissertation include the following:
• We propose ABC (Chapter 2), an asset-based cryptocurrency-focused threat
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modeling framework that is capable of identifying the complex collusion cases
and new threat vectors that cryptocurrencies introduce. Its design is moti-
vated by the observation that traditional threat modeling frameworks do not
fit cryptocurrencies, thus leaving them vulnerable to unanticipated attacks.
• We conduct a user study to evaluate ABC against the popular threat modeling
framework STRIDE [88]. We show how generalized threat models that are not
designed for large-scale distributed systems, and do not consider the attacker’s
financial motivations or possible collusion between these attackers, could cause
analysts to overlook serious threats to the system.
• We apply ABC to real world systems including two of our designs (MicroCash
and CacheCash), in addition to Bitcoin [107] and Filecoin [49]. These use cases
attest to the usefulness of ABC’s tools as they integrated well into CacheCash’s
and MicroCash’s design phases, and they revealed several missing threat sce-
narios in the public design of Filecoin.
• We propose CAPnet (Chapter 3), the first technique that lets untrusted caches,
such as peers with unknown computational and latency characteristics, join a
peer-assisted CDN while providing a bound on the effectiveness of accounting
attacks. Our key innovation is a lightweight cache accountability puzzle that
clients must solve before caches are given credit. The puzzle solution serves
as a content retrieval confirmation to assure publishers that the claimed data
transfer has taken place.
• We analyze the security of CAPnet, showing how to configure the system pa-
rameters to make honesty the most profitable option. We also evaluate its
performance and demonstrate how the setup of the design parameters affect
the productivity of content distribution.
• We introduce MicroCash (Chapter 4), the first decentralized probabilistic
framework that supports concurrent micropayments using a single escrow and
at a fast rate. MicroCash allows payment exchange using a single round of com-
munication, and features a lightweight lottery protocol, requiring only hashing,
to aggregate the small payments.
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• We derive a lower bound for the payment escrow a payer needs in MicroCash
to cover all payments with probability 1−  (for some small ). We also derive
a lower bound for the penalty deposit needed to deter cheating using a game
theoretic analysis.
• We evaluate the performance of MicroCash in comparison to MICROPAY [110]
(a sequential probabilistic micropayment scheme). We show how concurrency
reduces the amount of data logged on the blockchain, and how the lightweight
design of our scheme optimizes the payment processing rate.
• We combine the previous techniques to secure the service-payment exchange
process used in CacheCash (Chapter 5). We cover both the service setup and
content distribution phases. These involve how publishers can form dynamic
CDNs in the system, how caches can join these CDNs, and how client requests
are handled to deliver the desired content.
• We devise a unique way to compute a cache payment value in order to minimize
any losses potentially caused by cheating, and to stabilize the work relation
between a cache and a publisher. Instead of collecting one lottery ticket per
data chunk served, CacheCash divides this payment into two tickets that are
collected at two stages. One when the chunk is served and one when this chunk
is proved to be correct. CacheCash ties the currency value of both tickets
together and makes it accumulate over time as the cache continues working
with the same publisher.
• We present a thorough game theory analysis of the financial defenses that
CacheCash adopts. This involves configuring the payment function used to
reward caches, and devising mechanism to be used by caches to prioritize client
traffic and select which publisher to work with in the system.
• We derive a lower bound for the payment escrow a publisher needs in
CacheCash, under the two-ticket model, and a lower bound for the penalty
deposit needed in this modified model.
• We evaluate the performance of CacheCash by conducting benchmarks to
demonstrate the efficiency gain of the various performance optimization tech-
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niques adopted in the system.
1.5 Dissertation Roadmap
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces ABC, in-
cluding its design, a user study-based evaluation of its effectiveness, and a set of of
real-world use cases. Next, our defense mechanism against cache accounting attacks,
CAPnet, is presented in Chapter 3, along with a detailed analysis of its security and
performance benchmarks. Chapter 4 introduces our low-overhead and concurrent
micropayment scheme, MicroCash. This covers the system design, analyzing its se-
curity, and deriving bounds for the escrow balances needed for payment and penalty
deposits, in addition to a thorough evaluation of the system efficiency. CacheCash,
the core of this dissertation, is presented in Chapter 5 showing how it utilizes ABC
to identify the impactfull threat cases, integrates CAPnet and a modified version of
MicroCash in its service-payment exchange process, and secures the system operation
using both cryptographic and financial techniques. Finally, this dissertation concludes
in Chapter 6, where we discuss future directions to address more performance and
security challenges in distributed CDNs.
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Chapter 2
ABC: A Cryptocurrency-Focused Threat Modeling
Framework
This chapter is based on joint work with Allison Bishop and Justin Cappos [53, 54].
2.1 Overview
Despite the many advantages they offer — decentralization, transparency, and low-
ered service costs — there is still a big gap between the promise of cryptocurrencies
and their performance in practice. A major stumbling block is the perception that
these systems are not secure, and the large number of security breaches announced in
the past few years give credence to these doubts [14,15,17,28,43,45,46]. Therefore, a
better understanding of the security of cryptocurrencies is needed in order to ensure
their safe deployment in emerging applications.
The best practice for designing a secure system requires a threat modeling step
to investigate potential security risks. Such a model can guide system designers in
deploying the proper countermeasures, and assessing the security level of a system.
Although threat modeling has been thoroughly studied in the literature, existing
paradigms primarily target software applications [88] or distributed systems that have
a small number of participant types [105]. These techniques were not designed to be
scalable for a set of diverse, mutually distrustful parties as found in cryptocurrencies.
Such systems, especially these providing distributed services, consist of parties that
play different roles (miners, clients, and different types of servers), and an attacker
may control any subset of these parties. Adding to the complexity, the attacker may
seek to target any role in the system and may launch a diverse array of attacks with
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different intended outcomes. The complexity of reasoning about and managing threat
cases becomes unwieldy as these sets grow.
To address these issues, we propose ABC, an Asset-Based Cryptocurrency-focused
threat modeling framework. ABC introduces a novel technique, called a collusion ma-
trix, that allows users to investigate the full threat space and manage its complexity.
A collusion matrix is a comprehensive threat enumeration tool that directly addresses
collusion by accounting for all possible sets of attacker and target parties. ABC helps
in reducing the combinatorial growth of these cases by ruling out irrelevant ones
and merging threat cases that have the same effect. Such explicit consideration of
attacker collusion is particularly important in permissionless cryptocurrencies that
allow anyone to join.
ABC’s models are also tailored to better consider the threat domain of cryp-
tocurrencies. This is done by introducing new threat categories that account for the
financial motivations of attackers and the new asset types, i.e., critical system compo-
nents, these systems introduce. ABC identifies these categories by listing the assets
in a system, such as the blockchain and the peer-to-peer network, and outlining the
secure behavior of each asset. Then, the threat categories are defined as any viola-
tion of the security requirements for these assets. This approach produces a series of
system-specific threat classes as opposed to an a priori-fixed list of generalized ones.
Another feature of ABC is acknowledging that financial incentives and economic
analysis can play major roles in other steps in the design process. These tools can
be used in risk assessment and in mitigating some types of attacks that cannot be
neutralized cryptographically.
To demonstrate the framework’s effectiveness, we conducted a user study and
prepared use cases. The study compared the performance of subjects in building
threat models using ABC and the popular framework STRIDE. Among the obtained
results, we found that around 71% of those who applied ABC were able to identify
financial threats in a cryptocurrency system, as compared to less than 13% of those
applying STRIDE. In addition, while none of the STRIDE session participants spot-
ted collusion between attackers, around 46% of those who used ABC identified these
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scenarios. For the use cases, we applied ABC to three real-world systems, including
Bitcoin, Filecoin, and CacheCash. These cases attest to the usefulness of ABC’s tools
where they integrated well into CacheCash’s design phase, and they revealed several
missing threat scenarios in the public design of Filecoin. These findings confirm the
potential of ABC as an effective tool for assessing and improving the security of
cryptocurrency-based systems.
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we summarize some prior work done around threat modeling.
We also highlight relevant works on threat identification and security analysis in
cryptocurrencies.
Threat modeling frameworks. The STRIDE framework, developed by Microsoft
as part of its Security Development Lifecycle (SDL), is one of the earliest and most
popular works in this field [88, 123]. STRIDE is an acronym of the threat categories
the framework covers, namely, Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information dis-
closure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege. This framework is a multistep
procedure that involves understanding the software application functionality, captur-
ing its operation flow using data flow diagrams (DFDs), mapping the components of
these DFDs to the threat categories mentioned previously, and employing threat tree
patterns to derive concrete threat cases.
Though several solutions have extended STRIDE to accommodate more complex
systems [105], and cover other security requirements, e.g., privacy [73], its model
does not fit cryptocurrencies. Another study [125] has borne out this premise, where
the authors extended STRIDE’s threat categories to handle Bitcoin-like community
currencies. However, their approach targets only community fund operation, where
more modifications would be needed to handle other components of the currency
exchange medium, and other types of distributed services.
Other paradigms have pursued slightly different approaches. KAOS [124] is a
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goal-oriented requirements engineering framework that has been extended to cover
security. ANOA [63] is a generic framework to define and analyze anonymity of
communication networks. And the framework presented in [87] targets the secure
design of data routing protocols. Finally, other works build specialized threat models
for specific classes of distributed systems, e.g., storage systems [84] and virtual
directory services [71], rather than introducing a framework. These works indicate
that different types of systems have different requirements when performing threat
modeling. This reinforces the idea that emerging systems, such as cryptocurrencies,
need specialized threat modeling tools.
Security analysis of cryptocurrencies. Most of the work done so far in this
category can be divided into two classes. The first formalizes the security properties of
consensus protocols and blockchains [110], while the second discusses specific security
attacks on cryptocurrencies. For example, in a series of studies on Bitcoin, Bonneau et
al. [67] presents several security threats, Karame et al. [91] analyzes double spending
in fast payments, Androulaki et al. [58] evaluates its anonymity property, and Gervais
et al. [78] studies how tampering with the delivery of blocks and transactions affects
the participants view of the blockchain. Work on other cryptocurrencies include Luu
et al. [96, 97], who focus on security threats to smart contracts in Ethereum [131],
while Sanchez et al. [103, 104] analyze the security of Ripple [40] and the linkability
of wallets and transactions in its network.
While these attack descriptions are very useful, they only outline specific threat
scenarios for a given system. Our goal, however, is to develop a framework that
allows reasoning about the full set of potential attacks facing any cryptocurrency-
based system.
2.3 Stepping through the ABC Framework
Having highlighted the need for a cryptocurrency-specific threat modeling framework,
we now present the ABC model. As a systematized approach, applying ABC starts
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by understanding the functionality of the system under design with a focus on its
asset types and the financial motivations of the participants (Section 2.3.1). This
is followed by identifying the impactful threat categories and mapping them to the
system assets (Section 2.3.2). After that, ABC directs system designers to extract
concrete attack scenarios using a new tool called a collusion matrix, which helps in
exploring and analyzing the full threat space (Section 2.3.3). Lastly, ABC acknowl-
edges that financial incentives affect other design steps including risk assessment and
threat mitigation (Section 2.3.4).
To make the discussion easier to follow, we illustrate the ABC process by de-
scribing its application to the following simplified system, which was inspired by
Golem [27]:
CompuCoin is a cryptocurrency that provides a distributed computation outsourc-
ing service. Parties with excessive CPU power may join the system as servers to
perform computations on demand for others. Clients submit computation jobs to
servers, wait for the results and proofs of correctness, and then pay these servers
cryptocurrency tokens. The mining process in CompuCoin is tied to the amount of
service provided to the system. That is, the probability of selecting a server to mine
the next block on the blockchain is proportional to the amount of computation it has
performed during a specific period.
The full threat model of CompuCoin is available online [2]. Several excerpts from
this model are embedded in the discussion of ABC steps that follows.
2.3.1 System Model Characterization
Understanding the system is an essential step in the threat modeling process. A
misleading or incomplete system description can lead a designer to overlook serious
threats and/or incorporate irrelevant ones. Therefore, an accurate system model
must outline the use scenarios of the system, the assumptions on which it relies,
and any dependencies on external services. In addition, this model must be aware
of all participant roles, and any possible motivation they might have to attack the
system. For the latter, evaluators need to consider how the financial interests of these
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Figure 2.1: System model characterization of CompuCoin.
participants shape their behaviors.
Moreover, a system model must define the critical components that need to be
protected from attackers. These components represent the assets that would compro-
mise the whole system if compromised. To capture the features of the system, ABC
identifies these assets based on its functionality. In detail, ABC divides the system
into modules, and labels the valuable components of each module as assets, which
could be concrete or abstract resources [105]. For example, the blockchain and the
currency can be considered concrete assets, while preserving user privacy would be
an abstract asset.
Finally, a system model includes graphic illustrations of its work flow. For dis-
tributed systems, it is useful to draw network models [105], in which system modules
are represented by graphs showing all participants, assets, and the interactions be-
tween them. These graphs are helpful when enumerating the concrete threat scenarios
as we will see in Section 2.3.3.
Running example application. Figure 2.1 illustrates how this step would look
in CompuCoin. It shows the various components of the system model, in addition to
a network model of the computation outsourcing service. It should be noted that the
asset list in this figure is not exhaustive, and is limited by the rather brief description
provided for CompuCoin.
As shown in the figure, CompuCoin is open to all participants to join as clients and
servers, with servers also filling the role of miners. Dependency on other systems may
include reliance on a verifiable outsourcing computation protocol, e.g. [109]. In terms
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of assets, one may define three in CompuCoin: the Service promised to clients, the
Payments used to compensate for the service, and the Currency Exchange Medium
that covers four sub-assets (in light of the extended review of Bitcoin [67]): the
blockchain, currency, transactions, and the communication network that connects
the parties together. Here one may merge the currency with the transactions in one
asset, as transactions are usually the currency tokens that state the coin’s ownership.
Another option is to merge currency with the payment asset to cover all currency
flow in the system. However, we believe that a fine-grained division provides a more
comprehensive treatment when identifying threats.
2.3.2 Threat Category Identification
After understanding the system model, the next step is to identify the broad threat
categories that must be investigated. For each system component, system analysts
outline all threat classes that may apply. Here ABC steps away from conventional
practice of using an a priori-fixed list, and instead uses an adaptive approach in-
spired from requirements engineering [73] that defines threats as violations of system
security goals. Given that assets are the target of security breaches, ABC defines
these threat classes as violations of asset security requirements. This allows deriving
cryptocurrency-specific threat categories because ABC identifies the assets in a way
that aligns with the functionality of these systems.
Accordingly, in this step, an evaluator examines each asset in the system and
applies the following procedure to identify its threat classes:
• Define what constitutes secure behavior for the asset, and use that knowledge
to derive its security requirements. These requirements include all conditions
that, if met, would render the asset secure. For example, CompuCoin’s servers
provide a computation outsourcing service and collect payments in return. One
may consider the service payment asset secure if: a) servers are rewarded prop-
erly for their work, and b) that they earned the payments they collected.
• Define the threat categories of an asset as violations of its security require-
ments. Tying this to the above example, the service payment asset would have
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Table 2.1: CompuCoin threat categories.
Asset Security Threat Category
Service
Service corruption (provide corrupted service for clients).
Denial of service (make the service unavailable to legitimate users).
Information disclosure (service content/related data are public).
Repudiation (the server can deny a service it delivered).
Service Service slacking (a server collects payments without performing all the promisedwork).
payments Service theft (a client obtains correct service for a lower payment than the agreed
upon amount).
Blockchain
Inconsistency (honest miners hold copies of the blockchain that may differ beyond
the unconfirmed blocks).
Invalid blocks adoption (the blockchain contains invalid blocks that does not
follow the system specifications).
Biased mining (a miner pretends to expend the needed resources for mining to
be elected to extend the blockchain).
Transactions
Repudiation (an attacker denies issuing transactions).
Tampering (an attacker manipulates the transactions in the system).
Deanonymization (an attacker exploits transaction linkability and violates users’
anonymity).
Currency Currency theft (an attacker steals currency from others in the system).
Network Denial of service (interrupt the operation of the underlying network).
the following threat classes: service slacking, where a server collects payments
without performing all the promised work, and service theft, where a client
obtains service for a lower payment than the agreed upon amount.
The previous steps are highly dependent on how system analysts define the se-
curity properties of an asset, especially if there is no agreed-upon definition in the
literature. For example, several works studied the security of the blockchain [67,110].
Yet, there is no unified security notion for the service asset because each type may
have different requirements.
Running example application. Applying this step to CompuCoin produced
the threat categories listed in Table 2.1 (the detailed process can be found in Ap-
pendix A). We found this table useful when building threat models for all the use
cases found in Section 2.5, where we mapped the listed categories to the assets in each
system. In this process, we found that some threat types were not applicable due to
the absence of some assets. Notably, Bitcoin’s only assets are the ones related to the
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currency exchange medium. On the other hand, some systems required replicating
some of these categories among all instances of an asset, e.g., in Filecoin all service
asset threats were replicated for the two service types this system provides, namely,
file storage and retrieval. This shows how the system characteristics affect the threat
category identification step in ABC.
2.3.3 Threat Scenario Enumeration and Reduction
Once the threat categories have been identified, the next step is to enumerate concrete
attack scenarios under each threat type. It is important in this step to be as compre-
hensive as possible by considering all potential attackers, target parties, and the set
of actions attackers may follow to achieve their goals. This also involves considering
collusion cases where several attackers may cooperate on attacking the system.
Detecting collusion is particularly important in cryptocurrencies. This is because
the presence of monetary incentives may motivate attackers to collude in more ways
than traditional distributed systems. The popular centralization problem caused
by mining pools attests to this fact, where these pools can collude and perform
devastating attacks. Even miners may collude by accepting, or rejecting, updates on
the network protocol which leads to hard forks in the system. ABC enables system
designers to detect these, and other, collusion cases at early stages of the system
design.
To achieve this, ABC introduces collusion matrices that instruct analysts to enu-
merate all potential collusion cases, and reason about the feasibility of all threat
scenarios in the system. A collusion matrix is two-dimensional, with the rows rep-
resenting potential attackers and the columns representing the target parties. For
the rows we list all participant roles in the system, both individually and in every
possible combination. We also add a category called “external” that represents all
entities outside the system. The same is done for the columns, with the exception
that “external” is excluded. By definition, an external party is not part of the system,
and hence, can not be a target. Each cell in these matrices represents a potential
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Figure 2.2: Collusion matrix of service theft threat in CompuCoin.
An example of a collusion matrix for the service theft threat in CompuCoin is
shown in Figure 2.2. The dashed ellipse in the accompanying network model encloses
a service session, which is an interaction between a server and a client. Any entry
with multiple parties on the attacker side in this matrix indicates collusion. Note
that a participant label may represent slightly different roles depending on where it
is placed. For example, in Figure 2.2 the label “server” on the target side corresponds
to a single server (i.e., Bob) since a service session involves only one server. However,
the label “server” on the attacker side represents all servers in the system, including
Bob. Hence, the cell in grey shade in Figure 2.2 does not suggest that a server colludes
to attack itself, but instead, it represents the case where other servers collude with
Alice against Bob.
For each threat category mapped to the assets in the system, a separate collusion
matrix is created and analyzed as follows:
1) Enumeration: In this step, system analysts examine each cell and enumerate
all strategies that attackers can use against the target parties, while documenting
the process. It is useful to consider the network model of the system components as
they show the interactions between the participants and the system assets.
2) Reduction: While examining each cell, system analysts reduce the number of
threat cases by:
• Eliminating cells representing scenarios that will not produce a threat to the
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system and recording the rationale for elimination. For example, in Figure 2.2,
the cells that have the client as a target are irrelevant to the service theft threat.
This is because a client does not provide a service to others. Other cases can
also be crossed out if they are neutralized by system assumptions or by early
design choices. For example, requiring all transactions to be signed by their
originators rules out transaction repudiation and tampering attacks.
• Merging together scenarios (and the corresponding cells) that have the same
effect, or those that do not become stronger with collusion. For example, in
Figure 2.2, the grey shaded cell in which Alice is colluding with other servers
to avoid paying Bob is reduced to the case that Alice is a sole attacker. This
is because only Alice pays for the service she receives from Bob, whereas other
servers are not part of the protocol1.
3) Documentation: System analysts should document all threat scenarios that
remain after the reduction step. That is, each documented case should outline
the attack description, the target asset(s), the attacker(s), the flow of actions, all
preconditions that make the attack feasible, and the reasons behind merges and
deletions (if any).
The overall number of matrices and the size of each matrix depend on the system
parameters, such as number of participant roles and assets. The above reduction
steps eliminates a substantial number of cells in a principled way, which saves time
and effort.
Running example application. The CompuCoin threat model has 11 collusion
matrices [2]. We present one of them here; the service theft threat collusion matrix as
illustrated in Figure 2.3. As shown, 21 cells can be reduced to just 2 threat scenarios
(merged and ruled-out cells are displayed in pink and black shades, respectively). In
this matrix, ten cases have been ruled out. This includes all cells under the column
with the “client” header, for the reasons explained previously, and the first three
1The case that these clients drop/withhold these payments in collusion with Alice is part of
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Figure 2.3: Analyzing service theft matrix in CompuCoin.
cells under the column with the “server” header. This is because “external” and/or
“server” cannot be attackers because they do not ask/pay for the service2.
Ten other merged cases are shown in Figure 2.3. This includes all cells under
the column with the “client and server” header, which are reduced to attacking only
servers. This is again because clients do not serve others. The rest of the merges
cover the last three cells in the column with the “Server” header. In these cells, a
client is colluding with an external entity and/or other servers to make the target
server lose payments. Such collusion will not make a client stronger (these parties
can drop/withhold payments, however, this is covered under DoS threat). Hence, all
these cells are reduced to the case of a solo client attacker.
2.3.4 Risk Assessment and Threat Mitigation
The outcome of the threat modeling process, i.e., the documented list of impactful
threat cases, can provide the designers with a guiding map to secure the system.
During this process, it is useful to prioritize threats based on the amount of damage
they can cause. This falls under the purview of risk management, a separate task from
threat modeling, carried out using frameworks like DREAD [88] or OCTAVE [52].
ABC integrates with risk management by leveraging existing techniques for threat
2One may say that an external may join the system as a client to perform the attack. This case
is covered under the client role in the matrix.
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mitigation. For example, many threat vectors can be addressed using rational finan-
cial incentives that are often called detect-and-punish mechanisms. That is, when
a cheating incident is detected, the miners punish the attacker financially. These
approaches can use a game theoretic approach [122] to set the design parameters in
a way that makes cheating unprofitable compared to acting honestly. By modeling
interactions between the players as an economic game, the financial gain of all player
strategies can be computed. Then, the parameters are configured to make honest be-
haviors more profitable than cheating. The same procedure can be used to quantify
the damage these financial threats may cause. In other words, a threat that could
give the attacker a big payoff should be prioritized over a threat that yields minimal
profits. This reinforces the idea that cryptocurrencies require an expanded model for
exploring risks and countering them.
Running example application. To illustrate this step in CompuCoin, we con-
sider the distilled threat scenarios found in Figure 2.3. Both threats can be neutralized
financially by designing proper techniques to make the client lock the payments in an
escrow, along with a penalty deposit. The client loses the latter if he should cheat,
perhaps by issuing invalid payments that carry his signature. The penalty deposit
amount can be computed as the maximum payoff a client may obtain by cheating.
This makes cheating less profitable than honesty, and hence, unappealing to rational
clients.
2.4 Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of ABC, we set up an empirical experiment that com-
pares how it performs against STRIDE [88], a widely used threat modeling framework.
We chose STRIDE for this comparison because it is a popular example of the type
of a model a system designer will turn to in the absence of a cryptocurrency-specific
framework [125]. The experiment took the form of a user study in which participants
were asked to build threat models for a simple cryptocurrency system using one of
these two frameworks. As our primary goal was to test whether financial incentives
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and collusion could influence the type of threats discovered, our evaluation focuses
on answering the following questions:
1. Does a threat modeling framework affect how subjects characterize a system
model?
2. Do the threat categories of each framework influence the broad threat classes
identified by the subjects?
3. Do participants build more accurate threat models when using ABC than when
using STRIDE?
4. Do participants find the ABC/STRIDE method easy to use in completing the
study?
In what follows, we discuss the study methodology and some of the insights drawn
from the findings.
2.4.1 Methodology
We recruited 53 participants, primarily masters students in systems security pro-
grams. We used five subjects as a pilot group to test and refine our materials. The
remaining 48 participants were divided randomly into two groups of 24, one of which
built the threat model with STRIDE, whereas the other used ABC.
Each testing session spanned three hours and was divided into two parts: a group
tutorial and individual completion of threat models. The group tutorial started with
a 20 minute overview of cryptocurrencies, followed by a one-hour training in the
framework to apply. The ABC tutorial contained a summary of the steps found
in this paper, and for STRIDE, we prepared a tutorial based on material found
in [32, 73, 88, 123]. The participants were then given a 25 minute break to reduce
any fatigue effects. The session resumed with a 15 minute overview of ArchiveCoin,
the system for which subjects will build a threat model. ArchiveCoin is a simplified
Filecoin [49]-inspired cryptocurrency system that focuses mainly on the service and
its rewards in order to fit the study session period.
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The individual completion of threat models spanned the remaining hour of the
study session. Given that the allocated time was short, we asked the subjects to look
into just one threat category in Step 3, namely, the service theft of file retrieval. This
category was not used in the clarifying examples of the tutorials to avoid biasing the
results. Participants performed Steps 1 and 2 (system model characterization and
threat category identification), and then submitted their answers. Only at this point
were they given the materials for Step 3, in which they were asked to elicit threat
scenarios for service theft of file retrieval. This was done so that participants who
missed this threat when answering Step 2 could not alter their responses. At the
end, the participants were asked to fill out a short questionnaire in which they rated
how easy or hard it was to apply the threat modeling framework they employed. Our
study instrument and all supporting materials are available online [2].
2.4.2 Findings
In this section, we discuss the main results produced by the study.
Effect on the System Model Characterization Step
In the first step of each threat modeling framework, the subjects were asked to charac-
terize the system model by defining its modules, its assets, and the participant roles,
in addition to drawing either a network model of the system, in case of ABC, or a
data flow diagram (DFD), in case of STRIDE. To quantify the influence of the frame-
work on this step, we compute the subject scores based on reference threat models we
built for ArchiveCoin3. We report these scores after normalization, meaning that we
divide them by the maximum score value one may obtain when answering everything
correctly.
The results for Step 1 are found in Figure 2.44. As shown, ABC scored higher
3We built two reference models, one using STRIDE and one using ABC to evaluate the responses
of each framework session. Nonetheless, both models produced the same list of elicited threat cases
in the last step.
4This figure is a box plot [21], which displays the distribution of the data points by showing the
maximum and minimum (the whiskers above and below the box), the median (horizontal line inside
the box), and the data points that span the first to third quartiles (the box itself). In case most of
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Figure 2.4: Subject scores for Step 1. Diamonds indicate the mean.
than STRIDE, with total average values of 0.92 and 0.69, respectively. Analyzing the
responses for the sub-steps in Step 1 revealed several interesting observations. The
first one is related to identifying the financial assets and modules in the system. As the
figure shows, several subjects who applied STRIDE did not identify the payments (or
currency) as an asset. Instead, their focus was on the user files stored in the system.
Similarly, most of them did not identify the payment process as a system module, and
focused only on file storage and retrieval processes. On the other hand, most of the
subjects in the ABC session identified these financial related assets and modules, as
reflected in the lower average scores of STRIDE participants reported in Figure 2.4,
and the frequency results found in Figure 2.5. These results indicate that employing
conventional threat modeling frameworks, instead of ones that are customized for
monetary-incentivized systems, could lead evaluators to neglect the financial aspects
of the system. This, in turn, could cause evaluators to miss important threat cases,
and thus, leave the system vulnerable to attacks.
The second observation is related to how subjects defined the participant roles
in the system. As shown in Figure 2.4, STRIDE achieved an average score of 1
in this category as compared to only 0.89 for ABC. All STRIDE session subjects
defined the participant roles correctly, which in that model, included only clients
these points are very close this box is suppressed into a line.
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Figure 2.5: Identifying payment related modules and assets.
and servers. For ABC, we mentioned in its tutorial that an “external” entity must
be considered among the participant roles. Yet, not all the subjects in the ABC
session recorded the “external” role in their responses. This points to an important
observation. Evaluators may only consider insider attackers because they interact
with the system, and forget that external entities could be also motivated to, and
capable of, an attack. Considering external attackers affects not only the eliciting of
concrete threat scenarios in Step 3, but also the identification of the threat categories
in Step 2. Therefore, more emphasis need to be placed on this role early on in the
threat modeling process.
Lastly, the third observation is related to the framework influence on how sub-
jects represented the system modules graphically. Figure 2.4 shows that the average
scores for the network model/DFD sub-step were found to be 0.98 and 0.44 for ABC
and STRIDE, respectively. STRIDE session subjects struggled to draw a DFD for
ArchiveCoin because such a representation is more suitable for software applications
than distributed systems. On the other hand, ABC’s use of network models made
this task easier for its session subjects, and almost all of them sketched diagrams
correctly. As mentioned previously, this graphic representation helps in eliciting the
concrete threat scenarios in the system (Step 3), and hence, inaccurate diagrams may

















Figure 2.6: ABC and STRIDE scores for Step 2. Diamonds indicate the mean.
Effect on the Threat Identification Step
In Step 2 of both frameworks, the subjects were asked to define the broad threat
categories to be investigated. As part of the study material, participants who applied
STRIDE were given its threat category list, along with the component mapping table
found in the STRIDE user guide [32]. Similarly, participants who applied ABC were
given the list found in Table 2.1 (covering only the service and service reward assets).
The subjects in both groups defined the categories to be considered for ArchiveCoin
by mapping these lists either to the system assets (in case of ABC), or to the DFD
components (in case of STRIDE). The reference models we built indicated that the
mapping outcome for both frameworks would include the following threat classes:
service corruption, DoS, information disclosure, service slacking and service theft for
both service types that ArchiveCoin provides (file storage and retrieval).
Based on the scores for the threat identification step found in Figure 2.6, the
cryptocurrency-tailored categories of ABC made it easier for the study participants
to identify the threat categories in question as compared to STRIDE. This is de-
spite the subjects having little experience with cryptocurrency-based systems. The
average score for ABC subjects is around 0.51, compared to 0.29 for STRIDE (note
these scores are normalized as mentioned before). The generalized categories used by
STRIDE fit software applications well, but they do not suit monetary-incentivized
distributed systems. System analysts, using these generalized categories, would need
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Figure 2.7: Frequency of threat category identification.
to expend more time and effort in order to identify the more specific threat classes
of interest.
To provide more insights about the effectiveness of the threat categories of each
framework, we analyzed the number of subjects who identified each threat category
as depicted in Figure 2.7. ABC is ahead of STRIDE for all financial-related threats,
i.e., service slacking and theft, as well as the service corruption threat. For the ser-
vice theft of file retrieval threat, which is the category that we asked the participants
to investigate in Step 3, only three participants in the STRIDE session spotted this
threat, while 17 subjects in the ABC session did so, or around 13% and 71%, respec-
tively. For service theft of file storage and slacking of file retrieval, none of STRIDE
participants spotted these threats, and only one participant spotted service slacking
of file storage. In contrast, 67%, 17%, and 50% of ABC participants identified these
threats, respectively. This, again, shows that the ABC categories guided the subjects
toward service and payment related threats in a better way than the general threat
classes included by STRIDE.
For the rest of the threat classes, we found that STRIDE’s subjects are ahead of
ABC’s session participants for both DoS and information disclosure threats. As shown
in Figure 2.7, around 88% and 83% of STRIDE subjects identified these categories,
respectively, while around 50% and 42% of ABC’s subjects did so. Although we do
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not have a precise justification for this outcome, we think that this is due to the fact
that these threats are thoroughly explained in the threat category table of STRIDE,
which includes attack examples as well. Hence, we believe that the ABC tutorial
needs to stress these threats and explain them in greater depth.
Threat Model Accuracy
To quantify accuracy, we compute the recall and precision values for the concrete
threat scenarios found by each subject as compared to the reference threat models we
built for ArchiveCoin. The recall is computed as TP/(TP + FN), and precision is
computed as TP/(TP+FP ), where a true positive TP is a correctly identified threat,
false negative FN is an undetected threat, and false positive FP is an incorrectly
defined threat. The recall (precision) indicates how many valid (invalid) threats a
subject defined. Both quantities take values between 0 and 1.
Based on the results of Step 3 in each framework (i.e., eliciting concrete threat
scenarios), we found that participants who applied ABC produced a larger number
of valid threat cases than STRIDE session subjects, with average recall values of 0.48
and 0.4, respectively. At the same time, participants using ABC identified a lower
number of irrelevant cases than those who applied STRIDE. The former scored an
average precision value of 0.57, as opposed to 0.48 for the latter5. We believe that this
is due to several factors. First, ABC directed participants to consider the financial
aspects of the system, which affected the elicited threat scenarios. Second, the use of
the collusion matrices helped ABC participants to reason about the threat space in an
organized way that reduced random speculations, as opposed to the STRIDE threat
tree patterns that work well when applied to software applications. Third, ABC’s
collusion matrices guided participants to spot threat cases caused by collusion, as
opposed to STRIDE’s tree patterns that focus only on solo attackers. The results
show that none of the subjects in the STRIDE session identified a possible collusion
case between a client and servers, while 11 subjects in the ABC session identified
5One participant in ABC session has 0 false negative and 0 true positive, we excluded him/her





















Figure 2.8: Total normalized scores (diamonds indicate the mean).
this collusion case6. This confirms the importance of considering collusion when
investigating threat cases, and shows the usefulness of ABC matrices in handling this
task.
All these factors affected the overall correctness of the threat models built by
the subjects. As shown in Figure 2.8, the ABC session scored an average of 64% as
compared to 50% for STRIDE. This is expected based on the reported results for the
modeling steps, where ABC scores were ahead of those of STRIDE.
Framework Ease-of-use
As mentioned previously, at the end of each session, we asked participants to re-
port on how easy they found applying the framework in question. Ease-of-use was
measured on a Likert scale in which 1 indicates the lowest value and 5 indicates the
highest value. The average values are 3.9 for ABC and 3.8 for STRIDE7. This result
becomes somewhat more significant when we point out that the participants already
had some exposure to STRIDE and its threat tree patterns. Even though it is a
new framework that introduced several new concepts to the participants, ABC still
achieved a comparable ease of use level. This suggests that participants were able to
6Most of them, however, did not provide a clear description of the attack scenario. Hence, these
incomplete descriptions were not counted as correct threats when grading Step 3.
7Three participants did not complete the questionnaire in the STRIDE session.
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grasp its concepts through just a single hour of training, and therefore ABC shows
potential as a usable method for threat modeling.
2.4.3 Threats to Validity
We acknowledge that a few limitations must be kept in mind when considering the
study results. Empirical studies of threat modeling usually span a longer time frame,
often on the orders of months, e.g., [118]. However, the fact that we were able
to glean several important observations suggest that there may be lessons to be
learned from short focused studies. In addition, we feel the design of our study
might serve as a guide for determining promising areas for extended research before
a large commitment of time and resources is made. Another constraining factor
could be the age and experience level of our subjects. Different responses might have
been obtained if we tested system security experts. However, we believe that the
inexperience of our participants match the cryptocurrency space well, which attracted
users and researchers from various fields, even those from outside systems security.
Therefore, our results give indications on how they might perform when investigating
the security of cryptocurrencies.
2.5 Use Cases
To demonstrate how ABC would function when applied to complex real-world sys-
tems, we developed use cases in which we built threat models for three cryptocurren-
cies. Each of these cryptocurrencies represents a different stage in a system design
lifetime. Bitcoin [107] is a well-established system, Filecoin [49] is under develop-
ment and close to being launched, and our system, CacheCash, is still in its early
development stages. The analyses for Bitcoin and Filecoin stopped before the risk
management/mitigation phase. However, CacheCash’s analysis involves also the risk
mitigation step as we later describe.
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Table 2.2: Threat model comparison.
Aspect Bitcoin Filecoin CacheCash
ABC steps covered Steps 1 - 3 Steps 1 - 3 Steps 1 - 4
Completion time (hr) 10 47 Not tracked
No. of collusion matrices 5 14 9
Total threat cases 105 882 525
Distilled threat scenarios 10 35 22
2.5.1 Bitcoin Analysis (Steps 1-3)
Bitcoin is by far the most valuable cryptocurrency with a capital market share of
around $92 billion as of April 2019 [24]. As shown in Table 2.2, the Bitcoin threat
model has significantly fewer collusion matrices and threat cases than other systems8.
This is because it provides only a currency exchange service, which reduces the num-
ber of assets. Furthermore, it involves only two types of participants, miners and
clients, which reduces the size of the collusion matrices. These factors, in addition
to our familiarity with Bitcoin design details, contributed in reducing the completion
time of Bitcoin’s threat model as shown in the table. Moreover, at the time we were
working on this model, we had already completed the design of ABC. This suggests
that deep understanding of the system model, and the availability of suitable tools
impact not only the accuracy of the results, but also the time and effort expended in
the threat modeling process.
We drew two main observations about the threat model we generated for Bitcoin.
First, all the known threats to Bitcoin, such as double spending, Eclipse attacks [85],
Goldfinger attack [94], and delaying blocks and transaction delivery [78], were mapped
to the collusion matrices produced by ABC. Second, collusion between participants
can play a major role in Bitcoin’s security. That is, several threats are neutralized by
the assumption that at least 50% of the mining power is honest. Yet, mining pools
have been formed to concentrate mining power. At the time of this writing, around
95% of the mining power is in the hands of just 10 mining pools [9]. If the managers
8The full threat model of Bitcoin is available online [2]
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of these pools decide to collude, they could break the honest majority barrier and
take the system down. In fact, serious security attacks can be performed with less
amount of mining power. Sompolinsky et al. [121] attest that a selfish mining attack,
or blocks withholding, in which an attacker controls even less than 30% of the mining
power, would be able to undermine the fairness of the mining reward distribution.
Furthermore, miner collusion may take a different form represented by rejecting
specific updates on the network protocol. As cryptocurrencies are still in the devel-
opment stage, features and updates are still being added to their protocols. These
updates can create soft and hard forks in the network [61]. In this form of collusion,
a subset of the miners do not agree to adopt the new version of the protocol. This
causes a split in the network, i.e., inconsistency in the blockchain view, and may ex-
tend to spinning out a new version of the currency. This happened in Bitcoin, where
there two new cryptocurrencies split from its network including Bitcoin Cash [11] and
Bitcoin Gold [12].
Usually, the >50% threat, or miners’ collusion in general, is argued about infor-
mally using incentive compatibility. This idea asserts that rational miners are more
interested in keeping the system running to preserve the value of their rewards. How-
ever, this claim is hard to verify and remains as an open question [67]. In addition,
this assumption might be valid when all parties belong to the same system. Yet,
miners could be working in several systems and it could be the case that destroying
one to strengthen the other would be more profitable. Nonetheless, such observations
highlight two key points. First, it indicates the importance of validating all the secu-
rity assumptions a system makes in its design. And second, it points to the need for
rational economic incentives to address some types of security threats that cannot be
addressed by using only cryptographic approaches. The design of ABC accounts for
such observations as mentioned earlier in this chapter.
2.5.2 Filecoin Analysis (Steps 1-3)
Filecoin [49] is a cryptocurrency-based distributed file storage and retrieval system.
Any party may join the system as a storage or retrieval miner to offer service to
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others. Filecoin operates distributed retrieval and storage markets where clients and
miners can submit storage/retrieval bids and offers. Once these offers are matched,
the service-payment exchange process, in which clients pay the miners in the Filecoin
currency in exchange for receiving correct service, may start. The mining process
in Filecoin is tied to the storage service miners put into the system. Recently, the
Filecoin team raised around $250 million through an ICO (initial coin offering) [1] in
preparation for an official launch.
Filecoin is a more complicated system than Bitcoin as it provides two types of
services on top of the currency exchange medium. In addition, its protocol involves
three participant roles: clients, retrieval miners, and storage miners, with the latter
filling the traditional roles of miners in maintaining the blockchain. This complexity
is reflected in the number of collusion matrices and threat cases produced as shown in
Table 2.2. Moreover, all threat categories that target the service asset were replicated
for each service type, which contributed to the large size of the threat model. These
factors affected the completion time to build the model, which was 4.7x the time
needed to build Bitcoin’s model. This cost in time commitment is a natural result
of working with newly developed and complex systems that provide a rich set of
features.
In threat modeling Filecoin’s whitepaper, we found three unaddressed issues,
mostly dealing with collusion cases that were not considered. Additionally, there are
many places where the system is underspecified and so it is not possible to reason
about whether or not it meaningfully addresses a threat.
Ethics and disclosure. We reached out to the Filecoin team, which mentioned efforts
they have undertaken to resolve these problems. We withhold details about these
issues until later as part of the responsible disclosure process.
2.5.3 CacheCash Analysis (Steps 1-4)
We developed ABC during the early stages of our work on designing CacheCash.
As the work progressed, we realized that most of the threat cases we encounter are
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related to the financial aspects of the system, and the possible collusion between
participants. Such aspects, as mentioned previously, are not explicitly addressed by
traditional threat modeling frameworks. At that time we realized that none of these
frameworks suited our needs, which lead to developing ABC.
Beyond threat modeling, we used ABC while designing threat mitigation tech-
niques in the CacheCash system. During that time, we observed the importance
of rational financial incentives in this process. This includes employing detect-and-
punish mechanisms in which the penalty deposit of a party is revoked upon detecting
that it is cheating, or designing algorithms that, when implemented in a malicious
way, can cost the attacker more in resources than would working honestly. Further-
more, we realized the value of game theory and economic analysis in assessing the
effectiveness of these economic threat mitigation approaches, and in quantifying the
risk, or amount of damage, that financial attacks may cause. To date, we found ABC
useful for CacheCash in both the pre-design threat modeling step, and the after-design
security analysis of the system modules. More about the threat model of CacheCash
can be found in Chapter 5.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced ABC, a cryptocurrency-focused threat modeling frame-
work. Its design is motivated by the observation that traditional threat modeling
frameworks do not fit cryptocurrencies, thus leaving them vulnerable to unantici-
pated attacks. ABC introduces collusion matrices, a technique that allows designers
to investigate hundreds of threat cases in a reasonable amount of time. Both the user
study and the use cases confirm that our framework is effective in unraveling hidden
threat cases. This shows the potential of ABC to improve the security of a wide array
of distributed systems.
We found ABC useful when building threat models for MicroCash (Chapter 4)
and CacheCash (Chapter 5), where it allowed identifying the threat cases that the
designs of these systems must address in order to secure their operation. Among these
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threats, we have cache accounting attacks. In the next chapter, we present CAPnet,




CAPnet: A Defense Against Cache Accounting Attacks on
Content Distribution Networks
This chapter is based on joint work with Kevin Kelley, Allison Bishop, and Justin
Cappos [57].
3.1 Overview
In this chapter, we introduce CAPnet, the first technique that lets untrusted caches,
such as peers with unknown computational and latency characteristics, join a peer-
assisted CDN while providing a bound on the effectiveness of cache accounting at-
tacks. Our key innovation is a lightweight cache accountability puzzle that clients
must solve before caches are given credit. The puzzle solution serves as a content re-
trieval confirmation assuring publishers that a minimum, pre-configured bandwidth
cost has been expended by caches.
For each content request, the publisher generates a puzzle that a client must solve
by processing the data chunks retrieved from caches (each of which is encrypted with a
request-specific key). Solving this puzzle requires the client to sequentially touch small
pieces of these chunks in an unpredictable order. Because of this unpredictability, the
communication overhead of generating the solution without having the data colocated
is significant. Combined with the use of a completion mask, a secret that is used
to conceal an encrypted data chunk until it has been completely transferred, this
processing pattern forces colluding parties to expend the required bandwidth amount,
which can be configured to be similar to retrieving the content, and thus removing
any motivation to cheat.
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Equally important for its use in practical applications, CAPnet does not sacrifice
efficiency for enhanced security. Its tools are built on computationally-light operations
(symmetric encryption and hashing). CAPnet is also designed to be scalable; while a
client needs to process a large portion of the retrieved content when solving a puzzle,
a publisher needs only to process a small, server-configurable number of pieces to
generate a challenge. Because of this asymmetry, our scheme can meet the deployment
demands of large-scale content distribution applications.
To demonstrate that CAPnet is effective at mitigating cache accounting attacks,
we configure the system parameters based on an analysis of the bandwidth cost in-
curred by malicious puzzle-solving strategies. Our analysis shows that the publisher
can ensure that a malicious actor must expend a substantial amount of bandwidth,
even given unrealistically strong assumptions about the malicious actors capabilities.
To evaluate CAPnet’s efficiency, we experimentally evaluate the computational over-
head of our scheme under various configurations. The benchmark results show that a
modest client machine can solve puzzles at a rate sufficient to confirm the retrieval of
around 170 Mbps. Even a single core low-end publisher machine can generate enough
puzzles to support a bitrate of around 4 Tbps.
3.2 Related Work
To orient readers to current state-of-the-art defenses for cache accounting attacks,
this section reviews prior work done in this area. We also present information about
a related topic — proofs of data storage — and discuss why this proof paradigm is
not applicable to cache accounting attacks.
Cache accountability in peer-assisted CDNs. One technique used in peer-
assisted CDNs is to rely on the peers themselves to report statistics about content
delivery. For example, clients in Akamai Netsession [4] share reports about their
upload and download activity, and this information is used to manage network re-
sources. Even some systems that exchange service for monetary rewards, e.g., [106],
rely on these types of reports to track the service contributions of peers in order to
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pay them accordingly. However, in such an open environment that allows anyone to
join, peers may fabricate these accounting reports. This has been confirmed through
empirical studies [51, 95].
Specialized cache accountability defenses work to address this issue by making
clients commit to these activity logs. This is done by requiring participants to main-
tain tamper-evident logs, cryptographically sign all messages sent to the network,
and periodically exchange these logs with a verifier. The verifier in turn checks the
consistency of the reported information and performs anomaly detection to identify
cheating based on a protocol reference implementation. The repeat and compare
scheme [100] utilizes this technique to address the problem of corrupted content dis-
tribution. PeerReview [83] employs a similar approach to detect Byzantine faults.
And RCA (Reliable Client Accounting) [51] exploits such logs to address the same
collusion problem we are interested in. However, this approach cannot prevent col-
luding parties from fabricating consistent and valid-looking, signed and consistent,
log reporting content transfers that did not take place. Thus, cheating clients and
caches still can collude to collect rewards for work they did not perform.
A prior bandwidth puzzle-based defense, proposed by Reiter et al. [113], works
by issuing challenge puzzles to all caches and clients that possess the content. These
parties have to solve the issued puzzles over the retrieved content in a short period of
time to receive payment, where it assumes knowledge of the computational abilities
and communication latency of all parties. This scheme has several downsides when
compared to our approach. First, every time a new party retrieves the content,
puzzles must be solved by all peers that have a copy of this content, even those
uninvolved in the transfer. Second, the security of the scheme is based on knowing
a bound for the attacker’s hashing power, which is used to quantify the number of
challenge puzzles that must be presented within a time window. Third, the latency of
peers must also be known for the scheme to resist cheating. This latency constraint
may cause peers to lose their rewards in the event of lost or delayed messages. In
addition, an attacker that can fool others into believing they have high latency can
cheat because she has more time to solve puzzles, and hence, she can collude with
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other caches to solve their puzzles.
Relation with data possession proofs. Several works in the literature have tack-
led a related problem — how to prove that a server to which a client has outsourced
files is actually storing those files, e.g., ensuring correct data storage in the cloud [127].
Solutions to this problem include proofs-of-retrievability [69], proofs of data posses-
sion [75], and proofs-of-storage [74]. Such proof systems, at first glance, could be
viewed as potential defenses against cache accounting attacks. That is, a publisher
can ask a client to prove storing a local copy of the retrieved content. However, this
does not confirm that caches have served the content. These colluding caches can
generate valid proofs of storage for any client because they have the full raw content.
Similarly, a client that retrieves some content only once can produce valid proofs, for
itself or others, for all future requests that ask for the same content. While useful,
these proof systems are not applicable for fighting cache accounting attacks.
3.3 CAPnet Design
CAPnet defends against cache accounting attacks by both mandating proof of de-
livery, and making honest choices more profitable than cheating. In this section, we
describe how the design of CAPnet manages this defense. We start by defining the
work environment for content distribution systems our scheme targets, then provide a
high level view of the primary operations, after which we present the technical details
of these operations.
3.3.1 Work Environment Model
CAPnet targets the general paradigm of peer-assisted content distribution systems,
which also represents the basic network model of CacheCash. Such a model consists
of three participant types: publishers, caches, and clients. A publisher owns content,
e.g., videos or software packages, that clients want to retrieve. A publisher hires
caches to distribute this content in exchange for rewards, such as monetary incentives,
42
which are tied to the amount of service these caches provide. Each cache is defined
by its IP address, which the publisher monitors to detect Sybils. When a cache joins
a publisher’s network, it gains access to the content to be served, which we assume
to be divided into equally-sized data chunks. A client request can fetch a range of n
chunks within the object, e.g., movie, it wants to retrieve.
During the content distribution process, a publisher acts as a dispatcher assigning
caches to fulfill client requests. Therefore, clients must contact the publisher first,
asking for n data chunks, to obtain the list of n caches that will provide the service.
The publisher selects this set randomly such that each cache will serve a single data
chunk among the requested set.
As will be shown shortly, confirming that the content has been retrieved is done
over individual content requests. In other words, even if the client wants to retrieve
a large object, e.g., a movie of size 1 GB, it computes the retrieval confirmation over
each n chunks separately. Such an approach reduces the amount of memory that
CAPnet requires, e.g., for n = 4 and a chunk size of 1 MB, a client/publisher would
need only a 4 MB storage to hold the chunks needed for processing any request.
CAPnet enables the publisher to set a bound on the amount of bandwidth the
attacker must expend, with respect to the original content amount, which we call the
δ-bound. So, for 4MB of content, a 0.75-bound attacker in our scheme is expected to
expend 3MB to provide a valid content retrieval confirmation for a content request.
The δ-bound is controlled by the number of rounds in the cache accountability puzzle
of CAPnet. The larger δ, the larger the computation cost of generating and solving
this puzzle. Therefore, system designers need to configure this parameter based on
the desired security-efficiency trade-off they want to achieve.
Lastly, we work in the random oracle model, where hash functions are modeled
as random oracles. We also work in the ideal cipher model, where a block cipher is
modeled as a random permutation. In addition, we deal with efficient adversaries
that cannot break secure cryptographic primitives, such as AES, SHA256, and Pseu-
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Figure 3.1: CAPnet integration in content distribution (n is the number of caches
selected for a content request).
3.3.2 CAPnet in a Nutshell
CAPnet consists of a set of actions integrated into the content delivery process.
Collectively, these actions demonstrate that the required bandwidth amount was
actually expended, even in the face of malicious, colluding client and caches. In what
follows, we provide an intuitive discussion of these actions to highlight the motivation
behind the design (a rigorous security analysis of how these actions defend against
cache accounting attacks is found in the next section).
As shown in Figure 3.1, to request content in the CAPnet model, a client retrieves
a request bundle from the publisher that enables the retrieval of n data chunks (steps
1, 2, and 3)1. This bundle stipulates which caches to contact, and includes the client’s
IP and a request number. In addition, the bundle contains a puzzle, that when solved,
enables the client to prove that the requested chunks (or at least an amount of data
within the δ-bound) were indeed retrieved.
The client contacts caches, possibly in parallel, and provides the request bundle
that instructs each cache what specific data chunk to serve (step 4). Each cache
will encrypt its data chunk with a unique per-request key, and additionally encrypts
the produced ciphertext using a fresh per-request completion mask (step 5). The
double encrypted chunk, appended with the completion mask, is then delivered to the
client (step 6). Once all chunks are received, the client decrypts each chunk using
1If the content has more than n chunks a client will send several requests.
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the completion mask (step 7), and solves the puzzle using the single-layer encrypted
chunks (step 8). With the puzzle solution the client can decrypt the data chunks
to obtain the raw content (step 8), and confirm to the publisher that these chunks
were retrieved (steps 9 and 10).
When a cache begins serving content for a publisher, they establish a shared secret
called a master key. Along with the request number, both parties use this key to non-
interactively generate a fresh per-request session key that is used to encrypt the data
chunk the cache will serve. Since this key is unique and cannot be distinguished from
random2, each request returns a different, random looking, encrypted chunk3, even
if the raw content is the same. Also, since the session key is a secret known only to
the publisher and that cache, a malicious cache does not know the encrypted content
that an honest cache would serve.
In addition, CAPnet ensures that a client retrieves the entire encrypted chunk be-
fore it can start solving the puzzle. This is done by having each cache select a random
completion mask, i.e., a random key, that is used to encrypt the chunk ciphertext.
A cache appends the completion mask to the transmitted, double encrypted chunk.
Thus, the client has to download the entire chunk before being able to decrypt any
part of it.
A puzzle is computed by processing small (e.g., 16 byte long) pieces of the (single-
layer) encrypted chunks. Starting at a randomly selected piece in the first chunk, one
computes the hash of this piece and maps it to a piece index in the second data chunk.
In the random oracle model, this mapping randomly jumps to a piece in the second
chunk. The hash is now computed over the previous hash and the second piece and is
used to select another piece in the third chunk, and so on. Once the data chunk from
each cache is visited, this completes a round. The next round is begun by mapping
the last hash of the prior round to a piece index in the first chunk. This continues
for the number of rounds chosen by the publisher to achieve the desired δ-bound.
The publisher and the client compute the puzzle in slightly different ways. The
2This is by the security of PRFs.
3Recall that we work in the ideal cipher model.
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publisher randomly chooses a “starting piece” in the first chunk and computes one
puzzle to produce a challenge for the client. This challenge does not contain any
information about the starting piece. Hence, the client will attempt to solve the
challenge by computing candidate, or trial, puzzles initiated at various pieces in the
first chunk until the solution is found. This forces the client to process a δ portion of
the content before finding the solution.
Increasing δ strengthens the security guarantees of CAPnet by causing malicious
parties to retrieve more content, but also increases the computation cost for publishers
and honest clients as larger number of rounds are needed. Caches, on the other hand,
have uniform computational cost independent of the δ-bound.
3.3.3 Design Details
We now describe the CAPnet actions in more detail, including puzzle generation,
solving, and verification.
Puzzle Generation
The publisher generates a challenge puzzle based on the data chunks a client wants
to retrieve. Figure 3.2 depicts this action through a clarifying example involving two
data chunks. In this figure, L stands for location, H stands for hashing, E stands for
encryption, || is a concatenation operation, and the arrows indicate the sequence of
pieces selected when computing a puzzle.
As shown, a puzzle starts at the first data chunk and proceeds by processing a
number of small data pieces selected at random. Given that a puzzle round processes
encrypted pieces, the publisher encrypts the piece selected at each step. It then
hashes the encrypted piece along with prior hash or location value. The output hash
is mapped to a piece index within the next chunk (or the first chunk is this is the
beginning of a new round).
This computation pattern imposes three aspects. First, each location value encap-
sulates all encrypted pieces processed so far, which enforces sequential computation
of the puzzle. Second, processing encrypted pieces prevents any correlation between
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L3 = H( L2 || E(piece 2))
L5
Figure 3.2: An example of puzzle challenge generation with two chunks and two
rounds. The puzzle challenge is H(L5) and its solution is L5.
puzzles generated for different requests, even if they are for the same raw content.
Third, touching all data chunks in a round robin order makes all chunks contribute
equally in solving a puzzle. This ensures that a puzzle solution is computed over all
chunks, confirming their retrieval.
Once the puzzle computation is completed, which happens when the designated
number of rounds is reached, the publisher uses the hash of the last location, i.e.,
H(L5) in the figure, as the challenge, and it asks the client to return the preimage
of this hash, i.e., L5. This is done without revealing piece1. Instead, the client tries
all data pieces in the first chunk. Hiding the starting piece causes the client to touch
a large percentage of the pieces in each chunk while enabling the publisher to touch
very few. This minimizes the computational load for publishers, allowing them to
process a large number of client requests concurrently.
The technical details of this process are captured by Algorithm 1. In this algo-
rithm, Dj is the jth data chunk, piecei is the ith data piece in a data chunk, Rpuzzle
is the number of puzzle rounds, and piecestotal is the total number of pieces in any
data chunk. The data pieces inside a chunk are referenced using their indices, where
the first piece has an index 0, the second has an index 1, and so on. We use index(·)
to denote the index of a given piece.
Algorithm 1 shows two phases: an initialization phase, and a challenge preparation
phase. The initialization phase is needed to allow caches and the publisher to agree
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Algorithm 1 Puzzle challenge generator.




4: for j = 1 to n do




8: Select index(piece1) randomly from D1
9: Set j = 1, L1 = 0, r = n ·Rpuzzle
10: for i = 1 to r do
11: Fetch piecei from Dj based on index(piecei)
12:
. Compute ctri and encrypt piecei
13: ctri = index(piecei) + ctrj,initial
14: ci = AES-CTR(kj , ctri, piecei)
15:
. Compute location and index of piecei+1
16: Li+1 = SHA256(Li||ci)
17: index(piecei+1) = Li+1 mod piecestotal
18: j = (j mod n) + 1
19: end for
20: Set Challenge = SHA256(Lr+1)
21: return Challenge
on the encryption setup. We use AES in the counter mode (AES-CTR) for encryption
because it allows a publisher to encrypt any individual data piece without encrypting
the whole data chunk. To generate identical encrypted data, the publisher and each
cache Cj must generate the same session key kj and the initial value of the AES-CTR
counter ctrj,initial.
Generating the AES-CTR counter and session key is done using a one time setup
without any per-request interaction between the publisher and cache. As mentioned
before, a cache Cj shares a master key with the publisher that they both use to derive
any future session key kj. This is done by means of a pseudorandom function (PRF)
keyed with this master key, and evaluated over the request number and the client
IP to output kj. The same PRF idea, but keyed with the session key, is used to
generate ctrj,initial. Accordingly, in the initialization phase, the publisher generates
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all keys and counters for all data chunks that will be used by the caches involved in
the service session.
The puzzle generation phase proceeds as described previously. After selecting a
piece index at random from the first data chunk, the publisher proceeds by computing
the location of the next piece (line 16), and mapping this location to a piece index
(line 17). The new location computation requires encrypting the prior piece, which
in turn requires computing the correct AES-CTR counter value (line 13). By doing
so, the publisher produces the same ciphertext of the selected piece that a cache
will produce. The aforementioned process is repeated for the required number of
iterations, as found in lines 10-19. Lastly, the algorithm outputs the hash of the last
location as the puzzle challenge.
After the puzzle is generated, the publisher informs the client about the puzzle
challenge it has to solve as part of the request bundle mentioned earlier. To allow
the client to decrypt the retrieved data chunks, the publisher can either provide the
keys in response to the puzzle solution reported by the client, or simply encrypt all
session keys using the puzzle solution and share the ciphertext as part of the request
bundle. Either way, once the client solves the challenge puzzle it can recover these
keys and decrypt the received data.
Puzzle Solving
The client receives the puzzle challenge, along with the cache contact information,
within the request bundle sent by the publisher. With this bundle, the client can start
the content retrieval process, where it connects with the listed caches and requests the
specified data chunks. Caches will deliver double-layer encrypted chunks, with the
completion mask appended to each chunk. The client uses the completion mask as
the decryption key to remove the second encryption layer of the chunk. By repeating
this process for all chunks, the client obtains the single-layer encrypted data chunks.
The client can now perform the second action in the CAPnet process — solving
the challenge puzzle. It uses a similar algorithm to the one used by the publisher
with three differences. First, since the client retrieves encrypted data chunks from the
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caches, it does not encrypt the data pieces before applying the hash, thus skipping
lines 4-6 and 13-14 in Algorithm 1. Second, since the client does not know the starting
piece, it computes a puzzle for every piece in the first data chunk until the correct
solution is found. In other words, it repeats lines 9-11 for each candidate starting
piece. And third, once the client solves the puzzle, the output is the puzzle solution,
which is the last location in the correct puzzle.
Puzzle Verification
The last action in the CAPnet process is verifying the correctness of the reported
puzzle solution. While it would be possible to keep a record of the puzzle challenges
and their solutions for each client, we devise a computationally-lightweight technique
that does not require maintaining any per-client state.
In this technique, the publisher generates a unique secret token for each content
request. This is done by evaluating a secret PRF over the request number and the
client IP. The publisher then encrypts the secret token using the puzzle solution, and
sends the encrypted token to the client as part of the request bundle. Once the client
solves the puzzle, it can decrypt the token and send it back to the publisher along
with the request number. The publisher can simply evaluate the secret PRF over the
request number and the client IP, and thus, verifies whether the output equals to the
token value reported by the client. This enables the publisher to quickly check the
correctness of a puzzle solution.
3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of CAPnet in fighting cache accounting
attacks. We begin by outlining the setup of this analysis, after which we discuss




The analysis setup defines how we model our adversaries, and explains the security
properties that CAPnet is designed to achieve. The set of notations that this analysis
uses is shown in Table 3.1.
Adversary Model. We consider a client colluding with a set of nm ≥ 1 caches4. (If a
client does not collude with any cache, it must retrieve all the data chunks to solve
the puzzle just like an honest client.) This collusion can be modeled as an interaction
between two parties: the client and a collective entity Cm. Any cache Cj in Cm can
pool all encrypted data chunks from the rest of the malicious caches at a very low
cost. That is, given that each cache has a full copy of the raw content, Cj needs
only the session keys of these caches to produce their encrypted data chunks locally.
When we say that a client retrieves data pieces from Cm, we mean that this client is
interacting with the cache that pooled the data chunks.
In order to have a strong bound on attacker capabilities, we consider an attacker
with full knowledge about the piece distribution across all the trial puzzles a client
will compute. In other words, the attacker knows the selection frequency of data
pieces, i.e., how many times a piece has been processed by all puzzles, in all chunks
rather than just in the puzzles for which this attacker has enough prior pieces. The
attacker may use this information to retrieve the most frequent pieces when solving
the challenge puzzle.
Despite the hash function being modeled as a random oracle with a uniform and
random output, this piece frequency still matters. Suppose that we have a chunk
composed of 4 pieces that are randomly chosen to be in 4 trial puzzles. Over 90% of
the time one of these pieces is chosen at least twice (only about 9% of random draws
of 4 items choose one from each). On average more than 1 piece is likely not to be
chosen for any trial puzzle. An intelligent attacker would choose the piece used in
the most trial puzzles since it gives the greatest chance to solve the challenge. So,
4All these caches are different, i.e., not Sybils run on the same machine. This is due to the




n Number of caches selected to serve a content request.
Cm Set of malicious caches among the n caches.
nm Size of Cm, where nm ≤ n.
hsize Hash output size.
chunksize Data chunk size.
piecesize Data piece size, where piecesize ≤ hsizem .




Rpuzzle Number of puzzle rounds.
Y A random variable that represents the number of pieces a malicious
puzzle solver retrieves.
E[Y ] The expectation of Y .
δ The ratio between the bandwidth amount a malicious puzzle solver
would spend and the amount that an honest solver would use. This is
computed as δ = E[Y ]n·piecestotal .
accounting for the fact that the actual frequencies may not be uniform, even with a
random function, more accurately models the attacker’s capabilities. Furthermore,
providing the attacker perfect information about these actual frequencies implies that
the security bound we infer will be conservative.
The client and Cm want to solve the puzzle while expending as little bandwidth as
possible. In quantifying this cost, we compute the download bandwidth consumption
for the colluding group.
Our adversary model is subject to the following assumptions:
1. Secure cryptographic primitives. Efficient adversaries cannot break the ba-
sic cryptographic building blocks (SHA256, AES, and PRFs) with non-negligible
probability.
2. Clients do not already possess the content. At the beginning of a service
session, a client does not have a copy of the content it will request. This can be
achieved by having publishers track which clients have retrieved which content.
However, even if this assumption is violated, the client still must retrieve data
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chunks from honest caches in order to solve a puzzle, leading to the retrieval of
at least δ = n−nm
n
of the requested chunks.
3. Free adversarial metadata communication. It is difficult to know the
minimal size of information adversaries would need to communicate when co-
ordinating the puzzle solving process. Therefore, we will just assume that such
costs are free from a bandwidth standpoint and only count data piece transmis-
sion. While it ignores some cost, this makes the overhead numbers conservative
in that real attackers will incur more cost than what we predict.
4. Content is already compressed. The raw content distributed by caches is
already compressed. As such, a malicious cache who intends to compress the
raw content before encrypting it will only save a very small bandwidth amount.
In addition to the above, and as mentioned previously, we work in the random
oracle model (i.e., hash functions are modeled as random oracles), and in the ideal
cipher model (i.e., block ciphers are modeled as random permutations).
An intelligent client and Cm collaborate to solve the puzzle while transferring the
least amount of data possible. In this collaboration, the client receives encrypted
chunks only from honest caches, while Cm produce all encrypted chunks of malicious
caches by pooling their session keys as explained previously. The strategy then will
have a solver, either the client or Cm, that attempts to solve the puzzle using the
chunks it has in addition to information it requests from the second party, whichever
of the client or Cm is not the solver. The second party acts as a piece provider which
sends pieces or hashes (i.e., piece locations computed in a puzzle round) to the solver.
For reasons we will see shortly, pieces make more sense for the attacker to transmit.
As our analysis will show, the client and Cm can decide in advance which party
will play which role based on which option incurs the least bandwidth cost. This
decision depends on the number of malicious caches nm. If this number is less than
half, i.e., nm < n2 , it is more efficient for the client to act as the solver. If it is greater
than half, it is more efficient for the client to let Cm solve the challenge puzzle. If the
number of caches is exactly half, it is equally efficient regardless of who is the solver.
Other attack strategies may involve attacking the cryptographic primitives used
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in CAPnet design. This may include trying to find the preimage of the puzzle chal-
lenge by inverting the hash, or predicting the session keys used by honest caches to
produce their encrypted chunks locally by a colluding cache. By the security of the
underlying cryptographic primitives CAPnet employs, i.e., the use of secure PRFs
and first-preimage resistant hash functions, such strategies will succeed with negligi-
ble probability.
It should be noted that the above list is not known to be comprehensive.
There could be other attack strategies outside the analysis presented in this section
(although we are not aware of any of such strategies). Performing a rigorous analysis
over the full potential threat space is an open problem for future work.
Security Goal. The goal is to ensure that a malicious puzzle solver cannot solve the
challenge puzzle in CAPnet unless it expends, on average, a bandwidth amount equiv-
alent to retrieving at least δ portion of the content. This means that the colluding
group is expected to expend a total of δ · n · chunksize bandwidth units. So for
δ = 0.95, the attacker has an expected value of 95% of the bandwidth cost even if
all metadata overhead are ignored. System designers may set the value of δ based
on the security-efficiency trade-off they want to achieve. A larger δ value provides
stronger security guarantees, but also increases the computational cost of generating
and solving puzzles.
It is not practical to have δ = 1 unless the publisher touches every piece of the
requested chunks. Since each chunk must be encrypted with a fresh key, this cost is
prohibitive. In fact, if the publisher is willing to touch every piece, it is simpler to
compute the hash of the encrypted chunks, and use this hash as the confirmation that
a client has to compute. However, this would greatly reduce performance. Assuming
that the publisher does not touch every piece, then δ < 1 for the following reason.
Suppose that the attacker retrieves every piece of the content except one. If this
piece was not touched by the publisher, the attacker can prove that the content was
retrieved with δ < 1. Since we only account for the piece transfer costs, at least
some of the time (when the attacker does not retrieve untouched pieces) δ < 1, which
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makes the expected value of all cases to be less than 1.
3.4.2 Analysis of Puzzle Solving Strategies
In what follows, we analyze the bandwidth cost of the collaborative malicious puz-
zle solving strategies described earlier, and show how to configure CAPnet’s design
parameters to achieve the desired δ-bound. These parameters include the data piece
size piecesize and the number of puzzle rounds Rpuzzle.
As mentioned previously, an attacker who wishes to solve the puzzle without
retrieving all the data chunks will either exchange hashes or retrieve data pieces. By
setting the piecesize ≤ hsizenm one can ensure that the cost of transmitting a hash is no
less than transmitting pieces. That is, even in the event when the piece provider has
nm consecutive encrypted chunks, meaning that given one hash value the provider
can process nm pieces in a puzzle round, transmitting a hash is more expensive than
transmitting these nm pieces. In fact since the pieces may be used in multiple puzzle
trials, it is better for the solver to retrieve them. For this reason, we focus on strategies
that involve piece dissemination instead.
When retrieving data pieces to solve the challenge puzzle, we conjecture that the
best strategy for the solver is to utilize its knowledge of the piece distribution across
all trial puzzles. Initially, the solver must possess some piece of each encrypted data
chunk to have a chance to solve the puzzle, since each round touches all encrypted
data chunks. In order to get pieces from the honest caches, the client must download
all double encrypted chunks held by these caches. For malicious caches, the client
can retrieve the individual pieces it desires. In selecting which pieces to retrieve,
the best approach is to ask for the piece that gives the greatest chance of solving
the puzzle. The solver can ask the piece provider to send the piece with the highest
frequency among the remaining pieces, and then determine if it enables solving the
challenge puzzle. This process continues until the solution is found. Assuming that
retrieving the most popular missing piece is optimal, this is the optimal strategy for
the malicious solver.
Recall that either the client or Cm may play the role of the puzzle solver. If Cm is
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the puzzle solver, the client must still be the one to download the chunks from honest
caches since the source IP of the request is checked. Hence, the client retrieval from
honest caches is a fixed cost. Once this happens, it is more efficient for the party with
the most content (either the client or Cm) to act as the solver and get as few pieces
as possible from the other party. This means that when nm < n2 , the client will have
a larger number of chunks than Cm, thus, the client will be the puzzle solver. On
the other hand, when nm > n2 , Cm will be the puzzle solver asking the client to send
pieces from the chunks it received from honest caches. When nm = n2 , either party
can be the puzzle solver.
Analyzing the bandwidth cost of the above strategy allows us to configure the
number of puzzle rounds to obtain a specific δ-bound. In order to do so, we compute
the expected number of pieces E[Y ] the colluding group will retrieve as a function of
Rpuzzle and the number of malicious caches nm. Then, we compute δ =
E[Y ]
n·piecestotal ,
after which we select Rpuzzle that satisfies the desired δ-bound. To compute E[Y ],
we conduct simulations in which we mimic the above strategy and track the number
of retrieved pieces. As an example, we consider the following setup, which we be-
lieve is similar to what is used in practical content distribution applications. We set
chunksize = 1 MB, and piecesize = 16 bytes, leading to piecestotal = 216 pieces. We
have Rpuzzle ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, n = 6, and nm ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. The simulations are repeated
103 times, where E[Y ], and consequently δ, is computed as the average across all
runs. We also report the standard deviation of our measurements. The computed δ
values are found in Table 3.2.
As shown, as the number of rounds increases, δ increases. This is expected because
a larger number of puzzle rounds means that the challenge puzzle requires a larger
number of pieces to be solved. Consequently, the puzzle solver is expected to retrieve
more content in order to find these pieces. On the other hand, δ decreases as the
number of malicious caches increases for a fixed Rpuzzle value. Again, this is expected
because more malicious caches makes the collusion more effective.
Note that scenarios where Cm is the solver have significantly lower δ values. This
is because Cm already possesses the majority of the content that has been pooled at
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Table 3.2: The δ-bound for various nm and Rpuzzle values, n = 6 caches (R is Rpuzzle).
For nm < 3 the client is a more efficient puzzle solver, for nm > 3 Cm is a more
efficient puzzle solver, nm = 3 is equivalent for each.
Client as solver Either Cache as solver
R
nm 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 0.87±0.03 0.78±0.06 0.71±0.08 0.45±0.06 0.21±0.03 0
2 1 0.91±0.04 0.86±0.06 0.82±0.08 0.52±0.06 0.24±0.04 0
3 1 0.93±0.04 0.9±0.05 0.87±0.07 0.57 ±0.05 0.26±0.04 0
4 1 0.94±0.03 0.92±0.05 0.91±0.06 0.59±0.05 0.28±0.03 0
5 1 0.95±0.03 0.94±0.04 0.93±0.04 0.6±0.05 0.29±0.03 0
6 1 0.96±0.03 0.95±0.04 0.94±0.04 0.61±0.04 0.29±0.03 0
7 1 0.96±0.02 0.95±0.02 0.95±0.04 0.62±0.04 0.3±0.03 0
8 1 0.97±0.02 0.96±0.03 0.95±0.03 0.63±0.03 0.3±0.02 0
9 1 0.97±0.02 0.97±0.03 0.96±0.03 0.63±0.03 0.3±0.02 0
10 1 0.97±0.02 0.97±0.03 0.97±0.03 0.64±0.03 0.31±0.02 0
no cost (since we assume that metadata retrieval, such as keys, is free, pooling session
keys costs no bandwidth). To solve the challenge puzzle, Cm only needs to retrieve
the missing pieces from the client who has the data chunks from the honest caches.
3.5 Evaluation
In order to understand how CAPnet’s security impacts efficiency, this section evalu-
ates its performance in the context of content distribution applications. Given that
CAPnet imposes a minimal bandwidth cost to exchange a puzzle challenge and its
solution, what is left to measure is its computational overhead. Towards this end, we
conduct empirical experiments to answer the following specific questions:
• How fast can a publisher generate challenge puzzles?
• How quickly can a client solve these puzzles?
• How does the configuration of the design parameters affect these results?
The rest of this section describes our methodology and discusses the significance
of the obtained results.
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3.5.1 Methodology
To establish our benchmarks, we measured the rate, in puzzles per second, at which
a publisher can generate challenge puzzles, and the rate at which a client can solve
these puzzles. For the publisher, we considered the case of popular content that
large numbers of clients routinely request in close time intervals. For the client, we
computed the puzzle solving rate based on the average case, meaning that a client
tries half the starting pieces in the first data chunk to find the solution.
Our experiments were conducted on a modest publisher server with an AMD
Ryzen 3 2200G processor and 16 GB of memory, and a low-end client machine with an
Intel Core i7-4600U processor and 8 GB of memory. Each puzzle generator and solver
has been called at least 5,000,000 and 5,000 times, respectively. Unless otherwise
mentioned, all graphs use Rpuzzle = 5, chunksize = 1 MB, hsize = 32 bytes, and
piecesize = 16 bytes. In addition, instead of reporting the puzzle rate for puzzle
generator and solver, we compute the bitrate at which content can be requested using
these puzzles. Despite both the client and publisher operations being embarrassingly
parallelizable, we run each on a single core to show the per-core performance.
3.5.2 Results
Publisher’s bitrate vs δ. We begin by measuring the puzzle generation rate while
varying the number of puzzle rounds Rpuzzle and number of caches n with one ma-
licious cache (Figure 3.3a). As shown in the figure, we compute the δ-bound value
that corresponds to each Rpuzzle value. This produced a curve from 1 round (upper
left point on each curve) to 10 rounds (lower right point). The bitrate decreases as δ
increases because with larger Rpuzzle the publisher processes a larger number of pieces
when preparing the challenge, which reduces the puzzle generation rate. On the other
hand, an increased number of caches n increases the throughput because more data
is served per challenge puzzle. This factor also affects the δ-bound of CAPnet. As
shown in the figure, for larger n the range δ gets larger for all Rpuzzle values. That is,
the impact of having a malicious cache decreases when n gets larger. This captures
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(a) Generator speed (Tbps), δ effect. (b) Generator speed (Tbps), chunksize effect
(c) Generator speed (Tbps), piecesize effect
Figure 3.3: Generator speed for various configurations (n is the number of caches in
a service session).
what happens in real life, where it will be harder for caches to collude effectively when
there is a large number of caches per session. Based on the figure, setting Rpuzzle ≥ 5
in practice provides a reasonable δ-bound for n ≥ 4 (δ ≥ 0.93), with diminishing
returns thereafter.
Client’s bitrate vs δ. Figure 3.4a shows the bitrate vs δ-bound for the puzzle
solver. As shown, for a fixed Rpuzzle value, the client’s effective bandwidth is relatively
uniform independent of the number of caches n. However, the Rpuzzle value, for a
fixed n, has substantial impact on the effective bandwidth of a client. Given that the
reported speed in the figure dwarfs the 5 Mbps Netflix 1080p quality video rate [37],
even using Rpuzzle = 5 (the 5th point on each curve starting from the left), our
modest client machine is able to watch dozens of 1080p videos concurrently. If higher
performance is desired, then reducing Rpuzzle, i.e., reducing δ, provides drastically
better performance, up to 900Mbps, if needed.
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(a) Solver speed (Mbps), δ effect. (b) Solver speed (Mbps), chunksize effect
(c) Solver speed (Mbps), piecesize effect
Figure 3.4: Solver speed for various configurations (n is the number of caches in a
service session).
How does chunksize impact client and publisher bitrates? We measured
the puzzle generation and solving rates for various data chunk sizes and n values
(results are shown in Figures 3.3b and 3.4b). The chunksize has a large effect on
the performance of publishers, but minimal effect on client’s performance. There are
several reasons for this difference. The publisher has almost a fixed puzzle generation
rate regardless of the chunk size, because it processes the same number of pieces
for fixed Rpuzzle, piecesize, and n values. Consequently, a larger chunksize makes the
amount of content served per challenge puzzle larger. Alternatively, for a client the
puzzle solving rate decreases with larger chunksize because the client has to compute
a larger number of trial puzzles. When calculating the bitrate for some n value, the
low puzzle rates are multiplied by large chunksize and vice versa. For this reason the
client bandwidth is somewhat similar for all chunksize values.
How does piecesize impact client and publisher bitrates? To understand
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how to set the piece size, we studied its effect on publisher (Figure 3.3c) and client
(Figure 3.4c) performance. The publisher can generate enough puzzles to serve over
3 Tbps, regardless of the piece size. However, a piece size of 16 bytes is slightly more
efficient because AES-CTR works on 16 byte blocks for encryption. In addition, a
smaller piece size means that the publisher processes a smaller amount of content
for a fixed number of pieces. The client, on the other hand, tends to benefit from
larger piece sizes because they reduce the number of starting pieces, and hence, trial
puzzles, a client has to compute. Given that a client with piecesize = 16 byte already
has a high throughput, and given that publishers are usually heavy-loaded entities,
we recommend the use of piecesize = 16 bytes to boost publisher performance.
In summary, the previous results demonstrate that CAPnet is computationally-
lightweight. Its security in fighting cache accounting attacks is substantial (δ >
0.95 with generous attacker assumptions), even at bandwidth values that support a
publisher serving several Tbps or a client simultaneously watching dozens of 1080p
videos.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced CAPnet, a low-overhead solution to defend against
cache accounting attacks in peer-assisted CDNs. CAPnet is the first system that
forces malicious caches, even when colluding with clients, to expend substantial band-
width to demonstrate that content was retrieved. This is done by introducing a
cache accountability puzzle that provides strong protections even given unrealisti-
cally strong assumptions about the attacker’s capabilities. For example, with a 5
round puzzle, if 3 malicious caches out of 6 total caches wish to perform a cache
accounting attack, the colluding parties would retrieve on average more than 0.95
of the requested content (δ > 0.95). We analyze the security of CAPnet, and show
experimentally that it incurs a low computation cost. This demonstrates the viability
of employing our scheme in large scale content distribution applications.
CAPnet is one of the modules that CacheCash employs to ensure security at low
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cost. In the next chapter, we introduce another module, namely, MicroCash, that
addresses the issue of processing micropayments securely and efficiently.
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Chapter 4
MicroCash: Practical Concurrent Processing of
Micropayments
This chapter is based on joint work with Allison Bishop and Justin Cappos [56].
4.1 Overview
As mentioned previously, micropayments provide a flexible payment paradigm with
a large set of potential applications, such as ad-free web surfing, online gaming, and
peer-assisted service networks [111]. To reduce the overhead of processing these small
payments, several probabilistic solutions were proposed that allow local exchange of
micropayments while aggregating them into few transactions with larger values before
processing [70, 99, 111, 114, 115, 129].
At a high level, in these schemes the total amount of payments is locked in an
escrow and micropayments take the form of lottery tickets instead of actual trans-
actions. Each ticket enters a lottery where it has a probability p of winning, and
when it wins, produces a transaction of β currency units. This means that only one
large transaction, on expectation, is processed among a batch of 1
p
tickets, which
reduces the processing costs. Unfortunately, as discussed in Section 1.1, the older
solutions [99, 114, 115, 129] require a trusted party to audit the lottery and manage
payments. While the new, fully distributed ones [70, 111] support only sequential
issuance of lottery tickets using the same escrow because an escrow can pay only
one winning ticket. Also, they incur large computation and communication over-
head, where they rely on computationally-heavy cryptographic primitives, or require
multiple rounds to exchange a payment.
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To address these drawbacks, we propose MicroCash, the first decentralized prob-
abilistic framework that supports concurrent micropayments. MicroCash features a
novel payment setup that allows a customer to issue lottery tickets in parallel and
at a fast rate using a single escrow. This is achieved by having the customer specify
the total number of tickets it may issue and the rate at which it will issue them, and
provide an escrow balance that covers all winning tickets with very high probability
(with probability > 1−  for some small system parameter ). This balance coverage
is coupled with ticket tracking, based on sequence numbers, to detect if a customer
exceeds the ticket issue rate of its escrow.
MicroCash is also cost effective because it introduces a lightweight non-interactive
lottery protocol, requiring only hashing, that allows a payment exchange with only
one round of communication. In this protocol, each issued ticket is tied to a lottery
draw value in a future block on the blockchain. A ticket wins if hashing this value
along with the ticket produces an output below a threshold computed based on p.
We show that such a simple and highly efficient protocol is secure in the random
oracle model and under proper assumptions regarding the security of the underlying
cryptocurrency system.
Moreover, as a probabilistic micropayment scheme, MicroCash provides the fol-
lowing properties. First, it enhances system scalability, in terms of the blockchain
size and transaction throughput, by tuning the payment setup parameters to reduce
the on-chain traffic. Second, it reduces interaction between participants and allows
processing of a large number of off-chain payments, or lottery tickets, at a fast rate.
This is possible because verifying a ticket involves only lightweight operations and
requires just local information merchants have about the escrow setup. Third, Micro-
Cash neutralizes the security threats that arise in probabilistic micropayments using
both cryptographic and financial techniques. The latter requires any customer to tie
its payment escrow to a penalty deposit that is revoked upon cheating, with a lower
bound derived using a game theoretic analysis.
We conduct thorough benchmarks to evaluate MicroCash’s performance, where we
compare it to a state-of-the-art sequential micropayment scheme, MICROPAY [111].
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Our results show that a modest merchant machine in MicroCash is able to process
2,250 - 10,400 ticket/sec, which is around 1.67-4.1x times the rate in MICROPAY,
with 60% reduction in the aggregated payment size. Furthermore, a modest cus-
tomer machine in MicroCash is able to concurrently issue more than 32,000 micro-
payment/sec using one escrow, while MICROPAY requires the customer to create
more than 1000 escrows to support a comparable issue rate. This allowed MicroCash
to reduce the transaction fees and the additional blockchain size by around 50%.
4.2 Related Work
In this section, we review prior work done in the area of probabilistic micropay-
ments. In addition, we review an alternative payment aggregation mechanism,
called payment networks [72, 112], focusing on its limitations when used to handle
micropayments.
Probabilistic Micropayments. The idea of employing a lottery for micropayment
aggregation dates back to the seminal works of Wheeler [129] and Rivest [114]. In
these schemes, a customer and a merchant run an interactive lottery based on a simple
coin tossing protocol [114]. This was optimized later by developing a non-interactive
lottery protocol that a merchant can run locally [115]. All of these schemes assume
the presence of a centralized bank to hold accounts for customers and merchants, au-
thorize customers to issue lottery tickets, and process winning tickets. The existence
of a trusted bank imposes additional overhead on the users who have to establish
complex business relationships with this bank. Also, it limits the use of the payment
service to only fully authenticated users. Therefore, this centralization issue is viewed
as the main reason why there has been only limited adoption of such solutions [70].
Cryptocurrency-based probabilistic micropayments provide a potential solution
to address this centralization problem. This paradigm replaces the trusted bank and
its private records with the miners and the blockchain. In addition, it allows anyone
to join without any identity authentication.
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To the best of our knowledge, only two distributed schemes have been proposed
to date in the literature, MICROPAY [111] and DAM [70]. MICROPAY translates
the scheme of Rivest [114] into an implementation on top of a cryptocurrency sys-
tem. Instead of using an authorized bank account, customers create escrows on the
blockchain that they use to issue lottery tickets. For the lottery protocol, MICRO-
PAY adopts the same interactive coin tossing protocol mentioned above, but also
adds an alternative non-interactive version that reduces the communication com-
plexity. However, the latter is computationally-heavy because it requires public key
cryptography-based operations and a non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof
system to prove the correctness of the lottery draw. Moreover, MICROPAY only
supports sequential micropayments. That is, because a winning ticket receives all
escrow funds, a customer cannot issue a new ticket using the same escrow until it is
confirmed that the previous ticket did not win. This means that there must be a new
escrow on the blockchain for every winning ticket. DAM shares the same sequential
constraint but it adds the feature of preserving user privacy (not like MICROPAY
that is public), where it extends Zerocash [117] primitives to implement anonymous
micropayments.
We believe that the added blockchain transactions needed to create escrows due
to the lack of payment concurrency, and the reliance on computationally heavy
primitives, may reduce the usefulness of these schemes in large-scale distributed
systems. Thus, there is a need for optimized approaches that allow concurrent
micropayments at a lower overhead. This need is the motivation behind building
MicroCash.
Payment Channels and Networks. This payment paradigm was originally de-
veloped to handle micropayments in Bitcoin [13], where it relies on a similar concept
of processing most of the small payments locally. However, later on it was geared
primarily toward enhancing the scalability of cryptocurrencies [72, 86], where, par-
ticularly in Bitcoin, the limited block size and the slow block generation rate allow
handling only few transactions per second. This is done by utilizing off-chain pro-
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cessing to reduce on-chain traffic helps in increasing the transaction throughput at a
lower overhead.
A (micro)payment channel is a contract between a customer and a merchant tied
to a shared escrow fund. The ownership of this fund is adjusted over time based
on the off-chain transactions, or local payments, made to date. Merchants collect
their accumulated payments by releasing the most recent transaction expressing the
latest state of the fund ownership. As such, only two transactions are logged on the
blockchain per channel, the opening transaction and the closing one, regardless of the
number of local payments.
Several schemes were proposed to implement this paradigm. This includes pay-
ment channels that allow exchanges only between two parties [13,72,86], and payment
networks, e.g., lightning networks [112], that allow any two parties to pay each other
if they are connected by a payment path (a consecutive set of payment channels). In
addition, several solutions were introduced to optimize these initial proposals. For
example, Sprites [101] uses smart contracts to optimize the collateral cost of the light-
ning networks. Bolt [82] addresses user privacy by constructing paths that hide the
identities of the transacting parties and the payment value. And Fulgor/Rayo [98]
handle payment linkability in these networks, and prevent deadlocks when concurrent
payments cannot be completed due to insufficient channel capacity.
In general, payment networks suffer from the high collateral cost of setting up
multiple escrows when constructing payment paths. These costs may indirectly push
the network towards centralization [30]. This is because only wealthy parties can
afford locking currency in multiple escrows to establish payment channels, and hence,
most users will rely on these parties, or hubs, to relay the off-chain transactions. In
addition, these networks charge for payment relaying, so a user will have to pay fees
to each hub along the path. With micropayments, such a setup would be infeasible
because these fees could be much larger than the payments themselves. Probabilistic
approaches, on the other hand, are more flexible in allowing several parties to be
paid using the same escrow. And by doing so, they reduce the collateral cost and
eliminate any fees when exchanging lottery tickets. Hence, distributed probabilistic
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micropayments provide a better solution for handling small payments in cryptocur-
rency systems.
4.3 Threat Model
As discussed in the previous sections, distributed probabilistic micropayments rely
on off-chain processing. Merchants accept lottery tickets, as opposed to transactions
logged on the blockchain, with a promise that a customer will pay later when a ticket
wins the lottery. This local processing of future payments creates the potential for
various types of attacks. In this section, we outline a threat model that accounts for
these attacks, which guided the design of MicroCash.
In developing this model, we make the following assumptions:
• No trusted party exists.
• Participants are rational, meaning that they may follow the protocol without
violation, or deviate from it (either on their own or in collusion with each other),
based on what will maximize their utility gain.
• The underlying cryptocurrency scheme is secure in the sense that the majority
of the mining power is honest. This means that the confirmed state of the
blockchain contains only valid transactions, and that an attacker who tries to
mutate or fork the blockchain will fail with overwhelming probability.
• Hash functions are modeled as random oracles, and the hash values of the
blocks on the blockchain are modeled as a uniform distribution. This implies
that predicting the hash of a future block succeeds with very low probability.
• Efficient adversaries cannot break the basic cryptographic building blocks
(SHA256, digital signatures, etc.) with non-negligible probability.
• Communication between customers and merchants takes place over secure chan-
nels such as TLS/SSL.
We used ABC (Chapter 2) to build a threat model for MicroCash1. During this
process, we identified the assets to be protected in distributed probabilistic micro-
1A detailed version of the threat model is available online [31]
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payments, which include the escrows, the lottery tickets or payments, and the lottery
protocol. Then, by analyzing the security requirements of these assets, we produced
the broad threat categories in such systems. Our list includes the following:
• Escrow overdraft: A customer creates a payment escrow insufficient for hon-
oring the winning lottery tickets tied to this escrow, or creates a penalty escrow
that does not cover the cheating punishment imposed by the miners. Such a
threat could be the result of creating small balance escrows, or front running
attacks in which a customer withdraws the escrows before paying.
• Duplicate ticket issuance2: A customer issues lottery tickets with the same
sequence number to several merchants. This leads to issuing more tickets than
what the escrow can cover, i.e., not all winning tickets will be paid. In this way
a customer obtains more service than what it pays for.
• Invalid payments: A customer hands merchants lottery tickets that do not
comply with its payment setup or with the system specifications. Because these
tickets will be rejected by the miners if they win the lottery, the customer can
avoid paying merchants.
• Unused-escrow withholding: An attacker prevents or delays a customer
from withdrawing its unused escrows. For example, merchants may delay claim-
ing their winning lottery tickets to keep the payment escrow on hold.
• Lottery manipulation: An attacker attempts to influence the outcome of the
lottery draw, and hence, bias the payment process.
• Denial of service (DoS): This is a large threat category that includes all
attack forms that interrupt the system operation and make it unavailable for
legitimate users. We focus on attacks related to the payment process. For
example, an attacker may monitor the network and drop all lottery tickets or
escrow transactions to disturb the service.
Note that in this chapter, we are concerned with the payment scheme design,
2This threat is sometimes called double spending in the literature [70, 111]. We refer to it
as duplicate ticket issuance to distinguish this threat from double spending attacks on on-chain
cryptocurrency transactions.
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rather than how to exchange service with a payment, which is part of an application
design (part of CacheCash in this work, which we discuss in detail in Chapter 5). That
is, dealing with malicious merchants who collect lottery tickets and do not deliver a
service is outside the scope of MicroCash, same for dealing with malicious customers
who may obtain the service without paying.
In addition, MicroCash does not address payment anonymity (as in [70]). Ad-
dressing this issue securely, while preserving the low overhead of our scheme, is a
direction of our future work.
4.4 MicroCash Design
Having outlined the security threats to probabilistic micropayments in the previous
section, and the limitations of existing solutions in Section 4.2, this section presents
the design of MicroCash, a concurrent micropayment system that addresses these
issues. We start with an overview of the system operation, followed by a more detailed
technical description.
4.4.1 MicroCash in a Nutshell
At a high level, MicroCash operation proceeds in three phases, payment setup, ex-
change, and redemption, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. As shown, during the payment
setup (Step 1, Section 4.4.2), each customer issues a transaction creating two es-
crows: payment and penalty. The customer uses the former to make payments in the
form of lottery tickets, where this escrow is sufficient to pay all winning tickets with
probability 1− for some small . While the miners use the latter to financially punish
this customer if it cheats, e.g., by issuing tickets with duplicated sequence numbers
to different merchants. This transaction is embedded with information about the
customer’s payment setup, including the lottery winning probability p, the value of
a winning ticket β, and the set of beneficiary merchants that can be paid using this
escrow, among others.
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Figure 4.1: MicroCash operation flow.
is confirmed on the blockchain3. At that time, merchants can check the escrow
setup before transacting with the customer (Step 2). In exchange for the delivered
service, the customer can issue these merchants lottery tickets as payments (Step 3,
Section 4.4.3). A customer is limited in the number of tickets it may issue over a set
period. To provide a general, global nature of time, all parties track the height of the
blockchain and limit the sequence numbers of tickets that can be issued during any
round, where a round is the time needed to mine a block on the blockchain. Hence,
for each round, a customer uses the assigned sequence number range to issue tickets
to merchants.
For payment redemption, a merchant keeps each of the tickets it received until the
lottery draw time of this ticket. It then observes a value derived based on the block
mined at that time to determine if this ticket is a winning one (Step 4, Section 4.4.4).
A ticket wins if hashing the lottery draw value along with the ticket’s sequence number
and the escrow ID is below a threshold. If it wins, the merchant can claim the currency
value of this ticket, i.e., β coins, from the customer’s payment escrow during the ticket
redemption period (Step 5, Section 4.4.5). This is done by presenting this ticket to
the miners who, after validating the ticket, approve transferring currency from the
customer’s escrow to the merchant’s address.
After an escrow’s time period has elapsed, remaining funds may now be spent as
per usual by the owner-customer. Signaling the expiry of an escrow does not need
3After having the block that contains this transaction buried under y blocks, e.g., in Bitcoin
y = 6.
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an explicit transaction logged on the blockchain. This is because miners track the
timeframe during which a customer may issue tickets using an escrow, and after all
tickets have been paid out or expired, a customer can spend the remaining balance.
4.4.2 Escrow Setup
MicroCash introduces a novel escrow setup that allows multiple winning tickets to be
redeemed, which enables both concurrent ticket issuance and reduces the amount of
data logged on the blockchain. In order to support this feature, our scheme provides
techniques to determine the escrow balance needed to cover all concurrent tickets
with very high probability, and to track the issuance of these tickets in a distributed
way.
Escrow Creation
As an off-chain payment scheme, MicroCash must have a way to ensure that cus-
tomers can and will pay. This includes honoring winning tickets when redeemed by
merchants, and complying with a stipulated financial punishment if this customer
cheats. To satisfy this requirement, each customer is required to create payment and
penalty escrows with sufficient funds. Creating these escrows involves two actions:
a customer configures the payment parameters and locks funds in the escrows; and
miners verify that this setup complies with the system specifications.
Given that each payment escrow must be tied to a penalty escrow, a customer
sets up both escrows using one escrow creation transaction. This transaction has
two types of inputs. The first is the fund to be locked under each escrow balance,
where we refer to the payment and penalty escrow balances as Bescrow and Bpenalty,
respectively. And the second is a set of parameters that influence computing the value
of both Bescrow and Bpenalty, and how to spend them. These parameters, whose values
are specified by the customer possibly after negotiating the service with merchants,
include the following:
• The lottery winning probability p.
• The currency value of a winning lottery ticket β.
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• The ticket issue rate tktrate, which is the maximum number of tickets a customer
is allowed to hand out per round. This is used to calculate which ticket sequence
numbers are valid within each ticket issuing round.
• The escrow lifetime, denoted as lesc, which is the total number of ticket issuance
rounds. Therefore, the total number of tickets a customer may issue equals to
lesctktrate.
• The set of beneficiary merchants that can be paid using the escrow, where the
size of this set is denoted as m.
Computing the values of Bescrow and Bpenalty based on the above parameters pro-
ceeds as follows. To permit concurrent micropayments, Bescrow must be large enough
to pay all winning tickets tied to an escrow with probability 1 − , for some small
 (such as  < 0.05). While Bpenalty must be large enough to deter cheating in the
system. For a specific  value, and given that the payment probability distribution
can be modeled as a binomial distribution parameterized by p and number of trials
t = lesctktrate, Bescrow can be computed as:
Bescrow = βF
−1(p, lesctktrate, 1− )
where F−1 is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the binomial
distribution described above at the value 1− . The full details of deriving the above
equation are found in Section 4.5.1.
For Bpenalty, we compute a lower bound for this deposit using an economic analysis
that accounts for the additional utility gain a customer may obtain by cheating. This
bound is given by the following equation:
Bpenalty ≥ (m− 1)tktratepβ
(
1
1− (1− p)tktrate + ddraw + dredeem − 1
)
where ddraw is the lottery draw period in rounds and dredeem is the ticket redemption
period in rounds (more about these parameters in Section 4.4.4). This lower bound
ensures that the financial punishment exceeds the additional utility gain of cheating,
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and hence, makes cheating unprofitable compared to acting honestly. The full details
of deriving this bound are found in Section 4.5.2.
Verifying the correctness of a payment setup is performed by the miners upon re-
ceiving the escrow creation transaction. They validate the format of this transaction,
which involves verifying that the customer owns the input funds. Then, the min-
ers check that the value of Bpenalty satisfies the above bound, and that Bescrow obeys
the 1 −  coverage rule. The latter is done by computing the number of winning
tickets ψ that the payment escrow can cover, i.e., ψ = Bescrow
β
. And then, verifying
whether F (ψ) ≥ 1 − , using the CDF formula of the binomial distribution (again,
parameterized by p and t = lesctktrate). If all these checks pass, the miners add the
escrow transaction to the blockchain. Otherwise, they reject the escrow by dropping
its transaction.
Escrow Management
In MicroCash, the locked funds in the escrows can be spent only for a restricted set of
transactions. This set includes claimed winning tickets, proofs-of-cheating, and (after
the escrow lifetime is over) enabling a customer to spend its unused escrow funds.
To track the locked funds, miners maintain a state for each escrow in the system.
This state includes the following:
• The ID of the escrow, which is a random value generated by the miner that
adds the escrow creation transaction to the blockchain.
• The balances of both the payment and penalty escrows.
• The public key of the owner-customer, which is used to verify all signed tickets
that are issued using this escrow.
• The values of p, β, lesc, and tktrate, and the set of beneficiary merchants.
• A refund time for the escrow, denoted as trefund, at which the owner-customer
can spend any remaining funds in both the penalty and payment escrows. The
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Figure 4.2: Ticket issuing schedule, an example.
Ticket issuance using an escrow must follow a schedule based upon tickets’ se-
quence numbers. That is, if an escrow supports a rate of tktrate tickets per round,
then in the first round tickets with sequence numbers 0 to tktrate −1 may be issued.
Then, tickets with sequence number range tktrate to 2tktrate −1 can be issued in the
second round, and so on until the last round of an escrow lifetime. Merchants will
accept tickets in the current round with sequence numbers that follow this assign-
ment schedule. In order to deal with the fact that customers and merchants may
have inconsistent view of the blockchain, and hence, may not agree about what the
current round is (i.e., current height of the blockchain), merchants will also accept
tickets from the prior and next round given that these tickets use the correct sequence
number range.
An example of a ticket issuing schedule is found in Figure 4.2. As shown, the
escrow creation transaction is published at round 10 and confirmed at round 16
(assuming that a block is confirmed after being buried under 6 blocks). This escrow
allows issuing a total of 3000 tickets with 0.99 coverage probability (i.e.,  = 0.01 in
this case). Thus, at a ticket issue rate of 1000 tickets per round, the customer has 3
ticket issuing rounds, starting at round 17, with the sequence number ranges shown
in the figure.
The miners update the escrow state based on the restricted set of the escrow
related transactions (mentioned earlier) they process. For example, redeeming a
winning ticket reduces Bescrow by β coins. And receiving a valid proof-of-cheating
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against the customer causes miners to burn the funds inBpenalty. All these transactions
are logged on the blockchain, which permits anyone to validate the current state of
any escrow.
The miners discard an escrow state once all tickets tied to this escrow expire,
which happens at time trefund, or when an escrow is broken after receiving a valid
proof-of-cheating (discussed in Section 4.4.6). At that time, the customer may spend
the remaining funds, which is the residual of its payment escrow (if any) and its
penalty deposit (if not revoked), normally again.
4.4.3 Paying with Lottery Tickets
After the escrow is confirmed on the blockchain, a customer can start paying for
the service by giving merchants lottery tickets. A lottery ticket tktL is a structure
containing several fields as follows:
tktL = pkM ||idesc||tseq||σC (4.1)
where pkM is the public key of the recipient merchant, idesc is the payment escrow
ID, tseq is the ticket sequence number, and σC is the customer’s signature over the
ticket. The tseq field, along with idesc, identifies a ticket, which also provides means
for ticket tracking in the system. Note there is no need to include any information
about the escrow setup, including the public key of the owner-customer, in the ticket
itself. Merchants and miners can look this up on the blockchain using idesc.
When issuing a ticket, the customer fills in the above fields and signs the ticket
using the secret key tied to the public key the customer used when creating the
escrow. The ticket tseq can be any sequence number within the range assigned to the
current ticket issue round. The customer can continue issuing lottery tickets until it
finishes all sequence numbers assigned to the current round. After that, it must wait
the next round to generate more tickets.
Upon receiving a ticket, a merchant verifies it as follows:
• Parse the ticket as (idesc, pkM , tseq, σC).
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• Check that the escrow is not broken
• Check that its address, i.e., pkM that appears in the ticket, is listed as one of
the beneficiary merchants of the escrow.
• Verify that tseq is within the valid range based on the ticket issuing schedule.
(As mentioned before, to handle inconsistencies in the blockchain view, tickets
from the previous or next issuance round can be accepted.)
• Verify σC over the ticket using the public key of the customer who owns the
escrow.
If any of the above checks fails (except the third and the fourth), the merchant
simply drops the ticket. Further actions, such as exiting the current payment ses-
sion, or refusing further transactions with this customer are handled individually by
merchants, based on customer behavior and the merchant’s own policy. On the other
hand, if the ticket has an out-of-range sequence number (i.e., larger than the max-
imum sequence number allowed) or destined to a merchant that is not listed as a
beneficiary of the escrow, the a proof-of-cheating can be issued, which will cost the
customer its penalty deposit. Otherwise, if all the above checks pass, the merchant
accepts the ticket and keeps it until its lottery draw time.
4.4.4 The Lottery Protocol
MicroCash introduces a lightweight lottery protocol that relies solely on hashing. This
protocol does not require any interaction between the customer and the merchant.
Instead, it utilizes only the state of the blockchain, where the lottery draw outcome
is determined by a value derived from the block mined at the lottery draw time.
To specify the lottery draw time, MicroCash defines a system parameter called
ddraw. This parameter represents the number of rounds a ticket has to wait after the
round in which its sequence number can be issued (which we call tissue) until it enters
the lottery. Hence, the draw time tdraw of a ticket is computed as tdraw = tissue + ddraw.
This means that whether a ticket wins or loses the lottery depends on the block at
index tdraw. It also means that all tickets belong to the same ticket issuing round will
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enter the lottery at the same time.
The lottery draw value is computed using a simple verifiable delay function
(VDF) [66] that is evaluated over the block with index tdraw. This evaluation takes
a period of time, hence the name delay function. Consequently, when a miner mines
the block with index tdraw, it cannot tell immediately which ticket will win or lose.
This miner has to compute the VDF over this block in order to reveal the lottery
outcome.
We instantiate the aforementioned VDF using an iterative hash process, where
the number of hash iterations is set to a value that delays producing the output by the
period specified in the system. In addition, we let the miners compute this function
as part of the mining process. That is, when a miner mines a new block, it evaluates
the VDF over the previous block. Therefore, the VDF value of the block at index
tdraw appears on the blockchain when the block at index tdraw + 1 is mined.
Accordingly, in our protocol a merchant keeps a ticket tktL until its lottery draw
time tdraw. Then, after observing the VDF value of the block mined at that time,
the merchant computes the following quantity over this ticket (where H is a hash
function):
htktL = H(idesc||tseq||V DF (Blocktdraw)) (4.2)
A ticket wins if the least significant word of htktL is less than 2
32p. Therefore,
within the precision allowed by a 32-bit number, a ticket will have a p chance of
winning.
This process is clarified by the example depicted in Figure 4.3. As shown, the
ticket has been issued at round 30, and hence, it entered the lottery at round 40. The
VDF value of the block with index 40 appears inside block 41. Based on the value of
htktL , the ticket in the figure is a winning one.
Note that htktL involves only the ticket fields that are part of the escrow state. In
other words, it relies on values that the issuing customer cannot manipulate. These
do not include the merchant recipient address, which means that a ticket chance
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Figure 4.3: Lottery draw example (ddraw = 10, and p = 0.01).
means that if a customer issues a ticket with the same sequence number to multiple
merchants (i.e., duplicate ticket issuance), all these tickets will win or lose together.
If the tickets win, detecting cheating is trivial because both merchants will publish
their winning tickets on the blockchain to redeem the tickets.
4.4.5 Claiming Winning Tickets
After the lottery draw, a merchant can collect currency from the customer’s escrow by
redeeming its winning tickets (if any). This is done by issuing a redeem transaction
that has the winning ticket as input, and has β coins directed to the merchant’s
address as output.
To allow the miners to resolve tickets and release escrow funds back to the cus-
tomer in a reasonable timeframe, MicroCash specifies a redeem period for each ticket.
This is done by defining a system parameter called dredeem that determines the number
of rounds during which a ticket can be redeemed. After this period, a ticket expires,
i.e., becomes invalid, which happens at time texpire = tissue + ddraw + dredeem. Thus,
dredeem must span a period sufficient for merchants to redeem their winning tickets.
After receiving a redeem transaction, the miners process it as follows:
• Check that the format of the transaction complies with the system specifica-
tions.
• Verify the redeemed ticket as outlined in Section 4.4.3.
• Verify that the ticket is a winning one based on equation 4.2.
• Check that the ticket is not expired.
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• Verify the merchant’s signature over the redeem transaction using the public
key that appears in the winning ticket. This is needed to prevent participants
from redeeming tickets they do not own.
• Check that no other ticket with the same tseq and tied to the same escrow has
already been redeemed. If it is, this is proof of duplicate ticket issuance and is
used as a proof-of-cheating against the customer.
If all these checks pass, miners approve the redeem transaction and update the
escrow state accordingly. Otherwise, they drop an invalid transaction and, if a proof-
of-cheating is produced, revoke the customer’s penalty deposit as described in the
next section.
4.4.6 Processing Proof-of-cheating
A proof-of-cheating is a special transaction that can be presented to the miners by
any party who witnesses a cheating incident. In MicroCash, this transaction can be
issued when any of the following cheating behaviors is detected:
• Issuing more tickets than what an escrow can cover, i.e., exceed the maximum
tseq an escrow may allow.
• Duplicate ticket issuance.
• Issuing tickets to a merchant that is not listed as one of the escrow beneficiaries.
A valid proof-of-cheating must provide an irrefutable, publicly verifiable cheating
proof. Accordingly, a signed lottery ticket, or tickets in case of duplicate ticket
issuance, that falls under any of the above violations is a publicly verifiable proof
against the issuing customer.
Upon verifying a cheating incident, miners punish the customer by breaking the
penalty escrow tied to its payment escrow referenced in the ticket. In case of duplicate
ticket issuance, the miners first pay all duplicated winning tickets from the payment
escrow, if it is sufficient, and from the penalty deposit thereafter. Then, they publish
an escrow break transaction containing the proof-of-cheating on the blockchain, which
for security reasons that are explained in Section 5.5, burns the revoked penalty
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deposit. Respecting the lower bound of Bpenalty, ensures that all the aforementioned
cheating behaviors are unprofitable in expectation (i.e., they do not achieve any
additional utility gain over acting in an honest way). Hence, it makes such behaviors
unappealing to rational customers.
4.5 Economic Analysis for Escrows
In this section, we show how to compute the payment escrow balance Bescrow in a way
that satisfies the 1−  coverage rule. We also compute a lower bound for the penalty
deposit required to deter cheating under MicroCash setup.
4.5.1 Computing Bescrow
Computing Bescrow is done using a probabilistic analysis that relies on modeling the
payment process in MicroCash. In what follows, we state and prove a formula to
calculate this balance.
Theorem 1. For an escrow with lifetime lesc rounds, ticket issue rate tktrate, lot-
tery winning probability p, winning ticket currency value β, and parameter , where
lesc, tktrate ∈ N, β ∈ R+, and 0 ≤ p,  ≤ 1, the value of Bescrow needed to cover all
winning lottery tickets with probability at least 1−  under MicroCash setup is given
by:
Bescrow = βF
−1(p, lesctktrate, 1− ) (4.3)
where F−1 is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the binomial
distribution parameterized by p and a number of trials t = lesctktrate at the value 1− .
Proof. Given that we work in the random oracle model, and that we model the
block hashes on the blockchain as a uniform distribution, lottery winning events are
independent and can be modeled as Bernoulli trials. This means that the total number
of winning tickets tied to an escrow with lifetime lesc rounds, ticket issue rate tktrate,
and lottery winning probability p, is a binomial random variable parameterized by p
and a number of trials t = lesctktrate.
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Requiring Bescrow to cover all winning tickets with probability 1 −  means that
Bescrow must contain sufficient currency to pay a number of winning tickets ψ that
hits the (1 − )th percentile of the above binomial distribution, i.e., Bescrow = ψβ.
This number can be computed as:
ψ = F−1(p, lesctktrate, 1− )
where F−1 is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the binomial
distribution parameterized by p and a number of trials t = lesctktrate at the value
1 − . Substituting this expression in Bescrow = ψβ produces the formula stated in
the theorem above, which completes the proof.
4.5.2 Computing a Lower Bound for Bpenalty
Computing a lower bound for Bpenalty is done using a game theoretic approach that
quantifies the additional utility gain, or monetary profit, a malicious customer could
accrue as compared to an honest one. By setting the penalty deposit to at least equal
this additional utility, cheating becomes less profitable, in expectation, than acting
honestly, and hence, unappealing to rational customers.
In what follows, we present this analysis including the addressed malicious
strategies, the game setup, a definition for the utility gain function, and finally state
and prove a lower bound for Bpenalty.
Covered malicious strategies. In MicroCash, a penalty escrow is revoked upon
the detection of two types of malicious events: issuing duplicated tickets and invalid
payments (including those with out-of-range sequence numbers). The utility gain
of any of these malicious strategies depends on the length of the cheating detection
period, i.e., the time needed to detect a cheating incident. During this time the
cheating customer is still perceived as an honest by merchants, meaning that this
customer still can cheat and increase its utility gain. Consequently, the longer the
detection period the larger the additional utility.
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Given that merchants verify each ticket immediately when received, invalid
payments are detected instantly. On the other hand, duplicated tickets are detected
after they are redeemed (if they win the lottery), which may happen after several
rounds in MicroCash. This means that the additional utility gain of ticket duplication
is larger than the one obtained by issuing invalid payments. Therefore, setting the
value of the penalty deposit to be at least equal to the additional utility gain of the
former covers the latter as well. For this reason, we consider only ticket duplication
strategy in our analysis.
Game setup. We have a single player game in which a malicious customer applies
the ticket duplication strategy. This strategy is defined as duplicating a sequence
number among two or more tickets, up to m tickets, where m is the number of
beneficiary merchants that are tied to the same escrow. Based on the design of
MicroCash’s lottery protocol, these duplicated tickets will either all win the lottery
or all lose because the lottery draw does not depend on the ticket recipient address
(see equation 4.2 in Section 4.4.4). This means that duplication among fewer than m
merchants does not reduce the cheating detection probability. Therefore, a rational
customer who decides to duplicate a specific ticket will always duplicate it among all
m merchants.
We define the utility gain function of any customer as the service value minus the
payments made to merchants. We compute the expected value of this function for an
honest customer and for a malicious one that applies the ticket duplication strategy.
In order to deter cheating, we require the latter to be less than or equal to the former.
This is achieved by setting the penalty deposit to be at least equal to the maximum
additional expected utility gained by cheating.
As mentioned previously, MicroCash requires any customer to specify in advance
the set of merchants who are beneficiaries of its escrow. This is needed to be able
to bound the additional utility gain of malicious customers [70]. If this set is not
specified, the additional utility cannot be bounded because we would not know the






u(·) Utility gain function.
τ tktrate (number of tickets that can be issued per round), such that τ ∈ N.
d ddraw (lottery draw period in rounds), such that d ∈ N.
r dredeem (ticket redemption period in rounds), such that r ∈ N.
yi Number of duplicated tickets in round i, such that 0 ≤ yi ≤ τ .
m Number of beneficiary merchants, such that m ∈ N.
p Lottery winning probability, such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
β Currency value of a wining ticket, such that β ∈ R+.
υ lesc (escrow lifetime in rounds), such that υ ∈ N.
The cheating detection period of duplicated tickets in MicroCash is ddraw + dredeem
rounds. That is, a malicious customer will be detected when any of the duplicated
tickets is presented to the miners4. This happens if a duplicated ticket wins the lottery
and then claimed by the merchants. Considering the worst case that this claim may
take place in the last round of the redeem period, cheating will be detected after
ddraw + dredeem rounds from a ticket issue time. At that time, the miners break the
penalty escrow and the cheating customer leaves the system. Otherwise, if none of
the duplicated tickets win, this customer stays and may continue cheating.
Table 4.1 summarizes the notations we use in this section, including shorter
abbreviations than those used earlier in this chapter to simplify presentation.
Additional utility gain analysis. We now state and prove a lower bound for
Bpenalty based on the above game setup.
Theorem 2. For the game and escrow setup described above, issuing invalid or
duplicated lottery tickets is less profitable, in expectation, than acting in an honest
4We do not assume that merchants exchange any information between each others about tickets.
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way if:
Bpenalty > (m− 1)pβτ
(
1
1− (1− p)τ + d+ r − 1
)
(4.4)
Proof. During each round of an escrow lifetime, an honest customer can issue up to
τ tickets with unique sequence numbers. Each ticket has an expected value of pβ
coins, which corresponds to the service value a customer obtains for handing out this
ticket. We use this service value in computing the utility gain function, and hence,
deriving a lower bound for Bpenalty.
In MicroCash, a customer can create an escrow with an υ round lifetime. All
tickets issued in a round enter the lottery after d rounds, and all winning tickets will
expire after r rounds from the lottery draw time. In other words, for each round
i ∈ {1, . . . , υ}, all tickets issued in round i will enter the lottery at round i + d and
will expire at round i+ d+ r.
When applying the duplicated ticket issuance strategy, for each round i ∈
{1, . . . , υ} a malicious customer would decide to duplicate yi tickets, where yi ∈
{1, . . . , τ}. If none of the duplicated tickets win, which happens with probability
(1 − p)yi , the customer stays in the system and obtains an additional utility gain of
(m−1)pβyi over what an honest customer obtains. On the other hand, if any of these
tickets wins the lottery at round i+d, which happens with probability 1−(1−p)yi , the
customer will be detected at round i+ d+ r (the latest). This reduces its additional
utility by Bpenalty as its penalty escrow will be revoked by the miners.
Note that when a duplicated ticket wins, i.e., cheating will be detected, the mali-
cious customer still has r rounds to issue tickets from the time of learning that it will
be caught. Therefore, as a rational behavior, this customer will choose to duplicate
all tickets in these rounds because it will leave the system either way.
In order to compute the additional utility gain, we need to model the duplication
decisions a malicious customer would make at each round of an escrow lifetime. We
use a decision process diagram that captures a process evolution over time. Such a
diagram contains states indicating the rounds, and transition probabilities between




Figure 4.4: Decision process for a 3 round escrow with d = 2 rounds and r = 1 round.
Arrows carry probabilities, decisions are found below the states, and the utility gain
is found above the states.
shows the additional utility of being at each state, or round, in the system.
To clarify this concept, we consider a simple case where we have an escrow with
3 round lifetime, d = 2 rounds, and r = 1 round. The decision process for this setup
is captured in Figure 4.4. As shown, a customer issues tickets for rounds 1 and 2
before any lottery draw takes place, where it duplicates y1 and y2 tickets, respectively.
All tickets issued during round 1 enter the lottery at the beginning of round 3 (or
immediately after the end of round 2 as depicted in the figure). If none of these
tickets win, the malicious customer obtains an additional utility gain of (m− 1)pβy1
and proceeds to round 3. For this round, the customer decides to duplicate y3 tickets.
On the other hand, if any of the y1 tickets wins, the customer knows that it will be
detected at the end of round 3 (since r = 1). Hence, it decides to duplicate all tickets
in round 3 (i.e., y3 = τ). The total additional utility it obtains in this case, which is
displayed above the exit state as this customer will leave the system, is the sum of
the utility gain of duplicating y1, y2, and y3 tickets, where y3 = τ , minus the penalty
deposit that will be revoked.
The same analogy is applied to the rest of the rounds, with the exception that at
the very last rounds there are less than r rounds to be used at the exit state. In other
words, the number of remaining rounds in the escrow lifetime could be less than r,
and hence, a customer will duplicate fewer than rτ tickets, e.g., see the exit state
after round i = 3 in Figure 4.4.
Instead of analyzing a decision process for an υ round escrow directly, we formulate
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the expected utility gain of a malicious customer in a recursive way. That is, we use
the expected utility gain in an υ − 1 round escrow to compute the expected utility
gain in an υ round escrow, and so on. Intuitively, during the first round of an υ
round escrow, a malicious customer will decide to duplicate y1 tickets. If any of these
tickets wins at round 1+ d, cheating will be detected. In this case, and as mentioned
earlier, the customer will duplicate all tickets for the next r rounds and will pay the
penalty Bpenalty. This means that with probability 1 − (1 − p)y1 , the utility gain of
this customer is (m− 1)pβ(∑di=1 yi + rτ)−Bpenalty.
If none of the y1 tickets wins the lottery, the customer stays in the system. In this
case, round 2 was a fresh start for this customer in an υ − 1 round escrow. That is,
after collecting the utility gain of duplicating y1 tickets, the customer started fresh
in a one round shorter escrow. This means that with probability (1− p)y1 , the utility
gain of this customer will be (m−1)pβy1+Eυ−1[u(Cˆ)], where the second term denotes
the expected utility gain of a malicious customer in a υ − 1 round escrow.




1− (1− p)y1)((m− 1)pβ d∑
i=1





(m− 1)pβy1 + Eυ−1[u(Cˆ)]
)
(4.5)
But we have Eυ−1[u(Cˆ)] ≤ 0 since the penalty for an υ− 1 round escrow has been
configured in a way that makes Eυ−1[u(Cˆ)] ≤ 0 in order to deter cheating. Hence,
and by requiring Eυ[u(Cˆ)] ≤ 0 to make cheating unprofitable, we find that:
Bpenalty(y1, . . . , yd) ≥ (m− 1)pβ
(
y1






For any d and r value, the above quantity is maximized when yi = τ for i ∈
{1, . . . , d}.5 Substituting this in equation 4.6 produces the lower bound stated in the







. For the first term, we used a
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theorem, which completes the proof.
As an example, let’s consider an escrow with a 200 round lifetime, τ = 1000
tickets, p = 0.01, β = 1 coin, m = 5, d = 6, r = 6, and  = 0.01. Applying
equation 4.3 produces Bescrow = 2, 104 coins (note that the expected total payments,
i.e., coverage with probability 0.5, is 2,000 coins). And applying equation 4.4 produces
Bpenalty ≥ 480 coins.
4.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the resilience of MicroCash to the threats outlined in
Section 4.3. While investigating all possible attack scenarios, using ABC’s collusion
matrices, we analyzed 126 threat cases to distill 11 cases that MicroCash must
address to secure its operation. In defending against these threats, our scheme
utilizes cryptographic and financial techniques based on the threat type to be
addressed. This is discussed in the following paragraphs.
Escrow overdraft. This threat can be exploited using several strategies, including:
• A customer creates a payment escrow with a balance that does not obey the
1 −  rule, or a penalty escrow with a balance that cannot cover the financial
punishment.
• A customer issues more tickets than tktrate as specified in its escrow setup.
• A customer performs a front running attack in which it withdraws the payment
escrow before paying merchants, or withdraws the penalty escrow before paying
the financial punishment in the case of cheating.
The first strategy, in which a customer creates payment and penalty escrows
with insufficient balance, is neutralized by the escrow setup of MicroCash. When
processing an escrow creation transaction, the miners check that the payment escrow
simple iterative program to compute the value of y1 that maximizes this term for p ∈ {2−1, . . . , 2−10}
and τ ≤ 106. We found that y1 = τ for all these p values. The second term is maximized when yi
is set to its maximum value, which is τ , for all i ∈ {2, . . . , d}.
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balance covers all winning tickets with probability 1 − . In addition, they check
that the penalty deposit meets the lower bound derived in the previous section. The
miners will reject any escrow that do not satisfy these conditions.
The second strategy, i.e., issuing more tickets than can be covered by the escrow,
is not possible because lottery tickets are tracked using their sequence number. That
is, it is not possible for the client to issue more tickets than tktrate in any round
because each merchant checks the sequence number when verifying any received ticket.
Merchants will reject any ticket with a sequence number outside of the current round
(modulo one round to deal with desynchronized views of the blockchain).
For the last strategy that covers front running attacks, such attacks are mitigated
by the escrow spending mechanism and the lottery protocol implemented in Micro-
Cash. A customer does not control any of the escrows it owns. Instead, fund release is
triggered only by the receipt of a valid winning lottery ticket, in case of the payment
escrow, or a valid proof-of-cheating, in case of the penalty escrow. Honest miners will
enforce these rules in the system.
As mentioned previously, MicroCash burns penalty escrow funds when a proof-of-
cheating is received, rather than providing them to another party, for the following
reason. If the funds are provided to another party, that party may have colluded
with the customer to receive those funds. This would reduce the effective penalty
of cheating imposed on the customer. To mitigate this, miners burn the funds in a
penalty escrow (this is after paying out the merchants in case of ticket duplication).
Duplicate Ticket Issuance. MicroCash addresses this attack financially through
a detect-and-punish approach. Any party that detects two or more tickets carrying
identical sequence numbers, and issued using the same escrow, can produce a
proof-of-cheating against the issuing customer. Miners publish this proof on the
blockchain, which burns the customer’s penalty escrow as a punishment. Setting
the penalty deposit as described in Section 4.5 makes cheating unprofitable, which
deters rational customers from attempting this malicious strategy.
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Invalid payments. To pursue this attack, a customer may issue tickets with invalid
format or invalid field values knowing that these tickets cannot be claimed later if
they win. An invalid ticket is a ticket that uses an invalid escrow (e.g., a broken
one), or has an invalid (tissue, tseq) tuple, or destined to a merchant that is not one of
the escrow beneficiaries. These events can be detected instantly because merchants
validate all lottery tickets before accepting them. As mentioned previously, an
invalid ticket is dropped unless it has an invalid (tissue, tseq) tuple or a merchant that
is not a member of the set of beneficiary merchants. Such a ticket can be used as a
proof-of-cheating that costs the customer its penalty escrow, which exceeds the profit
of cheating as explained in the previous section. This deters rational customers from
issuing invalid tickets.
Unused-escrow withholding. This threat is mitigated by the expiration rule of
lottery tickets and MicroCash’s escrow refund policy. Each ticket has a redemption
period after which it expires. Hence, a merchant who tries to put an escrow on hold
by delaying claiming its winning ticket claim will lose its payment. Furthermore,
when all tickets tied to an escrow expire, i.e., when trefund is approached, the miners
will allow the owner-customer to spend the remaining funds in its escrow. This
prevents locking unused escrow funds indefinitely on the blockchain.
DoS. As DoS is a large threat category, in this work we consider the cases that are
different and unique to the design of MicroCash. These include preventing customers
from creating escrows, preventing merchants from claiming their winning lottery tick-
ets, or control relaying blocks and transactions based on their content. Such situa-
tions may happen when miners disregard specific transactions or blocks, or when an
attacker controls the network links and drops specific transactions or blocks.
The case of miners disregarding specific transactions/blocks may take place when
an attacker controls a substantial portion of the mining power. This may work even
under the assumption that the majority of the mining power is honest. That is,
an attacker with < 50% of the mining power may still be able to perform harmful
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attacks, e.g., selfish mining [116]. To protect against selective relaying, techniques
that allow propagating blocks and transactions without disclosing their content can
be employed, e.g., BloXroute [18].
The case of controlling the network links, which represents attacks against the
network availability, is a potential problem in any distributed system in general.
Deploying mechanisms to enhance network connectivity, e.g., participants maintain
connections with large number of miners, may reduce the effect of this attack. Such
mechanisms are independent of the design of MicroCash, it is up to the parties
themselves to adopt suitable solutions.
Lottery manipulation. This threat covers all strategies that could be used to
manipulate the lottery draw, including:
• An attacker, who could be any party inside or outside the system, tries to
influence the hash used in a lottery draw in order to make specific tickets win,
or lose.
• A malicious customer may issue winning lottery tickets, to itself or to malicious
colluding merchants, to drain the escrow before other merchants can claim their
winning tickets.
• A malicious customer deliberately issues losing tickets to merchants to avoid
paying them.
• An attacker, insider or outsider, tries to issue lottery tickets to herself or others.
In the first strategy, an attacker tries to influence the lottery by controlling the
hash used in the lottery draw. This can be done by either manipulating the ticket
fields that impact the lottery, where the issuing customer may tweak a ticket in order
to produce a favorable hash. Or by controlling the hash of the block mined at time
tdraw, where a miner may forgo any block that does not produce a favorable lottery
outcome (i.e., a favorable VDF value). Or even this malicious miner may publish an
incorrect VDF value in order to bias the lottery draw outcome.
All these malicious behaviors are mitigated by the lottery protocol design. The
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ticket fields that impact the lottery draw include only the ones that appear in the
escrow state, which cannot be tweaked by the issuing customer, or any other party.
For discarding unfavorable blocks, recall that the lottery draw is based on the VDF
value of the block at index tdraw. This value needs time to be computed. Therefore,
a miner who chooses to perform this computation, and then announce a favorable
block, will have a low chance of succeeding in publishing this block on the blockchain.
This is because other miners will announce their blocks immediately once they mine
them. The chances are higher for any of these blocks to be adopted by the network,
and hence, to be used in the lottery draw (under the assumption that the majority
of the mining power is honest). Furthermore, publishing an invalid VDF value will
not succeed. This is because honest miners, who already computed this value during
mining their blocks, will reject a newly received block with a VDF value that does
not agree with the one they computed. Consequently, such a malicious miner will
not only fail in biasing the lottery, but also will lose the mining rewards.
In the second strategy, a malicious customer tries to withdraw an escrow indirectly
by issuing winning tickets to itself, and claim these tickets before merchants can claim
their payments. To do so, a customer may wait until the block at index tdraw is mined
and then print winning tickets to itself. This techniques is mitigated by the lottery
protocol design. After observing the block at time tdraw, the customer cannot do
anything to produce winning tickets other than checking which sequence numbers
are winning (assuming it did not use these sequence numbers to pay any merchant
earlier). This customer cannot manipulate the ticket fields to make a losing tseq wins
as mentioned previously. Also, it cannot issue losing tickets using these sequence
numbers to merchants because it is too late (the issue time of these tickets was ddraw
rounds earlier), and hence, merchants will not accept these losing tickets. On the
other hand, a customer who saves some sequence numbers and use them to issue
tickets to itself, if they win, will not affect the payments of other merchants. This
is because these sequence numbers are covered by the payment escrow balance (i.e.,
they are legitimate tickets covered by the escrow).
The third strategy, where a customer deliberately hand merchants losing tickets,
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succeeds with a very low probability. In order to determine which ticket will lose the
lottery, this customer needs to predict the hash of the future block mined at time
tdraw in order to compute the VDF value of this block, or even guess the VDF value
itself. Since hashes are modeled as random oracles, predicting such values succeeds
with negligible probability.
Lastly, the fourth strategy, in which an attacker tries to issue tickets tied to
escrows she does not own, will not succeed due to the use of secure cryptographic
signatures. MicroCash requires any customer to sign all lottery tickets it issues, which
means that to issue a valid ticket an attacker needs to forge the customer’s signature.
By using a secure digital signature scheme, and unless an attacker steals the signing
key, such an attack will fail with all but negligible probability.
4.7 Performance Evaluation
In order to understand the performance benefit of concurrent probabilistic micropay-
ments, this section evaluates the computation, bandwidth, and payment setup costs
of MicroCash. To do this, we conduct empirical experiments to answer the following
questions:
• How fast can customers, merchants, and miners process lottery tickets?
• What is the bandwidth cost of exchanging these tickets?
• What is the size of escrows on the blockchain?
• How do the schemes compare using workload numbers derived from real world
scenarios?
To put our results in context, we compare our scheme with MICROPAY [111].
The rest of this section describes our methodology and discusses the significance of
the obtained results.
4.7.1 Methodology
To establish our benchmarks, we implemented the functions used for generating tick-
ets, verifying these ticket, and performing a lottery draw. For MicroCash, we followed
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the design introduced in this chapter. For MICROPAY, we tested its fully decentral-
ized version, called MICROPAY1, with its non-interactive lottery protocol [111]. This
protocol requires a merchant to publish the description of a verifiable unpredictable
function to perform the lottery. For this function, we used the verifiable random func-
tion (VRF) construction introduced by Goldberg et al. [80] with its implementation
over the NIST P-256 curve [39].
Two cryptographic primitives affect the implementation of both MicroCash and
MICROPAY, namely, hash functions and digital signatures. For hashing, we used
SHA256. For digital signatures, elliptic curve based constructions are usually used,
e.g., ECDSA and EdDSA, with various options for the underlying elliptic curve. We
chose to test the most common schemes, including ECDSA with secp256k1 curve
(used in Bitcoin and most cryptocurrencies), ECDSA with P-256 curve (widely used
and recommended by NIST), and EdDSA with Ed25519 curve [65] (received a great
interest recently due to its security and efficiency, where several major cryptocurren-
cies are using this scheme [34, 42] or preparing to switch to it [25, 41]).
We computed the performance metrics of interest as follows. We measured the
computation cost as the rate at which customers, merchants, and miners can pro-
cess lottery tickets. And we measured the bandwidth overhead by reporting on the
size of tickets (in bytes) when exchanged between customers and merchants, and the
size of winning tickets claimed by merchants through the miners. To evaluate the
effect of micropayment concurrency, we computed the number of escrows a customer
would need to support the ticket issue rate in each of the tested schemes. Further-
more, we studied two real life applications and computed the overhead of processing
micropayments using workload numbers derived from these applications.
Lastly, our experiments were implemented in C on an Intel Core i7-4600U CPU
@ 2.1 GHz, with 4 MB cache and 8 GB RAM, where each of the payment processing
functions was called 106 times.
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Customer 1891 32606 20884
Merchant 1353 2530 2509
Miner 1365 2591 2565
MicroCash
Customer 1890 32978 20879
Merchant 2266 10463 7825
Miner 2266 10463 7825
4.7.2 Microbenchmark Results
Lottery ticket processing rate
We start by quantifying the computation cost of processing micropayments in both
schemes. This is done by measuring the rate at which a customer can generate lottery
tickets, the rate at which a merchant can process these tickets, which involves both
validating a ticket and running the lottery6, and the rate at which miners validate
claimed tickets. The obtained results are found in Table 4.2.
As the table shows, customers in both schemes generate tickets at comparable
rates. This is because the operations performed when issuing a ticket are almost
identical in MicroCash and MICROPAY, with the exception that a ticket size in
MICROPAY is larger. The heaviest operation in this process is signing a ticket.
For this reason, the generation rates improve by using an efficient digital signature
scheme, where ECDSA over P-256 is the most efficient scheme. Such an improvement
is significant, as reported in Table 4.2, where replacing ECDSA (secp256k1) with
ECDSA (P-256) and EdDSA (Ed25519) boosts the performance by around 17x and
11x, respectively.
6Although a merchant in MicroCash runs the lottery several rounds after validating a ticket, we
report the cost of these two operations together. This is because such cost is the overhead per ticket
incurred on the merchant side.
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The trend is different for the rates of merchants and miners. As shown in Table 4.2,
these parties in MicroCash are 1.67x, 4.1x, and 3.1x faster than in MICROPAY for the
three digital signature schemes. This is because miners and merchants run the lottery
over the received ticket. In MicroCash, this process involves a single, lightweight
hash operation. On the other hand, the lottery in MICROPAY requires evaluating a
computationally-heavy VRF.
Furthermore, merchants and miners in MicroCash benefit more from the effi-
ciency of the used digital signature scheme. This is because the heaviest operation
these parties perform when processing a ticket in MicroCash is verifying a customer’s
signature. However, in MICROPAY the bottleneck is evaluating a VRF and pro-
ducing a proof that its output is correct on the merchant side, and verifying this
proof on the miner side. Thus, verifying the signature over a ticket comprise a small
portion of the computation needed to verify a ticket in MICROPAY. For this rea-
son, optimizing the digital signature scheme has a larger effect in MicroCash. As
shown in the table, MICROPAY obtains only around 1.9x improvement when replac-
ing ECDSA (secp256k1) with any of the other two schemes. In contrast, MicroCash
achieves around 4.6x and 3.45x improvement when replacing ECDSA (secp256k1)
with ECDSA (P-256) or EdDSA (Ed25519), respectively.
Key Takeaway: Compared to MICROPAY, MicroCash reduces the computa-
tional load on merchants and miners by a factor of 1.67-4.1x.
Lottery ticket bandwidth cost
In terms of bandwidth overhead, MicroCash incurs less overhead than MICROPAY
because its lottery tickets are of smaller size. A ticket sent from a customer to a
merchant is 142 bytes in MicroCash, while it is 274 bytes in MICROPAY7. A winning
ticket sent from merchants to miners is also 142 bytes in MicroCash, while it is 355
bytes for MICROPAY becuase this ticket must be accompanied with an additional
7For MICROPAY each lottery ticket contains a sequence number, the public keys of the cus-
tomer, the recipient merchant, and the escrow, beside a description of a VRF that includes the
group order, generator, and the VRF public key.
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field, a NIZK proof8. This means that MicroCash incurs only 52% of the bandwidth
cost of MICROPAY between customers and merchants, and only 40% of the cost
between merchants and miners.
To put these numbers in context, we report on the transaction sizes in Bitcoin.
The average size is around 500 byte, where a transaction with one or two inputs is
about 250 bytes [44]. Adding a winning ticket as one of these inputs produces a claim
transaction with a size of 392 bytes in MicroCash, which is less than the average
Bitcoin transaction size. While in MICROPAY, the size of a claim transaction will
be 605 bytes, exceeding the average size.
Key Takeaway: The use of efficient lottery protocol reduces not only the com-
putation cost in MicroCash, but also the bandwidth cost of exchanging lottery tickets
and the amount of data to be logged on the blockchain.
Size of escrow data on the blockchain
One major difference between concurrent and sequential micropayment schemes is
that concurrent schemes allow multiple winning tickets per escrow. This means that
the size of escrow data on the blockchain will vary based upon the number of winning
tickets. So, an escrow with 100 winning tickets in MicroCash will prevent 99 escrow
transactions that would have occurred with MICROPAY.
Additionally, in sequential micropayments, as in MICROPAY, the ticket issuance
rate also makes a difference in terms of the number of escrows needed. This is because
a new ticket cannot be issued using the same escrow until it is confirmed that the prior
ticket did not win, which requires the customer to wait for the merchant to announce
the lottery result. To issue another ticket during this waiting time, a customer needs
a different escrow. Hence, a customer might slow down just because it does not have
enough escrows to allow this rate. Furthermore, even if the customer is willing to
create larger number of escrows, this dramatically increases the payment setup cost.
Each of these escrows requires an individual escrow creation transaction, which in
8All these sizes are few bytes less when EdDSA is used because the signature is shorter than
what ECDSA produces.
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turn requires paying a transaction fee and logging on the blockchain.
For example, to support the ticket issue rates reported in Table 4.2, a MICROPAY
customer would need large number of escrows. The exact number of escrows needed
depends on the network latency and a merchant’s ticket processing rate. Using the
average US RTT of 31 ms [6], and the processing time of the tickets reported in the
table, in the best case an escrow in MICROPAY can be used to issue 32 tickets per
second (this is in case none of these ticket win or only the last one wins). Therefore,
a customer in MICROPAY would need 60, 1019, or 653 escrows to support the gen-
eration rates for signature schemes ECDSA (secp256k1), ECDSA (P-256), or EdDSA
(Ed25519), respectively, as found in Table 4.2. On the other hand, a customer in Mi-
croCash would need only one escrow with proper balance to pay at any given ticket
rate.
Key Takeaway: Supporting micropayment concurrency dramatically reduces
the amount of escrow data on the blockchain.
4.7.3 Micropayments in Real World Applications
To ground our results in real world numbers, we examined two applications; online
gaming and peer-assisted content delivery networks (CDNs). We computed the over-
head of processing micropyaments with parameter values derived based on the service
price and workload in these applications. This is done for three cases: Bitcoin without
employing any micropayment scheme, Bitcoin with MICROPAY, and Bitcoin with
MicroCash.
Setup
We begin with the online gaming. For this application we used data from the popular
game Minecraft [33] as an example. The average mid tier cost of playing this game
for 8 players is around $12 per month [26]. We considered 1000 players distributed
among 125 servers. This means that the service price is $0.034722 per minute (or
$0.000579 per second) for the 1000 players.
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For the peer-assisted CDN application, we considered a content publisher who
hires peers as caches to distribute the content for its clients. Suppose that a publisher
wants to serve content at roughly 1Gpbs. Such a service costs around $17,312 monthly
in the US [5], and hence, on average, the service cost per second is $0.006679. The
publisher will provide a lottery ticket to a cache for each 1MB data chunk it serves.
Thus, to support a rate of 1Gbps, the publisher will issue 128 tickets per second.
With these combined values, it is possible to compute the lottery winning prob-
ability p and the currency value of a winning ticket β. The former is done by de-
termining the total transaction fee to be paid for the miners (per second), and then
compute p in a way that makes the fees paid when claiming winning tickets (per
second) does not exceed this value. We consider the fee to be 2% of the service cost
paid per second [7] (at a minimum)9. For the fee of redeeming a winning ticket, we
use the median transaction fee in Bitcoin, which is around $0.068 as of late January
2019 [10].
Based on that, the fees per second are equal to the expected number of win-
ning tickets per second multiplied by the transaction fee that miners charge. So
in Minecraft, p can be computed as p = (0.02)(0.000579)
(16.67)(0.068)
= 0.00001, where 16.67 is
the number of tickets issued by all players per second (the 1000 players issue 1000




As for computing β, it can be estimated by dividing the service cost by the number
of winning tickets (both per second). In Minecraft, this produces β = $3.472, and it
is $3.4 in the CDN application.
For the escrow setup, in Minecraft, we assume that each player creates one escrow
per month. For the CDN application, we consider a publisher creating one escrow
per day. In addition to that, in MICROPAY a new escrow must be created after each
winning ticket.
It should be noted that in both the gaming and CDN examples, we account for
9In both example, we assume that the players and the publisher will pay at the same price
offered by a gaming or CDN company.
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Table 4.3: Micropayment overhead in online gaming (a round is 10 min).
Metric Bitcoin MICROPAY MicroCash
Winning tickets / sec N/A 0.000167 0.000167
Escrows / sec N/A 0.000552 0.000386
Transactions /sec 16.67 0.000719 0.000552
Transaction fees / round $680 $0.02934 $0.02254
Bandwidth between players
and miners
3,333 bps 1.105 bps 1.0093 bps
Bandwidth between players
and servers
N/A 36,533 bps 18,933 bps
Bandwidth between servers
and miners
N/A 0.807 bps 0.523 bps
Delta blockchain size / round 2.38 MB 0.000137 MB 0.00011 MB
the cost of operating the service only. For example, there is no money given to
fund Minecraft’s development team (which was presumably supported by the initial
purchase of the game) or to produce the video content that was served by the CDN.
In practice, operational costs are minimal compared to the development cost which
can run in the hundreds of millions of dollars [47].
We used this setup to compute overhead of micropayment processing for both
applications as shown in what follows.
Online Gaming Application
We used the configuration parameters outlined earlier to compute the cost of mi-
cropyament processing in this application. The results are found in Table 4.3.
We start with the number of transactions the miners process. In Bitcoin, all
micropayments will be processed as individual transactions. In contrast, with MI-
CROPAY and MicroCash, only winning tickets and escrow creation transactions will
be sent to the miners. Given that MICROPAY is a sequential scheme, where every
time a ticket wins the escrow breaks, the number of escrows per round equals to the
expected number of winning tickets per round. While in MicroCash, a player may
use one escrow for the duration of their subscription (a month, in our case). Conse-
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quently, and as the table shows, MicroCash generates 25% fewer transactions (both
escrow and winning ticket redemption).
The number of transactions affects the amount of fees miner charge for processing.
As the table shows, processing micropayments individually is expensive, which is $680
per round (a transaction costs around $0.068 as mentioned previously). However, in
MicroCash and MICROPAY, such a fee is paid only when claiming winning tickets
or creating escrows. Furthermore, due to the reduced number of escrows, MicroCash
incurs the least fees, which is around 75% of MICROPAY’s fees.
For the bandwidth cost, in Bitcoin players will send all micropayments directly
to the miners. They do not send anything to the servers nor servers send anything to
the miners. While in MICROPAY and MicroCash, all lottery tickets are exchanged
locally between players and servers. Only escrows and winning tickets will be sent to
the miners. Based on the average size of a Bitcoin transaction (around 250 bytes as
mentioned earlier), the size of an escrow transaction in MICROPAY is around 250
bytes, while it is around 327 bytes in MicroCash. This is because our scheme adds
additional fields to store the payment setup parameters as described in Section 4.4.2.
For the size of a claim transaction, beside the transaction average size, we add the
size of a winning ticket (142 bytes in case of MicroCash and 355 bytes in case of
MICROPAY). As shown in Table 4.3, the bandwidth cost between players/servers
and the miners in Bitcoin is more than 3000x the cost incurred in MICROPAY or
MicroCash. This shows the great benefit of processing payments locally using a
micropayment scheme.
The bandwidth cost of the miners can be used to quantify the increase in the
blockchain size per round, where all transactions sent to the miners are logged on the
blockchain. As the table shows, logging all micropayments is prohibitive, it requires
more than 2 MB per round. In Bitcoin, only one block of size 1MB can be published
per round, meaning that paying at this relatively slow rate cannot be supported. On
the other hand, this overhead is reduced to less than 0.00015 MB in MICROPAY and
MicroCash.
101
Table 4.4: Micropayment overhead in Peer-assisted CDNs (a round is 10 min).
Metric Bitcoin MICROPAY MicroCash
Winning tickets / sec N/A 0.001964 0.001964
Escrows / sec N/A 0.001976 0.00001157
Transactions /sec 128 0.00394 0.001976
Transaction fees / round $5,222 $0.160769 $0.08062
Bandwidth between publisher
and miners
256,000 bps 3.95 bps 0.165 bps
Bandwidth between publisher
and caches
N/A 280,576 bps 145,408 bps
Bandwidth between caches
and miners
N/A 9.508 bps 6.16 bps
Delta blockchain size / round 18.31 MB 0.000963 MB 0.000452 MB
Peer-assisted CDN Application
The results for this application are found in Table 4.4. There is a more dramatic
benefit to employing a micropayment scheme for serving CDN traffic than the gaming
application because the workload is larger.
As the table shows, in plain Bitcoin, 128 transactions per second are processed by
the miners, which is the number of data chunks caches serve per second. Whereas this
number drops to fractions in both MICROPAY and MicroCash, with 50% reduction
in MicroCash as compared to MICROPAY. This is reflected on both the transaction
fees and the blockchain size. Processing micropayments individually costs more than
$5,000 per round, while these fees drop to cents when a micropayment scheme is
employed. It also requires logging more than 18 MB per round on the blockchain.
On the other hand, this overhead is reduced to around 0.001 MB in MICROPAY and
0.0005 in MicroCash. This shows the great advantage of employing a micropayment
scheme for heavy loaded applications, and the benefit of supporting micropayment
concurrency (where MicroCash reduced the additional blockchain size and the total
fees by around 50%).
For the bandwidth cost between participants, in plain Bitcoin the miners have,
at least, 19,000x the cost when a micropayment scheme is employed. Moreover,
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MicroCash incurs almost no bandwidth cost between the publisher and the miners.
This is despite the fact that in this application, an escrow creation transaction in
MicroCash is larger than the one needed in MICROPAY (such a transaction is around
1,783 byte in MicroCash, where we consider 45 beneficiary caches to support the rate
of 1Gbps10). Such a minimal cost is due to payment concurrency, where MicroCash
allows creating a one long-lifetime escrow instead of large number of escrows as in
MICROPAY. Even for ticket exchange, MicroCash incurs a lower cost although both
schemes have the same number of tickets. This is because a ticket (on-chain or off-
chain) in MicroCash is substantially smaller than in MICROPAY.
Key Takeaways: Micropayments are absolutely critical to be able to process
small transactions in modern applications. MicroCash is cost efficient enough even
to be used in gaming and CDN apps where content production is not part of the
cost passed along to users. Concurrent use of a single escrow decreases the total data
added to the blockchain by roughly half.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced MicroCash, the first decentralized probabilistic frame-
work that supports concurrent micropayments. MicroCash enables processing small
monetary transactions with low overhead. This is done by introducing an escrow
setup and ticket tracking mechanism that permit a customer to rapidly issue tickets
in parallel using only one escrow. Moreover, MicroCash is cost effective, where it fea-
tures a non-interactive lottery protocol for micropayment aggregation that is based
solely on hashing. When compared to the sequential scheme MICROPAY, MicroCash
has a significant performance increase while substantially decreasing the bandwidth
cost and the amount of data stored on the blockchain.
In the next chapter, we present the main system, CacheCash, that builds upon
all modules introduced in this and previous chapters to provide a secure and efficient
fully distributed CDN service.
10We use the average upload speed in the US [8], which is 22.79 Mbps. Hence, to serve 1Gbps,
a publisher needs 45 caches.
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Chapter 5
Putting it Together: Tapping New Security and Efficiency
Strategies to Build CacheCash
This chapter is based on joint work with Allison Bishop and Justin Cappos [55].
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present the core part of this dissertation, CacheCash, the first
decentralized CDN system designed to address many of the limitations of existing
solutions discussed in Section 1.2. We show how CacheCash combines the modules
introduced in the previous chapters toward supporting a secure, efficient, and cost
effective content delivery service.
As mentioned previously, CacheCash creates a distributed bandwidth market that
enables publishers to hire caches on an as-needed basis. This market allows end users
to organically set up new caches and serve content, without introducing any trust
assumptions or pre-authentication requirements, and uses a cryptocurrency system
to reward these caches in a distributed way. Thus, it permits caches to dynamically
come and go as demand shifts, without constraining either caches or publishers with
long-term business commitments.
In order to support such a flexible service model, CacheCash introduces a novel
service-payment exchange protocol that reduces the risks of dealing with distrusted
parties in P2P networks. This protocol utilizes gradual content disclosure and partial
payment collection to encourage the honest collaborative work between peers, and to
stabilize the work relation between a cache and a publisher. In detail, CacheCash
devises a unique way to reward caches by modifying MicroCash to support two ticket
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types instead of one, and to allow variable winning ticket currency value instead of
a fixed payment amount. Furthermore, CacheCash utilizes CAPnet’s accountability
puzzle in finalizing a cache payment, where the full service reward cannot be collected
unless the client solves a puzzle correctly over the requested content. All these design
decisions are guided by a thorough threat model built using the ABC framework.
For serving each data chunk of the requested content, a cache receives two lottery
tickets. It collects the first ticket after delivering a double encrypted chunk to the
client, in exchange for the outer layer decryption key. While this cache collects the
second ticket after the client solves a cache accountability puzzle over the retrieved
chunks proving the correctness of the data, and confirming that caches performed the
promised work. CacheCash ties the currency value of both tickets together, where
collecting more winning tickets of the second type increases the currency value of a
winning ticket of the first type. This motivates caches to work faithfully and collect
both tickets. It also encourages any cache , to continue working with the same
publisher to increase the accumulative number of winning tickets from the second
type, and thus, increasing its profits.
The security of CacheCash relies on employing both cryptographic approaches and
rational financial incentives. The latter is based on a detailed game theoretic analysis
that determines how to make honesty the most profitable option for all entities in
the system. Furthermore, this analysis shows how to configure the payment function
used to compute the currency value of winning tickets in a way that captures the
aforementioned goals.
Equally important for its use in practical applications, CacheCash does not sac-
rifice efficiency for enhanced security. Its tools are built on computationally-light
primitives and operations, and it utilizes several techniques to boost performance.
Publishers achieve a high degree of efficiency by processing clients’ requests in batches,
and by offloading, as one response, all the information a client needs to complete a
service request. Similarly, caches and clients implement a lightweight data service
protocol. Hence, caches are able to serve large number of clients concurrently, and
clients are able to retrieve large amounts of data with low resource consumption.
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In evaluating the performance of the system, our benchmark results show that
a modest client machine can retrieve content at rate of around 122 Mbps, which is
enough to watch dozens 1080p quality videos simultaneously. A low-end cache can
serve clients at a bitrate of more than 20 Gbps (capped by the upload bandwidth
speed such a cache has). Even a low-end publisher machine can serve content requests
at a rate sufficient for 315,780 simultaneous views of the same 1080p video. All of
these rates are supported with very low bandwidth overhead, less than 0.1%.
5.2 Threat Model
As we have stated previously, working in a monetary-incentivized environment that
allows anyone to join creates several security risks. Participants will likely try to
maximize their monetary gains, even by using a malicious strategy. This section
presents a threat model for CacheCash that guided its design.
We used ABC (Chapter 2) to build a threat model for CacheCash1, under the
same set of assumptions found in Section 4.3. In this process, we identified the assets
to be protected in cryptocurrency-based distributed CDNs. These assets include the
service and the service rewards or payments2. By analyzing the security requirements
of these assets, we produced a set of broad threat categories, which includes the
following:
• Service corruption: This threat takes place when a client, who faithfully
obtains data chunks, retrieves the correct amount of data, but this data (or part
of it) has been altered in a way that results in retrieving corrupted content.
• Service theft: In this attack, honest caches that serve a client correctly do
not get their payments. The attacker could be a publisher (possibly colluding
with a client) who may manipulate payments to avoid paying caches or a client
that pretends it does not obtain correct service.
1A detailed version of the threat model is available online [31]
2Note that assets from the micropayment scheme are secured under the design of MicroCash,
and those for the currency exchange medium are part of Bitcoin threat model as we assume the use
of a modified version of Bitcoin network protocol.
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• Cache accounting attacks: In this attack, caches receive payments without
doing all the required work. It may happen when a client (who is not inter-
ested in the data) colludes with caches to help them collect currency without
delivering any service.
• Denial of service (DoS): This is a large threat category that includes all
attack forms that interrupt system operation and make it unavailable to legit-
imate users. We focus on attacks related to the content distribution service,
such as monitoring the network and dropping all service requests and pay-
ments, ignoring all content requests initiated by a specific client, or sending a
huge number of requests to publishers or caches to waste their resources.
As mentioned in Section 1.3, CacheCash does not address preserving digital rights
of publishers nor client privacy. Such an issues are part of our future work.
5.3 CacheCash Design
The design of CacheCash can be described as a series of interrelated processes, which
collectively create an efficient and cost-effective CDN service that achieves the goal
outlined in Section 1.3. This design combines cache accountability puzzles, decen-
tralized probabilistic micropayments, and rational financial incentives to secure the
service-payment exchange process. In addition, it taps various performance optimiza-
tion techniques to reduce system overhead. This section presents an overview of the
system followed by a detailed description of its individual operations.
5.3.1 Work Environment Model
CacheCash’s network, as depicted in Figure 5.1, is composed of four types of partic-
ipants: content publishers, their clients, caches, and miners. The roles and relations
between publisher, clients, and caches are the same as defined in CAPnet’s network
model (see Section 3.3.1). The only difference is that publishers pay caches cryptocur-
rency tokens in exchange for the content distribution service. The miners perform
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Figure 5.1: CacheCash network model.
and maintaining the blockchain). In addition, these miners implement the probabilis-
tic micropayment scheme CacheCash adopts, and punish cheaters financially based
on the protocol design. In implementing the underlying cryptucrrency system, we
assume the use of a modified version of Bitcoin’s network protocol. Such a version
includes all the additional transaction types and processing logic that CacheCash
requires.
5.3.2 CacheCash in a Nutshell
At a basic level, CacheCash operates as a set of three sequential actions: service
setup, content distribution, and payment for completed service. Below, we offer a
walk-through of these operations.
The service setup in CacheCash begins with the assembling of a set of caches. A
publisher advertises for caches to handle distribution of a particular content. Any
cache that agrees to participate retrieves a copy of the content from the publisher and
verifies its correctness. Furthermore, and similar to CAPnet setup (see Section 3.3.3),
this cache agrees with the publisher on a shared secret that is used to generate a
unique key for each session this cache will handle.
When the network reaches a feasible size, the publisher creates an escrow on the
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Figure 5.2: Content retrieval process (tktL1,j is the jth first lottery ticket, tktL2 is the
second lottery ticket, and kout,j is the jth outer layer encryption key).
Cash (see Section 4.4.2). However, CacheCash adds more parameters to the escrow
creation transaction, e.g., payment function configuration. Furthermore, it uses dif-
ferent bounds for the payment and the penalty escrow balances to accommodate this
function and the two lottery ticket types that CacheCash adopts for rewarding caches.
Distribution of content, which is the second action in CacheCash’s design, can
begin as soon as the escrow is confirmed on the blockchain. This action proceeds in
service sessions, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. A session starts with a client sending a
content request to the publisher (Step 1), after which the publisher selects a set of
n caches, each of which will deliver a specific data chunk of the content. In order to
allow the client to proceed on its own, the publisher replies to the content request
with a ticket bundle (Step 2). This bundle contains request tickets that a client will
use to contact caches, a cache accountability puzzle, and a set of lottery tickets to
pay these caches. The publisher sends the bundle back to the client (Step 3).
CacheCash reduces the monetary losses that can be caused by malicious actors in
the service-payment exchange process by dividing a session payment into two parts.
In detail, for any service request, the publisher generates two lottery tickets for each
cache, denoted as tktL1 and tktL2. A cache receives tktL1 upon delivery of the data
chunk to the client, but does not receive tktL2 until the delivered chunk is proved
valid. By having the publisher mask tktL2 with the accountability puzzle solution,
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caches cannot obtain this ticket unless the client solves the puzzle correctly. This
confirms to the publisher that caches have earned their payments.
Retrieving the content starts by sending each request ticket to its designated cache
(Step 4). Before sending the requested chunk, a cache double encrypts it by adding
both inner and outer layers of encryption (Step 5). The inner encryption layer is
required by the design of CAPnet (see Chapter 3). That is, encrypting a chunk using
a unique session key causes the ciphertext to be different. This in turn makes the
puzzle unique even if the raw content is the same. The outer layer encryption, with
the encryption key known only to the cache, serves two purposes. First, it forces a
client to retrieve the whole chunk before being able to start solving the puzzle (same
role of the completion mask introduced in CAPnet). And second, it forces this client
to pay a cache tktL1 in exchange for the encryption key (Steps 6 and 7).
After decrypting the outer layer of all chunks (Step 8), the client can start solving
the accountability puzzle. It uses the solution to unmask tktL2 and reveal the inner
layer encryption keys. With these keys, the client can recover the raw content, after
which it forwards tktL2 to all caches (step 9), which completes the service session.
The last action in CacheCash’s design is paying the caches out of the publisher’s
escrow. This follows the basic operation of MicroCash (Section 4.4), where a cache
uses its winning tickets to claim payments. However, CacheCash changes how the
currency value of a winning ticket is computed. To motivate caches to work faithfully
in a service session, and hence, collect both ticket types, the currency value of a
winning tktL1 is tied to the accumulated number of winning tktL2 a cache owns
(such that all these tickets are tied to the same escrow). This payment relation also
encourages a cache to continue working with the same publisher for the long run, and
thus increasing the counter value of winning tktL2, instead of switching frequently
between publishers. In turn, by reducing the amount of turnover, publishers can gain
a stability in the service they obtain.
As in MicroCash, once the escrow lifetime is over, no more tickets can be issued
to the caches. At that time, the owner-publisher can spend the remaining funds (if




The service setup action defines how a cache or a publisher can join the system
in order to start offering/receiving the CDN service. While the setup process for
caches is simple, involving retrieving a copy of the content and establishing a shared
secret with the publisher, it is a bit more involved on the publisher’s end. It requires
advertising the need for caches, and then creating and managing an escrow that
determines how and when caches can be paid. For this reason, this section focuses on
the publisher’s service setup, which includes service advertising, and escrow creation
and management.
Advertising to Recruit Caches
A publisher with content to distribute needs a set of caches to serve its customers.
Assembling that network typically starts with a recruitment initiative. The publisher
announces the set of service specifications it is looking for, such as bandwidth speed,
storage capacity, geographic location, etc., possibly using the publisher website or
any other suitable media. Any cache that meets the announced requirements can
contact the publisher to join its network.
Escrow Creation
Once a reasonable number of caches join its network, the publisher needs to create
two escrows, payment and penalty, before any service session can begin. Similar to
before, this is done using one escrow creation transaction that specifies the amount of
funds to be locked under Bescrow and Bpenalty, and the set of parameters that determine
the service price paid to caches. The publisher sets the values of these parameters,
possibly after negotiating with caches, which include the following:
• The set of beneficiary caches that can be paid using the escrow, where the size
of this set is denoted as N .
111
• The size of the cache set, i.e., n, that would be selected to fulfill any content
request.
• A signed hash of the content to allow a cache to verify its correctness3.
• The lottery winning probability p.
• The ticket issue rate of both tktL1 and tktL2, denoted as tktrate1 and tktrate2,
respectively, such that tktrate1 = ntktrate2. These are the maximum number of
tickets a publisher is allowed to hand out per round, which determine the ticket
sequence numbers to be used within each ticket issuing round.
• The escrow lifetime lesc, which is the total number of ticket issuance rounds.
Therefore, the total number of tktL1 and tktL2 tickets a publisher may issue
equals to lesctktrate1 and lesctktrate2, respectively.
The values of Bescrow and Bpenalty must meet the requirements outlined in Micro-
Cash. That is, Bescrow must obey the 1 −  coverage rule (for some small system
parameter ), and Bpenalty must respect the lower bound needed to discourage cheat-
ing. We derive bounds for these balances, under the two ticket model, in Section 5.4.
Verifying the correctness of the publisher’s payment setup is performed by the miners
in a similar way as described in Chapter 4.
Escrow Management
To track the locked funds in the escrows, miners maintain a state for each escrow in
the system that includes the following:
• The ID of the escrow.
• The balances of both the payment and penalty escrows.
• The public key of the owner-publisher.
• The values of p, lesc, tktrate1 and tktrate2.
• The value of n and the set of beneficiary caches (including both the public key
of each cache and a corresponding index).
3This hash is the root of the Merkle tree that is computed over all data chunks comprising
the content. Beside publishing the root on the blockchain, the publisher makes the full tree public
off-chain.
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• A counter for each beneficiary cache to track the number of winning tktL2 it
owns under this escrow. This counter is used to compute the currency value of
a winning tktL1 claimed by a cache as will be shown later.
• A refund time for the escrow trefund at which the publisher who owns the escrow
can spend the remaining funds. The value of trefund is equal to the expiry time
of the tickets issued in the last round of an escrow lifetime.
As outlined in Chapter 4, lottery ticket issuance must follow a schedule that
specifies which ticket sequence number range can be used for each round. CacheCash
modifies this schedule to cover the sequence number range for the two ticket types it
introduces. Furthermore, this schedule specifies for each n ticket of type tktL1 used
in a service session, what sequence number tktL2 must be used in that session. For
example, let n = 4, tktrate1 = 100, and tktrate2 = 25. In the first round after the
escrow is confirmed, the sequence numbers {0, . . . , 99} and {0, . . . , 24} can be used
for issuing tktL1 and tktL2, respectively. Moreover, the first n tickets of type tktL1,
i.e., sequence numbers 0-3 in our example, can be used in a ticket bundle with the
first tktL2 in the assigned range, i.e., sequence number 0. This assignment continues
until the last round of the escrow lifetime.
The miners update the escrow state based on the escrow related transactions they
process. For example, redeeming a winning tktL1 reduces Bescrow by the currency
value of this ticket. Announcing a winning tktL2 increases the counter of the owner-
cache by one. And receiving a valid proof-of-cheating against the publisher causes
the funds in Bpenalty to be burned and the escrow to be broken. The miners stop
tracking an escrow and discard its state once all tickets tied to this escrow expire.
This happens at time trefund, or when an escrow is broken after receiving a valid proof-




Content distribution in CacheCash proceeds in service sessions, with each session
involving two actions: a publisher handling a content request from a client, and a
client exchanging the payments issued by the publisher for data chunks from caches.
As mentioned previously, fair exchange between mutually-distrusted parties is
impossible [76,108]. This introduces certain security threats for caches and publishers
alike when it comes to exchanging service and payments. Paying a cache after it
delivers the content is risky because a malicious publisher may not pay once its client
has been served. Equally risky to the publisher is paying a cache in advance because a
malicious cache may choose not to deliver any content after collecting a full payment.
On top of all of this, publishers have to deal with cache accounting attacks in which
a cache colludes with a client to collect payments without doing any actual work.
CacheCash introduces a novel service-payment exchange protocol embedded with
several techniques to reduce the impact of these risks. Though this protocol follows
the general design of the non-monetized CAPnet service model (Section 3.3.3), it adds
several modifications. First, it uses micropayments to reward caches. This means
that a session payment is a small value, which motivates each party to act honestly
in the long run to increase its total profits. Second, it divides a session payment into
two parts, tktL1 and tktL2, to further reduce any potential monetary loss caused by
malicious actors. A cheating cache that serves corrupted content will collect only
tktL1, and a cheating publisher, possibly colluding with a client, can only save tktL2
because a cache will not release the outer layer encryption key without receiving a
valid tktL1. And third, a publisher masks tktL2 with the cache accountability puzzle
solution to prevent a colluding client and caches from collecting this ticket for free.
In what follows, we discuss the details of this exchange protocol as part of how
CacheCash handles a service session.
114
Handling a Client Request by the Publisher
To retrieve a specific piece of content, a client sends a service request to the publisher
asking for n data chunks4. After validating the request, by ensuring that the requested
data chunks correspond to a content the publisher owns, the publisher accepts the
request and prepares a response for the client in the form of a ticket bundle. This
bundle contains all the information needed to retrieve the requested data chunks and
pay the caches. The publisher prepares a ticket bundle as follows:
• Select a set of n caches to serve the client and assign each cache to serve a
specific data chunk5.
• Generate a cache accountability puzzle over these chunks (see Section 3.3.3).
This involves generating all inner layer encryption keys for the current session,
where the jth key is denoted as kin,j.
• Generate a data chunk request ticket, denoted as tktr,j, for each cache Cj in
the selected set. This ticket has the following format (H is a hash function):
tktr,j = idescrow||indexCj ||idDj ||H(kin,j)||rseq (5.1)
where idesc is the ID of the escrow that will pay for the service request, indexCj
is the index of the cache as specified in the escrow state, idDj is the identity
of the data chunk that this cache will serve, and rseq is the request sequence
number, which the same as tktL2 sequence number that will be used in this
session. The request ticket also contains the hash of kin,j, which commits the
publisher to the key it used when generating the puzzle. This is needed to
prevent a malicious publisher from accusing a cache of sending a corrupted
encrypted data chunk.
• Generate a set of n distinct tktL1 tickets, each of which is denoted as tktL1,j.
Each of these tickets has the following format, where tseq is the sequence num-
4If the requested object is composed of more than n chunks, such as a movie, the client will send
several requests covering the whole object.
5The publisher selects this set using any criteria of its choice, e.g., based on location, quality of
service, reputation, etc. The details of this mechanism is outside the scope of CacheCash
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ber of the ticket:
tktL1,j = idescrow||indexCj ||tseq (5.2)
• Generate one tktL2 for all n caches. This ticket has the following format:
tktL2 = idescrow||indexC1 || . . . ||indexCn||tseq (5.3)
• Mask tktL2, and all inner layer encryption keys kin,j, by encrypting them using
the puzzle solution.
• Sign the ticket bundle.
A publisher signs the ticket bundle in two steps. It hashes each field individually,
which involves hashing every single request ticket and lottery ticket to produce a set
of hashes called hbundle. Then, the publisher signs hbundle to obtain a signature σbundle.
Such an approach allows a cache to verify one signature over each individual ticket it
obtains from the client, as will be explained in the next section, without having the
publisher sign each ticket individually.
Upon receiving the ticket bundle, the client checks that its format compiles with
the system specifications, and that it contains valid request and lottery tickets (these
checks are the same as done by caches, which we introduce in the next subsection).
Then, the client computes hbundle as done by the publisher, after which it verifies
σbundle over hbundle using the publisher’s public key appearing in the escrow transaction
that is recorded on the blockchain.
Data Chunk Retrieval from Caches
With a valid ticket bundle in hand, the client can start retrieving data chunks from
caches. This action, as depicted in Figure 5.3, involves multiple steps as follows.
Step 1: As shown in the figure, the client starts by forwarding each request ticket
tktr,j to its designated cache. This is accompanied by a copy of hbundle and the





Figure 5.3: Data chunk retrieval from caches.
Step 2: Each cache Cj validates the received request ticket by checking that its for-
mat complies with the system specifications, ensuring the freshness of rseq, checking
that the ticket has the correct cache index as listed in the escrow state, and gener-
ating kin,i (in the same way using a keyed PRF as described in Section 3.3.3) and
verifying that the ticket contains the correct key digest. The cache also checks that
the escrow referenced in the ticket is not broken, and, lastly, it verifies the publisher’s
signature over the ticket. The latter is done by, first, hashing tktr,i and checking if an
identical hash is found inside hbundle. And second, verifying σbundle over hbundle using
the publisher’s public key found in the escrow state.
After verifying the request ticket, cache Cj double encrypts the data chunk Dj it
will deliver (the double encrypted chunk is denoted as EEDj in Figure 5.3). That
is, this cache uses kin,j to encrypt the raw data chunk, and then it generates a fresh
outer layer encryption key kout,j at random and use it to encrypt the produced
ciphertext. At the end, each cache Cj sends EEDj to the client.
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Step 3: Once the client receives EEDj, it sends each cache its lottery ticket tktL1,j
in order to receive the outer layer encryption key this cache used in the session.
Step 4: After receiving tktL1,j, cache Ci validates it as follows:
• Parse the ticket as (idescrow, indexCj , tseq).
• Check that indexCj is identical to its own index listed in the escrow state (this
also implies that a cache checks whether it is a beneficiary of the escrow).
• Check that the ticket sequence number tseq is within the allowed sequence
number range based on the ticket issuing schedule of the escrow.
• Verify σbundle over this ticket by only hashing the ticket and looking for an
identical hash in hbundle. Note that there is no need to verify σbundle again over
hbundle.
If all the above checks pass, the cache accepts the lottery ticket, and shares
kout,j with the client as an acknowledgment. If any of these checks fails, the cache
drops the client request unless it fails the second or third checks. A ticket with an
out-of-range sequence number, or destined to a cache that is not a beneficiary of the
escrow, can be used to issue a proof-of-cheating against the publisher.
Step 5: By using all kout,j from all caches, the client decrypts the outer encryption
layer of all data chunks. It uses the produced inner-layer encrypted chunks to solve
the puzzle challenge found in the ticket bundle. The puzzle solution allows the client
to unmask tktL2 and the inner layer encryption keys kin,1, . . . , kin,n. The client will
share a copy of tktL2, along with the puzzle solution, with each cache and use the
keys to decrypt the data chunks. This recovers the requested content.
If the unmasking process of tktL2 fails, it means that either a cache(s) has sent
a corrupted data chunk, or the publisher has sent an incorrect puzzle or ticket, to
avoid paying caches their tktL2. This dispute can be solved by having the client send
the hashes of the inner-layer encrypted data chunks to the publisher to identify the
118
cheating cache (more about this in Section 5.3.6)6. A cheating publisher cannot be
detected in this manner, but CacheCash can handle this case financially as will be
shown later. Meanwhile, the publisher directs the client to contact other caches to
retrieve valid copies of the corrupted data chunks.
Step 6: Each cache validates tktL2 as in Step 4 with two differences: First, it must
mask this ticket using the puzzle solution before verifying the publisher’s signature.
And second, beside checking that tseq is within the valid range according to the
ticket issue schedule, the cache needs to check that tseq of this ticket is the correct
one that must be used with tseq of tktL1. Also, this number must be identical to
rseq found in tktr,j received earlier.
A service session is considered complete when the client successfully retrieves all
the requested data chunks. If the client wishes to request more content, it will initiate
another service session with a new content request.
5.3.5 Payment Processing
Any cache keeps each lottery ticket it receives until the lottery draw time of that
ticket. It then determines if this is a winning ticket using the same lottery protocol
of MicroCash (Section 4.4.4). A cache claims a winning ticket by issuing a redeem
transaction to the miners containing the winning ticket and a copy of the ticket
bundle signature (both hbundle and σbundle). This claim need to be issued before a
ticket expires, which happens in dredeem rounds after the ticket lottery draw time.
The miners process the redeem transaction by checking its format and that the
claimed ticket is indeed a valid winning, not-expired and non-duplicated one, i.e., no
other winning ticket of the same type tied to the same escrow carries an identical tseq.
Validity is checked using the same procedure found in step 4 (for tktL1) or step 6 (for
tktL2) in the previous subsection. The only difference is that a miner needs to verify
6This requires a cache to sign the EEDj and kout,j before sending them to the client. We do
not implement this in the current version of CacheCash.
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σbundle over hbundle if they have not seen this signature before. The miners also ensure
that the cache owns the claimed ticket by verifying its signature over the redeem
transaction using the cache’s public key (found in the escrow state) that corresponds
to the cache index found inside the winning ticket. If any of these checks does not
pass, the miners drop the redeem transaction, while they issue a proof-of-cheating
against the publisher if duplication is detected. Otherwise, the miners approve the
redeem transaction.
How the escrow state is updated using a redeem transaction depends on the ticket
type. Only a winning tktL1 triggers currency transfer out of the publisher’s escrow,
while a winning tktL2 increments the tktL2 counter of the owner-cache by one. The
currency value of a winning tktL1 is computed as f(z) = az, where z is the cache’s
tktL2 counter value under the same escrow that pays this winning tktL1. Therefore,
the miners will first update the counter that a cache owns by counting all of its
winning tktL2 issued in a round. Then, they will compute the currency value of
winning tktL1 tickets that were issued in the same round.
The above payment function, and a bound for the constant a, are derived based
on an economic analysis that aims to make honesty the most profitable option for
publishers and caches (details are found in Section 5.6). This analysis also shows that
tktL2 counters need to be reset with each new escrow to avoid continued increase in
service price over time.
5.3.6 Proof-of-cheating Processing
CacheCash adopts the same mechanism for detecting and processing proofs-of-
cheating adopted in MicroCash (Section 4.4.6). The only difference is that due to
payment process modifications CacheCash introduces, the lower bound for the penalty
escrow is different (see equation 5.12 in Section 5.4).
In this section, we discuss other cheating behaviors that are specific to CacheCash
and cannot be proven to a third party. These include a publisher that sends an invalid
puzzle in a ticket bundle or invalid tktL2, or a cache that sends a corrupted data chunk
and collects tktL1 without revealing the outer layer encryption key. These behaviors
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are addressed using rational financial incentives. By modeling the system operation
as a repeated game, and having caches stop working with a cheating publisher or a
publisher blacklisting a cheating cache, we show how these malicious behaviors can
be made unprofitable in the long run. Hence, rational publishers, clients, and caches
will choose to act honestly. A complete discussion can be found in Section 5.6.
5.4 Economic Analysis for Escrows
In this section, we show how to compute the payment escrow balance Bescrow in a
way that satisfies the 1−  coverage rule under the two ticket type model CacheCash
adopts. We also compute a lower bound for the penalty deposit required to deter
cheating.
5.4.1 Computing Bescrow
Similar to MicroCash, we compute Bescrow using a probabilistic analysis that relies
on modeling the payment process in CacheCash. In what follows, we state and prove
a formula to calculate this balance.
Theorem 3. For an escrow with lifetime lesc rounds, ticket issue rates tktrate1 and
tktrate2, lottery winning probability p, number of caches per service session n, payment
function f(z) = az as defined earlier, and parameter , where lesc, tktrate1, tktrate2, n ∈
N, a ∈ R+, and 0 ≤ p,  ≤ 1, the value of Bescrow needed to cover all winning lottery
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F−1i is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the binomial
distribution parameterized by p and t = i tktrate1 at the value 1− 2lesc , and F−1 is the
inverse of the CDF of the binomial distribution parameterized by p and t = tktrate2
at the value 1− 
2lesc
.
Proof. In CacheCash, the total number of winning tickets (of any type) can be mod-
eled as a random variable that follows a binomial distribution (this is because the
winning events of these tickets are independent). Our goal is to use these distribu-
tions to compute the number of tickets (of each type) that will win with probability
at maximum 1−  and use it to compute Bescrow.
Recall that the currency value of any winning tktL1 in round i is tied to the total
number of winning tktL2 a cache owns accumulated over all rounds until round i.
Therefore, we need to determine the number of tktL2 each cache collects per round in
order to compute this currency value. We consider an extreme case where the same
n caches are selected for all service sessions paid by an escrow. This means that each
cache receives tktrate1
n
tickets of type tktL1, and tktrate2 tickets of type tktL2 per round.
Thus, the expected currency value of any winning tktL1, in a specific round, will be
the same because all these n caches receive the same number of tktL2.
We use random variables Z1, . . . , Zlesc to represent the number of winning tktL2 in
rounds i ∈ {1, . . . , lesc}, respectively. Hence, each Zi follows a binomial distribution
parameterized by p and a number of trials t = tktrate2. To obey the 1 −  coverage
rule, we need to compute the the number of winning tktL2 in round i that hits the
(1− 
2lesc
)th percentile of Zi.7 This number, which is denoted as ω, can be computed
as follows:
ω = F−1(p, tktrate2, 1− 
2lesc
) (5.7)
7We use 2lesc to account for the union bound of all error terms in all rounds, for both ticket
types, of the escrow lifetime.
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where F−1 is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the binomial
distribution parameterized by p and t = tktrate2 at the value 1− 2lesc .
For tktL1, we apply a different method to make the bound of Bescrow tighter, and
hence, reduce the amount of funds a publisher needs to lock in a payment escrow.
This method is based on observing that the number of winning tktL2 in the first
round, i.e., ω, contributes in the currency value of all winning tktL1 from all ticket
issuing rounds. While the number of winning tktL2 in the second round, which is also
ω, contributes in the currency value of all winning tktL1 in rounds 2, . . . , lesc, and
so on. This means that ω from the first round is multiplied by the total number of
winning tktL1 among lesctktrate1. And ω from the second round is multiplied by the
total number of winning tktL1 among (lesc− 1)tktrate1, and so on. As such, and using








where F−1i is the inverse of the CDF of the binomial distribution representing all
winning tktL1 in rounds i, . . . , lesc (hence, it is parameterized by p and t = i tktrate1)
at the value 1− 
2lesc
.
We can further simplify the above expression by using a Chernoff bound [102] to
show that for large t, the (1 − 
2lesc
)th percentile is not far from the mean. We first
state the Chernoff bound and then show how to apply it.
Theorem 4 (Chernoff Bound [102]). Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi, where Xi = 1 with probability
pi and Xi = 0 with probability 1 − pi, and all Xi are independent. Let µ = E(X) =∑n
i=1 pi, then for any 0 < λ ≤ 1:
Pr(X ≥ (1 + λ)µ) ≤ e−µλ
2
3 (5.9)
In our analysis, we set λ =  and we require that Pr(X ≥ (1 + λ)µ) ≤ 1 − 0.5,
where µ = p i∗ tktrate1. In other words, we want to define the value i∗ such that for
any round with index i ≥ i∗ we can use the expectation to compute the number of
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winning tktL1 instead of computing the (1 − 0.5)th percentile8. Accordingly, using
the Chernoff bound we get e−
µ2
3 ≤ 1− 0.5, which produces the following:
i∗ ≥ −3 ln(1− 0.5)
p 2tktrate1
(5.10)
For efficiency reasons, and to reduce the value of Bescrow as possible, we use the
minimum value of i∗ given by the above expression (this reduce the number of times
the inverse of the binomial CDF needs to be computed).
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)
(5.11)
Which completes the proof.
The above equation is used by the publisher and the miners when computing the
required payment escrow balance that satisfies the 1−  coverage rule.
5.4.2 Computing a Lower Bound for Bpenalty
In this section, we compute a lower bound for the penalty deposit required to de-
ter cheating in a similar way as done in Section 4.5.2, while accounting for the two
ticket type model. We quantify the additional utility gain, or monetary profit, a
malicious publisher could obtain as compared to an honest one. Then, we set the
penalty deposit to at least equal this additional utility, which makes cheating unprof-
itable in expectation compared to acting honestly, and hence, unappealing to rational
publishers.
8We consider the union bound for the error term 2lesc over lesc rounds as this is the period that
is covered by computing the number of winning tktL1.
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This analysis covers the same malicious strategies outlined in Section 4.5.2.
Again, since ticket issuing duplication has a larger utility gain, we only consider this
strategy in this section. In what follows, we present this analysis including the game
setup, a definition for the utility gain function, and and finally state and prove a
lower bound for Bpenalty.
Game setup. We have a single player game in which a malicious publisher applies
the ticket duplication strategy. In general, this strategy is defined as duplicating
any sequence number among two or more tickets that are tied to the same escrow.
In CacheCash this duplication is affected by the service setup. A publisher cannot
duplicate all tktL1 among all beneficiary caches of an escrow. This is because a cache
knows that a publisher can afford at maximum tktrate1
n
service sessions per round9,
which equals to the maximum number of tktL2 a publisher can issue per round. A
rational cache will not participate in more than tktrate1
n
service sessions because it
knows that any additional session will use invalid or duplicated lottery tickets.
Ticket duplication is also affected by whether a publisher is colluding with the
client. This collusion allows giving duplicated tktL1 to all n caches within the same
service session. By doing so, the cheating detection probability becomes smaller, and
hence, the utility gain of a cheating publisher becomes larger. To see this, assume
that an escrow has N = 4 beneficiary caches, n = 2, and let caches {C1, C2} and
{C3, C4} form two service sessions with different clients. Without colluding with the
clients, a publisher who decides to duplicate tickets among these sessions would need
two different tktL1 sequence numbers. Each sequence number can be duplicated, at
maximum, among two caches from different sessions. But with collusion, a publisher
can hand all the four caches tktL1 with the same sequence number. Given that
the lottery draw does not depend on the ticket recipient address (see equation 4.2 in
Section 4.4.4), all tickets with the same sequence number win, or lose, together. Thus,
9Recall that a service session involves a client and a set of n caches selected to fulfill a client’s
content request. Each of these caches receives one tktL1 with a unique sequence number, and one
tktL2 that is destined to all these n caches. The sequence number of tktL2 is determined based on
the sequence numbers of tktL1 tickets handed out in the session.
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the use of two duplicated sequence numbers has higher cheating detection probability
than having one duplicated sequence number. For this reason, we consider the case of
a publisher colluding with the client because this collusion increases the utility gain.
Furthermore, a rational publisher that decides to duplicate a ticket, will duplicate
it among all beneficiary caches. This is because duplication among fewer than N
caches does not reduce the cheating detection probability. In addition, the utility gain
of duplicating a ticket increases when the N caches are distributed among disjoint
service sessions, i.e., among N
n
disjoint cache sets. Having overlapped sets prevents
a publisher from duplicating any ticket among all N caches because common caches
will detect cheating immediately.
Based on the above, ticket duplication in CacheCash involves duplicating a tktL1
sequence number among all N caches, and duplicating the corresponding tktL2 se-
quence number among all N
n
cache sets. In total, in any round a publisher can make
up to tktrate1
n
duplication decisions. Since each duplication decision corresponds to two
sequence numbers; one for duplicated tktL1 and the other is for duplicated tktL2, we
refer to each duplication decision as duplicating a ticket tuple. Also, as before, the
cheating detection period of ticket duplication is ddraw + dredeem rounds10.
Table 5.1 shows the set of notations used in this section. (Some of these symbols
already appeared in Table 4.1, but we repeat them for completeness.)
Utility gain function definition. As before, we define the utility gain function of
any publisher as the service value minus the payments made to caches. We compute
the expected value of this function for an honest publisher and for a cheating one
that applies the ticket duplication strategy. In order to make cheating unprofitable,
we set Bpenalty to be at least equal to the maximum additional expected utility a
malicious publisher obtains over what an honest publisher can achieve.
Additional utility gain analysis. We now state and prove a lower bound for
Bpenalty based on the above game setup.
10We do not assume that caches exchange any information between each others about tickets.
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u(·) Utility gain function.
τ Max number of duplicated ticket tuples a publisher can choose per round
(this equals to tktrate2, or alternatively,
tktrate1
n ), such that τ ∈ N.
d ddraw (lottery draw period in rounds), such that d ∈ N.
r dredeem (ticket redemption period in rounds), such that r ∈ N.
yi Number of duplicated ticket tuples in round i, such that 0 ≤ yi ≤ τ .
N Number of beneficiary caches of an escrow, such that N ∈ N.
n Number of caches per service session, such that n ∈ N.
υ lesc (the escrow lifetime in rounds), such that υ ∈ N.
p Lottery winning probability, such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
f(·) The payment function that computes the currency value of a winning
tktL1.
a A positive constant used to configure the payment function f(z) = az
where z is the value of winning tktL2 counter, and a ∈ R+
Theorem 5. For the game and escrow setup described above, issuing invalid or





υ − d− r +N − 1
1− (1− p)2τ + (υ − d− r)(d+ r − 1)+
0.5(N − 1)(d+ r)(d+ r + 1)− (N − 1)
)
(5.12)
Proof. In CacheCash, a publisher can create an escrow with υ round lifetime. All
tickets issued in a round enter the lottery after d rounds, and all winning tickets will
expire after r rounds from the lottery draw time.
During each round of the escrow lifetime, an honest publisher can issue up to nτ




Figure 5.4: Decision process for a 3 round escrow with d = 2 rounds and r = 1 round.
Arrows carry probabilities, decisions are found below the states, and the utility gain
is found above the states.
In round i, each tktL1 has an expected value of pf(zi) coins, where zi is the expected
number of winning tktL2 the recipient cache owns in round i. This expected value
is the service value a publisher obtains for handing out tktL1 (and its corresponding
tktL2), which may increase with time due to collecting more winning tktL2. We use
this service value in computing the utility gain function for the publisher.
In contrast, a malicious publisher would decide to duplicate yi ticket tuples in
round i, where i ∈ {1, . . . , υ} and yi ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. Each tuple corresponds to two
sequence numbers that are used to issue duplicated tktL1 and tktL2 for all N caches.
If any of these tickets wins the lottery at round i+d, which happens with probability
1− (1− p)2yi , the publisher will be detected at round i+ d+ r (the latest). Once the
lottery draw outcome is determined, this publisher still has r rounds to issue tickets
before it is detected. Therefore, as a rational behavior, this publisher will choose
to duplicate all τ ticket tuples in these rounds. On the other hand, if none of the
duplicated tickets win, which happens with probability (1− p)2yi , the publisher stays
in the system.
In order to compute the additional utility gain, we model the ticket duplication
decisions a malicious publisher would make at each round using a decision process
diagram. As an example, we consider a simple case where we have an escrow with 3
round lifetime, d = 2 rounds, and r = 1 round as illustrated in Figure 5.4.
As shown in Figure 5.4, a malicious publisher duplicates y1 and y2 ticket tuples in
round 1 and 2, respectively. If none of these tickets win (it happens with probability
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(1− p)2y1), the malicious publisher obtains an additional utility gain of (N − 1)ap2y21
and proceeds to round 3. That is, each cache will have an expected counter value
of py1 (each cache received y1 tickets of type tktL2 in round 1). Hence, any winning
tktL1, where a total of Ny1 tickets of type tktL1 has been issued in round 1, will have
an expected value of ap2y1. So the total service value from all N caches is Nap2y21.
Compared to an honest publisher that issues unique tickets to all these caches, the
malicious publisher obtains additional service value from (N−1) caches (which equals
to (N − 1)ap2y21 as shown in the figure).
On the other hand, if any of the duplicated tickets in round 1 wins (it happens
with probability 1 − (1 − p)2y1), the publisher knows that it will be detected at the
end of round 3 (since r = 1). Hence, it decides to duplicate all ticket tuples it has in
round 3 (i.e., y3 = τ). The total additional utility it obtains in this case is the sum
of the utility gain of duplicating tickets in 3 rounds minus the penalty deposit that
will be revoked. As shown in the figure, the counter value of winning tktL2 increases
over time. Therefore, a duplicated tktL1 in later rounds has larger utility value than
earlier rounds.
We use the same technique that we applied in Section 4.5.2,where we formulate
the expected utility gain of a malicious publisher in a recursive way. The expected
utility gain of an υ round escrow is expressed in terms of the expected utility gain
of an υ − 1 round escrow, and so on. During the first round of an υ round escrow,
all caches start with zero counters of winning tktL2. We refer to these counters as a
vector c = (c1, c2, . . . , cN), where cj is the counter value for cache Cj. By duplicating
y1 ticket tuples in this rounds, with probability 1 − (1 − p)2y1 , the additional utility
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))
−Bpenalty (5.13)
That is, when the lottery draw outcome is determined for the y1 duplicated tickets
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(or the first round of the d+ r period), each cache Cj will have an expected counter
value of cj + py1. Each of the duplicated tktL1 has an expected service value of
p(cj + py1), where cj is determined by the cache that owns the duplicated ticket. So
the total service value obtained from all caches who received this duplicated tktL1
is p(c + Npy1). The additional utility gain the publisher obtains, as compared to
an honest one, will be this total minus the service value of one cache. To allow
accounting for arbitrary initial counter value c, we set this additional gain to be
p(c+(N −1)py1), and hence, for all y1 duplicated tktL1 it will be py1(c+(N −1)py1).
This produces a more conservative bound than the actual one because it involves the
sum of the counters for all N caches instead of N − 1. The same analogy is applied
for the duplicated tickets at later rounds, but with updating the initial counter value
properly, as shown in equation 5.13.
If none of the duplicated tickets win the lottery, the publisher stays in the system.
This means that round 2 is a fresh start for this publisher in an υ − 1 round escrow.
However, caches in this υ − 1 round escrow have non-zero winning tktL2 counters.
We refer to these updated counters as a vector c′. In this case, the utility gain of the
cheating publisher will be apy1(c+(N−1)py1)+Eυ−1,c′ [u(Pˆ )], where the second term
denotes the expected utility gain in an υ − 1 round escrow that has counter state c′.
Based on the above, we can express Eυ,c[u(Pˆ )], which is the quantity of interest,






apy1(c+ (N − 1)py1) + Eυ−1,c′ [u(Pˆ )]
)
(5.14)
Using the same argument we used earlier for MicroCash, i.e., we have Eυ−1,c′ [Pˆ ] ≤
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0 and we require Eυ,c[u(Pˆ )] ≤ 0, we find that:
Bpenalty(c, y1, . . . , yd) ≥
apy1
(
c+ py1(N − 1)
)
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(5.15)
In order to compute the maximum additional utility gain, we need to find the
values of c, y1, . . . , yd that will maximize the above expression. Starting with c, the
most expensive service period of an escrow lifetime is the last d + r rounds, i.e. the
last full cheating detection period. As such, Bpenalty(c, y1, . . . , yd) is maximized by
setting c to its maximum value after operating for υ − d − r rounds in the system.
To be conservative, we consider a publisher that issues all tickets in all rounds (i.e.,
it operates at the maximum allowed service rate). This makes the expected value of
c at the lottery draw time for the tickets issued in the first round of the last d + r
round period to be pτ(υ − d− r) (recall that τ = tktrate2).
For yi, given the maximum c value, we find that for any d and r value, the
above quantity is maximized when yi = τ for i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.11 Substituting this in
equation 5.15 produces the lower bound stated in the theorem, which completes the
proof.
5.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the resilience of CacheCash to the types of threats outlined
earlier in its threat model. In investigating all possible attack scenarios, using ABC’s
collusion matrices, we analyzed 420 threat cases to distill 15 cases that CacheCash
must defend against in order to secure the system operation12.
11This is done in a similar way as described in Section 4.5 for the same set of p and τ values.
12As mentioned in Section 2.5 in Chapter 2, CacheCash’s threat model have 525 cases that were
reduced to 22 threat scenarios. These include the cases from Bitcoin’s threat model. Excluding
Bitcoin’s related cases leaves us with 420 cases and 12 distilled threat scenarios as found in the full
threat model [31]. However, in this section we group some scenarios together and divide other cases
among multiple scenarios. Thus, we have 15 distilled cases instead of 12.
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Several threat cases are addressed by the secure design CAPnet and MicroCash.
CacheCash defends against the rest by using a combination of cryptographic and
economic techniques. The economic defenses, which exploit rational financial
incentives, will be noted here, but addressed in detail in the next section. The
rest of this section discusses the 15 threat cases and the defense mechanisms that
CacheCash employs against them.
Service corruption. In this threat, a malicious cache(s) delivers corrupted data
chunks to the client. The goal is to collect payments while making the client construct
different content than what was requested (this case is labeled as T1).
This threat is addressed financially. If it receives one or more corrupted data
chunks, the client will fail to solve the accountability puzzle over these chunks. This
costs caches their tktL2 because the client will fail in unmasking this ticket. As will
be shown in the next section, it is more profitable for a cache to collect both tktL1
and tktL2 in every service session it participates in than to collect only tktL1. This
is because of the payment setup of CacheCash, where the number of winning tktL2
controls the currency value of a winning tktL1. Hence, a rational cache will act
honestly to maximize its utility gain.
Cache accounting attacks. In this type of attack, malicious caches may try to
collect payments from the publisher without doing the promised work. This threat
can be exploited using several strategies (T4 is addressed by CAPnet):
(T2) An attacker issues itself, or other caches, lottery tickets tied to the publisher’s
escrow.
(T3) A client, who is not interested in the data, colludes with caches to hand them
tktL1 without retrieving any content.
(T4) A client, who again is not interested in the data, colludes with caches to solve
the cache accountability puzzle and unmask tktL2 without retrieving the full
content.
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Threat T2 is neutralized by requiring the publisher to sign any ticket bundle it
issues, with this signature covering all request and lottery tickets inside the bundle.
Given that our system uses a secure digital signature scheme, any attacker will succeed
in issuing valid tickets with negligible probability.
Threat T3 is addressed financially as mentioned earlier. In order to increase the
currency value of a winning tktL1, a cache is motivated to collect tktL2. In the long
run, collecting only tktL1, or even collecting fewer tktL2 than what an honest cache
would do, is less profitable than acting in an honest way. This makes this threat case
unappealing to rational caches.
Threat T4 is addressed by the security of the CAPnet scheme. A publisher can
configure the number of iterations in the puzzle in a way that forces any malicious
puzzle solver to expend a predetermined bandwidth bound that is very close to what
is required to retrieve the content.
Service theft. In this threat, honest caches that serve clients correctly may lose
their payments, fully or partially, in various ways including (T6 - T9 are addressed
by MicroCash):
(T5) A publisher generates invalid lottery tickets.
(T6) A publisher performs a front running attack by withdrawing the payment escrow
before caches can claim their winning tickets.
(T7) A publisher issues more tickets than what can be covered by the payment
escrow. This includes issuing tickets with sequence numbers that exceed the
allowed range or tickets with duplicated sequence numbers.
(T8) An attacker manipulates the lottery draw in order to make certain tickets win,
or lose, based on which cache owns the tickets.
(T9) A publisher issues winning tickets to itself after observing the lottery draw
outcome. The goal is to drain the escrow by claiming these tickets before
caches can claim their winning tickets.
(T10) A publisher generates an incorrect cache accountability puzzle that a client
cannot solve even over the correct data chunks. Therefore, this client will not
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be able to unmask tktL2 and caches will receive only tktL1 for such a session.
(T11) A client, acting on its own or in collusion with the publisher, does not hand
caches their tktL2 after retrieving the full content.
Invalid lottery tickets (T4) are detected instantly by the client when verifying
the correctness of the received ticket bundle. An honest client will reject any invalid
bundle, and hence, will not contact the caches. The case of a malicious client that
colludes with the publisher and sends caches invalid tktL1 or tktL2 is addressed both
cryptographically and financially. Any cache that receives an invalid tktL1 will not
send the outer layer encryption key to the client. Therefore, the client, who is inter-
ested in retrieving the data, will get only double encrypted data chunks that do not
allow access to the raw content. On the financial side, frequent loss of lottery tickets
will make caches stop working with the cheating publisher, thus forcing it to pay
for the service setup cost of a new network of caches. As will be shown in the next
section, such a cost exceeds the profit of applying threat T4, making this strategy
unappealing to rational publishers.
As mentioned above, threats T6-T9 are addressed by the secure design of Mi-
croCash. Publishers cannot withdraw their escrows before time trefund, and issuing
tickets with out-of-range or duplicated sequence numbers will cost the publisher its
penalty deposit. Respecting the lower bound of the penalty deposit (as given by
equation 5.12) makes these cheating behaviors unprofitable compared to acting in
an honest way. Furthermore, MicroCash prevents lottery manipulations by requiring
the publisher to issue tickets using a fixed ticket issue schedule with a future lottery
draw time. Hence, a publisher cannot tell which ticket will win or lose in advance.
MicroCash’s lottery design also discourages malicious miners from performing selec-
tive mining in which they forgo a block that does not produce a favorable lottery. All
these defenses ensure that caches get their fair chance in the lottery protocol of the
adopted payment scheme.
Both Threats T10 and T11 are addressed financially in a similar way to Threat
T5. Frequent loss of tktL2 will cause caches to stop working with the publisher,
forcing it to pay the cost of constructing a new network of caches. Thus, a rational
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publisher will not follow these attack strategies. In the case of a client acting on its
own in Threat T11, the publisher needs to employ mechanisms to monitor its clients.
Frequent complaints from caches about losing their tktL2 may make the publisher
blacklist a malicious client, stopping any future service requests. The design of such
service feedback techniques is outside the scope of the current work.
DoS. As DoS is a large threat category, we only consider here cases that are different
and unique to the design of CacheCash. These include:
(T12) An attacker overwhelms publishers or caches by sending them a large number
of forged content requests or old (replayed) ones.
(T13) Caches ignore all data chunk requests coming from a specific client.
(T14) A publisher avoids selecting specific caches to serve clients. Thus, these caches
waste resources storing the content and waiting for client requests, without
collecting any payments.
(T15) A publisher distributes corrupted content to caches during the service setup
phase in order to accuse them later of behaving maliciously and serving clients
incorrect data. The goal is to waste the resources of these caches and destroy
their reputation in the system.
Threat T12 is neutralized by requiring any client to sign all content requests
it issues, any publisher to sign all request tickets it issues, and any issued request
to include a fresh sequence number. Given that the system uses a secure digital
signature scheme, an attacker will fail in issuing valid requests because it needs to
forge the client/publisher signature over these requests. Furthermore, each publisher
checks that a content request is fresh before answering it, and each cache checks that
a request ticket is fresh before responding. This prevents request replay attacks in
the system.
Threat T13 is addressed financially. Any rational cache has the goal of maxi-
mizing its profits by serving as many clients as it can. Thus, a cache is discouraged
from following such a strategy. However, and as explained in the next section, caches
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prioritize serving clients based on the reputation of the publisher for honesty. This
priority drops when a publisher does not pay caches their tktL2. Reducing this prior-
ity, or even ending a work relationship with a malicious publisher, is not considered
a DoS attack against the publisher’s clients.
Threat T14 is also addressed financially. Service setup is costly. After paying this
cost, which includes distributing content to caches and announcing them as escrow
beneficiaries, a rational publisher will choose to work with these caches to serve its
clients. Even if a malicious publisher is willing to pay this cost and then abandon
caches, rational caches would not be willing to wait for so long. Instead, they will
switch to work with a different publisher in order to collect more profits, thus taking
away any incentive to pursue this strategy.
Finally, Threat T15 is neutralized by the escrow setup and the design of the
service-payment exchange protocol in CacheCash. A publisher is committed to the
content because the escrow creation transaction includes a signed hash of this content.
This hash is the root of the Merkle tree computed over all data chunks comprising the
content. The escrow transaction is publicly published on the blockchain, and the full
Merkle tree is also made public by the publisher. This allows any cache to verify the
correctness of the content copy it retrieves before starting the service. Furthermore,
given that the publisher is committed to the session keys used for encrypting the
data chunks in any service session, which includes the hash of each key in the request
ticket, the publisher cannot pretend that a cache served incorrect content. In case of
a dispute, a cache can disclose this key, along with the encrypted chunk it delivered,
which allows anyone to verify the correctness of the served chunk.
5.6 Economic Analysis for Financial Defense
Techniques
In this section, we present a detailed economic analysis for the financial defense mech-
anisms mentioned in the previous section. More concretely, we hypothesize utility
functions for rational participants and examine the extent to which honest behavior
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maximizes utility. Then based on this utility, we configure the system parameters in
a way that makes cheating less profitable, in expectation, than acting in an honest
way.
5.6.1 Analysis Setup
Our analysis focuses on how to prevent two deviant behavior cases by making them
unappealing to rational participants. First, we consider the case of a rational subset
of caches, possibly colluding with a client, attempting to maximize payments while
minimizing the resources they spend to provide the service. Second, we explore the
case of a rational publisher, possibly colluding with clients, attempting to maximize
the amount of service provided to its clients while minimizing the payments made to
caches.
We approach these economic attacks using a game theoretic model. We consider
a repeated game in which the same one-shot game, involving the same set of entities,
is played repeatedly over several time periods. In our setup, a one-shot game is a
round consisting of multiple service sessions, where each session involves a publisher,
a client, and a set of n caches. We track the evolution of the participants’ utility gain
across the rounds based on the various strategies they may follow. In particular, we
compare the utility gain of a malicious actor to an honest one, and show how to make
honesty the most profitable option. The set of notations used in this section include
those introduced earlier in Table 5.1 and these found in Table 5.2.
5.6.2 Case 1: Rational Cache Collusion
Any rational cache has the goal of maximizing its payments while minimizing the
amount of work it has to do in the system. Therefore, we define the utility function
for caches as the payments minus the monetary cost of the resources expended in
acquiring these payments. This can be expressed as follows:
utilitycache := payments− resourcescost (5.16)
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Dcost The monetary cost of the bandwidth amount expended when serving a
data chunk D.
Sji Number of service sessions assigned to cache Cj in round i.
Z Random variable that models the number of winning tktL2 tickets.
z The value of winning tktL2 counter.
For each service session in each round of the repeated game, a cache decides which
strategy to follow. The set of all cache strategies includes the following:
• Behave honestly.
• Collude with the client to collect tktL1 without doing any work (T3 listed in
the previous section).
• Collude with the client to collect tktL2 without delivering the full content (T4
listed in the previous section).
Recall that the third strategy is addressed by the security of CAPnet ??. Thus, we
focus on making the second cheating strategy unprofitable when compared to acting
honestly.
Let’s suppose a rational cache has been behaving honestly so far and achieved a
counter value of zi−1 at round i− 1. Let Zji be a random variable that represents the
counter value for an honest cache Cj at round i. Cj will behave honestly in all S
j
i




i )]− SjiDcost (5.17)
The first term represents the expected payments this cache would collect in round




by the expected currency value of each of these tickets (i.e., E[f(Zji )])13. While the
second term represents the total monetary cost of the resources this cache expends
to serve Sji data chunks.
On the other hand, a malicious cache Cˆj may apply the second strategy, i.e.,
collect only tktL1 without delivering any content, in x sessions out of Sj. Hence, it
collects Sji tickets of type tktL1, S
j
i − x tickets of type tktL2, and saves the cost of
serving x data chunks. Let Zˆji be a random variable that represents the counter value
for this malicious cache at round i, such that Zˆji < Z
j
i . This results in the following
utility gain for a malicious cache in round i:
E[u(Cˆj)] = pSjiE[f(Zˆ
j
i )]− (Sji − x)Dcost (5.18)
In order to make the honest behavior more profitable than cheating, we require
that E[u(Cj)] ≥ E[u(Cˆj)], which produces the following:




Accordingly, the function f(.) must be of an appropriate growth rate to satisfy the
above condition. We can achieve this, for example, by choosing f to be an appropriate
linear function f(z) := az for some positive constant a. In what follows, we derive a
lower bound for the constant a in order to have a fully defined payment function.
By linearity of expectation, we have:
E[f(Zji )] = E[aZ
j
i ] = a(zi−1 + pS
j
i )
E[f(Zˆji )] = E[aZˆ
j
i ] = a(zi−1 + p(S
j
i − x))
Intuitively, both an honest and a malicious cache start round i with a counter
value of zi−1. During round i, an honest cache collects S
j
i tickets of type tktL2,
among which pSji tickets are expected to win. A malicious cache, on the other hand,
13As discussed in Section 5.4.1, the winning events of each ticket type are independent, and can
be modeled as random variables each follows a binomial distribution.
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collects Sji − x tickets of type tktL2, and hence, its counter is expected to increase by
p(Sji − x).








That is, the lower bound for a is the one computed based on the least number of
assigned sessions to any cache in all rounds of an escrow lifetime (such that Sji > 0).
By using f(·) with a constant a the respects the above bound, the expected
utility gain in future rounds cannot be improved by lower counter values from early
rounds. Thus, there is never an incentive for a cache to deviate from honest behavior
and collect only tktL1 in some service sessions. This will motivate a rational cache
to work faithfully and collect both ticket types in every service session in which it
participates.
Computing the currency value of a winning tktL1 based on an accumulative
counter for winning tktL2 means that the service a cache provides becomes more
expensive with time. This may motivate a rational publisher to leave the system
when the caches’ counters reach large values, and then restart again with a new set
of caches with zero counters. For this reason, we suggest resetting these counters for
each new escrow a publisher creates.
5.6.3 Case 2: Rational Publisher Collusion
The goal of a rational publisher is to serve its clients correctly while paying as little
to caches as possible. Therefore, we define the utility function for any publisher as
follows:
utilitypublisher := servicecost − payments (5.21)
For each service session in each round of the repeated game defined earlier, a
rational publisher chooses a strategy to follow, either on its own or in collusion with




• Do not pay caches at all by issuing invalid tickets (T5), issuing tickets that
will not be covered by the escrow, such as those with out-of-range or dupli-
cated sequence numbers (T7), withdrawing the payment escrow before paying
these caches (T6), or manipulating the lottery to make the issued tickets worth
nothing (T8 or T9).
• Do not pay caches tktL2 (T10 or T11).
As explained in the previous section, the second strategy class is addressed by the
secure design of MicroCash. Consequently, we are left with the third strategy where
it suffices to compare its utility gain to the honest case and show how to make it
unprofitable.
Suppose that a rational publisher has been acting honestly until round i− 1. Let
Zji be a random variable that represents the counter value for cache Cj at round i.
By acting honestly in the next ith round, the expected utility gain of this publisher





SjiDcost − pSjiE[f(Zji )]
)
(5.22)
A cheating publisher, on the other hand, may not hand a cache Cj its tktL2 in
xj sessions out of S
j
i , such that xj > 0. This will reduce the payment value for this
cache because the expected value of its winning tktL2 counter will be lower than the
honest case. Let Zˆji be a random variable that represents the counter value for cache
Cj at round i when considering a malicious publisher, where Zˆji < Z
j
i . In this case,





SjiDcost − pSjiE[f(Zˆji )]
)
(5.23)
By comparing the two quantities in equations 5.22 and 5.23, we find that
E[u(Pˆ )] > E[u(P )]. This means that if caches continue working with the malicious
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publisher despite losing tktL2, applying the third strategy, i.e., not handing out tktL2
to caches, is always more profitable than acting in an honest way.
Accordingly, the main defense taken by honest caches is to reduce the amount
of service given to this publisher until they eventually leave its network. This will
incur a loss on the publisher’s side because it will have to pay the service setup cost
for constructing a new network of caches. Furthermore, this publisher could lose its
clients due to the reduced amount of service delivered by caches.
We need to characterize how a cache Cj will decide to leave or reduce service for
any given publisher. This decision is affected by several factors including the current
counter value of winning tktL2, the clients’ request rate (i.e., load assigned by the
publisher to a cache), and the probability that this publisher will act honestly in
future service sessions, which determines the expected winning tktL2 counter in the
future.
Based on that, we suppose that each cache computes a priority for each publisher
based on the expected profit it would collect by working with this publisher. A
cache then answers requests coming from each publisher’s clients with a probability
proportional to the expected service profit.
With the assumption that service sessions are independent, the service profit of
a publisher can be computed as follows. We start with computing the profit in a
single round. A cache Cj has a current counter value z
j
i in round i, and it expects
to participate in Sji+1 sessions in the next round. It will collect S
j
i+1 tickets of type
tktL1, while the number of tktL2 tickets could take any value in {0, 1, . . . , Sji+1}, based
on the honesty of the publisher. If a cache expects that a publisher will act honestly
with probability w (i.e., it will get a tktL2 in a session with probability w), then
the number of tktL2 it collects in S
j
i+1 sessions is a random variable that follows a
binomial distribution. Hence, the expected number of tktL2 a cache may receive in
the next round is wSji+1, and the expected number of winning tktL2 in that round will




















That is, a cache will get on average pSji+1 winning tktL1. Each of these tickets
will have an expected currency value equals to a(zji + pwS
j
i+1).
As mentioned above, equation 5.24, computes the profit for single round. A
cache can repeat this process by computing the profit for the rest of the rounds in
the publisher’s escrow lifetime. This can be done by applying equation 5.24 after
updating the initial counter zji properly based on the prior rounds.
In order to estimate w, we suppose that a cache relies on the number of tktL2 it
receives from a publisher. In detail, a cache may adopt a weighted average policy to
estimate this probability. During a specific time window, like several rounds in the
system, a cache records the number of sessions it served for a publisher, denoted as
S ′, and the number of tktL2 it received, denoted as s′. Then it computes the new




+ (1− γ)wold (5.25)
After computing the expected profit from the work with each publisher, a cache
will give highest priority to client requests paid by the publisher with the highest
profit value, and so on. If the work profit with some publisher is very low, while
working with another, possibly new publisher is more profitable, a cache may leave
this publisher and switch to a new one. Therefore, rational publishers will act honestly
and pay caches their tktL2 to avoid losing their caches, and possibly their clients if
the service get disconnected for long periods.
5.7 Performance Evaluation
In order to understand the performance benefit of our system, this section evaluates
the computation, bandwidth, and payment setup costs of CacheCash. To do this, we
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conduct empirical experiments to answer the following questions:
• How fast can a publisher or a cache serve content to clients? And how fast a
client can retrieve this content?
• What is the bandwidth overhead of serving and retrieving content?
• What is the size of the data logged on the blockchain?
• What do these numbers mean for a practical deployment?
The rest of this section describes our methodology and discusses the significance
of the obtained results.
5.7.1 Methodology
To establish our microbenchmarks, we implemented the functions used by a publisher,
a cache, and a client to serve/retrieve content. This includes all the routines used for
issuing a content request, generating a ticket bundle, and performing the data chunk
retrieval protocol between a client and a cache.
We computed the performance metrics of interest as follows. We measured the
computation cost as the bitrate at which a publisher or a cache can serve content, and
the bitrate at which a client can retrieve content. For the bandwidth overhead, we
computed the total amount of data these parties exchange to deliver the service, other
than the data chunks, such as content requests, ticket bundles, lottery tickets, etc. In
addition, we report on the size of escrow transactions and lottery ticket redemption
that publishers and caches record on the blockchain.
Our experiments were implemented in C, and conducted on a modest pub-
lisher/cache server with an AMD Ryzen 3 2200G processor and 16 GB of memory,
and a low-end client machine with an Intel Core i7-4600U processor and 8 GB RAM.
We used SHA256 for hashing, AES-CBC for the PRFs, AES-CTR for encryption,
and EdDSA (over Ed25519 curve) for digital signatures. Each of the tested functions
was called at least 106 times on the publisher/cache side, and 103 times on the client
side.
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Unless otherwise mentioned, all graphs consider the case of popular content where
clients request similar content over close time intervals. They also use a chunk size
of 1 MB, n = 4 caches, 5 puzzle rounds and piece size of 16 bytes for CAPnet cache
accountability puzzle, and a batch signature covering 128 ticket bundles in each batch.
5.7.2 Results
Service Speed
We start by quantifying the computation cost of content retrieval in CacheCash. We
study the effect of several parameters including data chunk size, number of caches
per request n, and employing batch signatures. We report the bitrate while assuming
that all entities have unlimited bandwidth to communicate with each other.
How does data chunk size and n impact content bitrate? Figure 5.5
shows the bitrate for a publisher, cache, and a client when varying the number of
caches in a service session and the chunk size. As shown, the chunk size has a
large effect on the performance of a publisher and a cache, but minimal effect on
a client’s performance. There are several reasons for this difference. For a fixed
number of caches, the publisher has almost a fixed cost for preparing a ticket bundle
regardless of the chunk size. This is because it processes the same number of pieces
when generating a puzzle, and generates the same number of request and lottery
tickets. Consequently, a larger chunk size makes the amount of content retrieved
per ticket bundle larger. On the other hand, for a fixed chunk size, increasing n
reduces the number of ticket bundles a publisher can generate per second. Larger n
increases the puzzle generation cost and the number of tickets to be generated per
bundle. Nonetheless, multiplying the request processing rate with larger number of
data chunks produces the same bitrate as the case for smaller n values.
Alternatively, for a client (as depicted in Figure 5.5b), a larger chunk size for a
fixed n, or larger n for a fixed chunk size, mean more computational cost to solve the
puzzle, and larger amount of data to be decrypted. This allows the client to complete
smaller number of content requests per second than when using small data chunk size
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(a) Publisher speed (Tbps). (b) Client speed (Mbps).
(c) Cache speed (Gbps).
Figure 5.5: Service speed for various data chunk sizes and n values.
or smaller n. Similar to the trend we saw in Section 3.5, when computing the bitrate
for some n value, the low request completion rates are multiplied by large chunk size
and vice versa. The same for the case of a fixed chunk size, larger n means more
data is retrieved per request compared to smaller n values. For this reason, the client
bitrate is somewhat similar for all chunk sizes and n values.
A cache speed, as depicted in Figure 5.5c, increases as the chunk size increases14,
where serving 2 MB chunks allows a bitrate of around 2.4x the one when 256 KB
chunks are used. Although a cache becomes slower in terms of request rate when a
chunks size increases, because a larger amount of data need to be double encrypted,
the larger chunk size makes the amount of content served using these requests larger.
How does employing batch signing affect content bitrate? In what follows,
we quantify the impact of one of CacheCash performance optimization techniques,
14Recall that n does not affect a cache performance, a cache always serves one data chunk per
session regardless of n.
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Table 5.3: Effect of batch signing on service speed. The number that comes after the
label batching indicate the batch size.
Signing Scheme Publisher (Tbps) Cache (Gbps) Client (Mbps)
Individual Tickets 0.064 11.34 121.92
Individual Bundles 0.46 23.55 122.56
Batching (64) 1.43 23.5 121.92
Batching (128) 1.51 23.24 122.24
Batching (256) 1.44 23.45 121.28
Batching (512) 1.48 23.35 120.64
Batching (1024) 1.45 23.47 121.28
namely, batch signing. As mentioned previously, and given that a cache needs to verify
each ticket it receives, one option for the publisher is to sign each ticket individually
inside a ticket bundle. The first optimization technique that CacheCash implements
is to sign the whole bundle once while sending the individual ticket hashes to a cache
to allow verifying this signature over each ticket (see Section 5.3.4). The second
technique is to apply batch signing across bundles, where all bundles generated within
a batch period are covered by one signature (see Appendix B).
In order to quantify the efficiency impact of batch signing, we measure the content
bitrate for the parties in the system under various signing scenarios. This includes
individual ticket signing, individual bundle signing, and batch signing with various
batch sizes (i.e., number of bundles covered by a single batch signature). The results
are found in Table 5.3.
As the table shows, signing ticket individually degrades the bitrate for both pub-
lishers and caches. This is because more signatures are generated and verified per
content request, which is the heaviest computational operation these parties perform.
A client, on the other hand, has a stable bitrate regardless of the signature scheme.
This is due to the fact that puzzle solving is what drives the load at the client side.
Optimizing the signature scheme optimizes a very small amount of this computational
load, which produces an unnoticeable effect as the results demonstrate.
Reducing the number of signatures improves a publisher’s bitrate. Signing a
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bundle, instead of individual tickets, boosts the publisher performance by around
7.2x. Furthermore, signing a batch, instead of individual tickets or individual bundles,
boosts the performance by around 22.7x and 3.2x, respectively. As shown, a larger
batch size does not improve the speed further, where for all tested batch sizes the
average bitrate is around 1.46 Tbps. This is because a larger batch size means larger
Merkle tree to be constructed, and higher number of membership paths in this tree to
be generated (each bundle needs a membership path). This additional cost balances
the cost saving obtained by the reduced number of digital signatures for large batch
sizes.
The trend is different for a cache, where an improvement by around 2.1x is gained
when signing bundles instead of individual tickets. However, batch signing does not
enhance the service speed. Although a publisher signs multiple bundles all at once,
a cache has to verify a signature for each request it receives regardless of the batch
size. For both bundle and batch signing, this corresponds to finding matching hashes
of the tickets inside hbundle and verifying one signature. For this reason, a cache has a
very close bitrate for all batch sizes as the one obtained for individual bundle signing.
Contextualizing our results. To ground our results in real world numbers,
we examined the customer demand from the popular content provider Netflix.com.
Netflix serves 1080p video at a bitrate of approximately 5 Mbps [37]. As shown in
Figure 5.5, and taking n = 4 caches and a chunk size of 1 MB, a publisher in our
setup, using a single core machine, can process 49,341 requests per second, which
translates to 197,364 data chunks per second. To understand this load, we look at a
popular show, “House of Cards”, where 5.4 million of its 83 million subscribers (as
of 2015) watched at least one episode within a month of its release [29]. Since the
report does not indicate how many of those views were concurrent, it is not possible
to infer the exact peak load. However, our single core publisher supports concurrent
viewing from 315,780 clients which is enough to support a simultaneous viewing peak
from 1/17 of the 5.4 million customers at any point during the first month.
As for the client, the previous results showed that on average our low-end client
is able to retrieve at least 122 Mbps using a single core (Figure 5.5b). This is more
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than 24 times the rate required to retrieve the same popular 1080p video [37].
Key Takeaway: CacheCash has a low a computational cost that enables a mod-
est, single core publisher or cache to serve content at a rate of several Tbps and several
Gbps, respectively, allowing a client to watch dozens of 1080p videos concurrently.
Size of Data Logged on the Blockchain
In CacheCash, two types of transactions are logged on the blockchain, escrow creation
and ticket redemption transactions. As mentioned before, CacheCash adopts a mod-
ified version of MicroCash, where it adds two types of tickets and more information
to the escrow creation transaction (e.g., signed hash of the content). Furthermore, a
signed lottery ticket has a copy of a batch signature that includes the full hash of the
bundle that contains this lottery ticket, the membership path of the bundle in the
batch Merkle tree, the tree root, and the signature over this root.
To reduce the size of the additional information to be logged on the blockchain,
CacheCash introduces several optimizations. These include reducing the ticket sizes
by including a cache index instead of its public key in a lottery ticket. Logging only
one winning tktL2 among the n copies that caches receive. And logging one batch
signature on the blockchain for all winning lottery tickets that belong to the same
bundle.
Based on that, we compute the delta blockchain size that CacheCash incurs,
and compare it to MicroCash’s overhead, for the same CDN example found in Sec-
tion 4.7.3. We use the same setup for p, data chunk size, average transaction size,
and number of beneficiary caches. We consider a batch size of 32 bundles (this is
the number of content requests issued per second in that example). For MicroCash,
we consider signatures and keys using EdDSA scheme. The results are shown in
Table 5.4.
Starting with escrows, both MicroCash and CacheCash allow a publisher to create
one escrow per day (as in our example). However, an escrow creation transaction in
CacheCash is larger, which is around 1,835 byte as compared to 1,738 bytes in Mi-
croCash. This is reflected on the slightly higher bandwidth cost between a publisher
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Table 5.4: Size of data logged on the blockchain (a round is 10 minutes).
Metric MicroCash CacheCash
Escrows / sec 0.00001157 0.00001157
Tickets / sec 128 160
Winning tickets / sec 0.001964 0.002456
Transactions / sec 0.001976 0.00394
Bandwidth between publisher
and miners
0.16093 bps 0.1699 bps
Bandwidth between caches
and miners
6 bps 27.3 bps
Delta blockchain size / round 0.00044 MB 0.00123 MB
and the miners.
For the tickets issuance rate, a publisher in CacheCash issues more tickets, an
additional 32 tktL2 tickets. Each of these tickets is replicated among n = 4 caches,
where in the worst case each cache will claim this ticket if it wins. Hence, the number
of issued claim transactions in CacheCash is twice what will be produced in Micro-
Cash. Also, each of these transactions will have a copy of the batch signature. For
this reason, the bandwidth cost between caches and miners is significant (CacheCash
incurs around 3.9x the cost in MicroCash).
However, not all these transactions are logged on the blockchain as mentioned
earlier. Only one copy of a winning tktL2 will be logged, and for all winning tick-
ets that belong to the same bundle only one batch signature with be recorded on
the blockchain. As such, a batch signature over a specific bundle will make to the
blockchain is any of the lottery tickets inside the bundle wins, which happens with
probability 1 − (1 − p)n. As Table 5.4, although CacheCash adds around 4.6x the
amount of that MicroCash adds to the blockchain, the cost is still very low. It requires
a space of around 0.13% of a block size in Bitcoin per round.
Key Takeaway: The two-ticket payment model in CacheCash adds more band-
width cost than MicroCash, however, the overall cost is very low, less than 0.13% of
a block size in Bitcoin.
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Service Bandwidth Overhead
In terms of bandwidth overhead, we computed the total amount of data the parties
exchange for the service other than the data chunks. This includes the content re-
quest messages, the ticket bundles, the request/lottery tickets and encryption key
messages a client and a cache exchange, transactions with the miners, etc. Then,
we computed the overhead ratio as overhead bytes divided by total bytes exchanged
(which includes both overhead and data chunks) using the example setup used in the
previous subsection. Our results shows that the overhead is less than 0.1%.
Key Takeaway: CacheCash incurs a very small bandwidth overhead, less than
0.1% of the total bandwidth needed for the service. This suggests that CacheCash
would not degrade productivity of content distribution applications.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter introduced CacheCash, a cryptocurrency-based, fully-decentralized con-
tent delivery service. CacheCash combines the flexibility of P2P networks with cryp-
tocurrency payments to create a distributed bandwidth market. This market allows
publishers to create dynamic CDNs at a low deployment cost, without sacrificing se-
curity nor efficiency. This is done by introducing a secure service-payment exchange
protocol that combines cache accountability puzzles with a two-ticket micropayment
model, to reduce the monetary losses caused by malicious actors.
The chapter also presented detailed security analysis demonstrating how malicious
behaviors are neutralized using both cryptographic approaches and rational financial
incentives. It also described a series of empirical experiments testing CacheCash’s
performance under various configurations. The results showed how our system can
support content delivery at a high bitrate with a minimal bandwidth overhead. This
indicates the potential of CacheCash as a practical solution to support an open access





The evolution of cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies has provided potential
new templates for reshaping large-scale distributed systems and services. Cryptocur-
rencies implement a decentralized virtual currency exchange medium that permits
participants to be rewarded without any pre-authentication or identification require-
ments. Furthermore, they provide public verifiability and auditing without the need
to place trust in any party. Such features can be exploited in P2P-based resource
exchange paradigms to creating a market that rewards for the correct service without
driving the underlying system toward centralization.
This work focused on one type of such services; online content delivery. The esca-
lating demand for this service, which now accounts for more than half the Internet’s
bandwidth, drove content publishers to look for non-traditional solutions, such as
peer-assisted models. The goal is to reduce costs, while enjoying higher flexibility
than can be offered by traditional infrastructure-based CDNs. By providing mone-
tary incentives, trustless peers, or caches, are encouraged to serve others and comply
with protocol specifications. Such an approach is beneficial for both publishers and
end users (or caches). Publishers obtain service at a cheaper price and can hire caches
in areas that are not covered by CDN providers. In return, end users can exploit their
idle resources to collect payments.
Though this idea has been around for a long time, even before the emergence of
cryptocurrencies, all prior works and deployed solutions suffered from various draw-
backs that restrained practicality. These include assuming the existence of a central-
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ized party to control the system or placing trust in content publishers. In addition,
these systems lack effective defenses against critical attacks and collusion cases, and
the needed flexibility to meet specific delivery configurations, such as allowing pub-
lishers to sponsor content retrieval for their clients.
In this dissertation, we proposed CacheCash, the first fully decentralized,
cryptocurrency-based, CDN system that addresses these problems. CacheCash per-
mits caches to come and go as demand shifts, and enables publishers to hire these
caches on “as needed” basis. This is done without constraining any of these parties
with long term commitments. CacheCash builds upon various components and proto-
cols that were developed to satisfy the security and efficiency goals of the system. Its
design is guided by a thorough threat model built using our cryptocurrency-oriented
ABC framework. CacheCash’s service-payment exchange protocol utilizes CAPnet’s
accountability puzzles to defend against cache accounting attacks. This protocol also
implements an efficient probabilistic micropayment scheme, a modified version of
MicroCash, to reward caches. The system exploits various game theoretic and cryp-
tographic approaches to secure its operation and encourage honest behavior based on
an economic perspective.
In terms of efficiency, CacheCash builds a content distribution service that allows
a publisher to serve content at a rate sufficient to support 315,780 concurrent clients
watching the same 1080p video. It also enables a cache to serve data chunks at a
bitrate of several Gbps (capped by the upload bandwidth speed such a cache has),
and a client to retrieve content at a rate of 122 Mbps, enough to watch around 24
1080p videos simultaneously. This shows the potential of our system as a viable
content delivery solution for large-scale applications.
6.2 Future Directions
While CacheCash resolves the security and efficiency issues elaborated at the
beginning of this thesis, it would benefit further from few design optimizations that
could promote its cost-effectiveness, and address issues such as user privacy. This
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is in addition to providing a full implementation of the system. These optimization
and deployment plans shape our future work directions, which we outline below.
Service price and collateral cost. In Chapter 5, we derived a payment function
that is used to compute the currency value of a winning tktL1. Such a function,
although it is linear in the winning tktL2 counter value for a single ticket, is quadratic
when used to compute the total payout a cache obtains for all its winning tktL1 tickets.
An interesting direction is to explore alternative payment function expressions that
make the service price grow at a slower rate with the caches’ load. In other words,
we seek to find relations that are less sensitive to load distribution, and hence, lower
service price inflation. This makes it more viable for publishers to provision service
cost and create long lifetime escrows.
Another interesting aspect is to optimize the collateral cost of the service, i.e.,
balances of both payment and penalty escrows. One such approach is to devise an
alternative lottery protocol that bounds the number of wining tickets per round.
More concretely, we want to eliminate the chance that more tickets than expected
will win. Beside developing such a lottery technique, an in-depth analysis is needed
to derive the bounds for both Bescrow and Bpenalty based on the winning behavior of
tickets under this new lottery protocol.
User privacy. The current version of our system does not preserve user
privacy. Publishers can track their client activities and content watching habits.
Similarly, caches can track what content each client is interested in. One of our
future directions is to investigate how to enhance user privacy in CacheCash while
maintaining its low overhead.
Fault tolerance and cache selection. Another future direction of our work
is to investigate how faulty caches affect the service that clients receive. That
is, what should a client/publisher do when some data chunks in a service session
are not received (or corrupted)? Should a client just start a new session and
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request all chunks again? We aim to find more optimized approaches that allow
clients to request only missing chunks. This also involves developing probing
and feedback, or reputation building, mechanisms, which can allow collecting
performance information that help in discovering faulty, or poor performing
caches early on. Such a mechanism would also enable publishers to set up cri-
teria to select caches for content requests in a way that controls the quality of service.
System deployment. Until now, we have only built a prototype for the data
service protocol of CacheCash. For the payment service, we intend to modify the
Bitcoin’s protocol by adding all the new transaction types, and processing logic,
that our system introduces. Our next step is to assess this plan and either go with
the Bitcoin protocol, adopt an alternative model, such as Ethereum [131], or even
build our own network protocol, based on lessons learned from the operation of other
cryptocurrencies. The latter is motivated by an initial vision of developing a new
consensus protocol that ties mining to the CDN service a cache puts into the system.
This promotes the notion of useful mining, rather than having the miners perform
useless computations. It also offers a chance to build a decentralized mining network
that discourages the formation of mining pools.
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Appendix A
Deriving ABC Threat Categories
In what follows, we show how the threat categories listed in Table 2.1 were derived.
We apply the procedure outlined in Step 2 of the ABC framework (Section 2.3.2) to
the assets of CompuCoin, which include the service (e.g., computation outsourcing in
case of CompuCoin), service rewards or payments, blockchain, transactions, currency,
and communication network. For each asset, we outline its security properties in order
to identify any factors that might violate these properties, which are labeled as threat
categories.
Starting with the service asset, our analysis outlines the following:
1. Security properties: A secure service can be defined as the action of serving
clients correctly at anytime, while providing confidentiality and binding the
servers to the service they provide. Hence, the security properties of a service
asset may include integrity, availability, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.
2. Threat categories: By negating the above properties, we find that the service
asset has the following threat categories:
• Service tampering/corruption: An attacker provides clients with invalid
service or corrupts the correct service delivered by others.
• Information disclosure: An attacker reveals the contents of service-related
messages, such as the service content/outcome, the service requests sent
by clients, replies sent by servers, etc.
• Repudiation: A server denies providing a specific service or a client denies
receiving it.
• DoS: An attacker makes the service unavailable to legitimate users.
Next, we analyze the service payment (or rewards) asset as follows:
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1. Security properties: One may consider the service payment asset secure as long
as: a) servers are rewarded properly for the service they provide, and b) servers
earn the payments they collect.
2. Threat categories: Negating the above security requirements produce the fol-
lowing threat categories:
• Service slacking: A server collects payments without performing all the
promised work.
• Service theft: A client obtains service for a lower payment than the agreed
upon amount.
For the blockchain asset, our analysis produces the following:
1. Security properties: The blockchain security properties are tied to the security
of the underlying consensus protocol. These properties have been thoroughly
studied in the literature [67, 77, 110]. We adopt the ones introduced in [110]
with slight modifications based on the work presented in [67], which include:
• Consistency: At any point in time, honest miners hold copies of the
blockchain that have a common prefix and may differ only in the last
y blocks, where y is a block confirmation parameter. A block then is
confirmed once it is buried under y blocks on the blockchain.
• Future-self consistency: At any two points in time, t1 and t2, the
blockchain maintained by an honest party may differ only in the last
y blocks. Consistency and future-self consistency properties achieve
blockchain persistence or immutability.
• Fairness: Miners collect mining rewards in proportion to the resources
they expend in the mining process.
• Correctness: All the blocks within the longest branch in the blockchain
are valid. (Note that correctness and fairness represent the chain quality
property outlined in [77, 110].)
• Growth: As long as the system is functional, new valid blocks will be
added to the blockchain.
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2. Threat Categories: By negating the above properties, we can distill the following
threat categories for the blockchain asset:
• Inconsistency: Honest miners do not agree on the prefix of the blockchain
copies they hold beyond the unconfirmed blocks. This also covers the case
of an honest miner who does not agree with itself on the blockchain prefix
it holds over time, e.g., alternating between two branches that compete in
being the longest.
• Invalid block adoption: The longest chain contains corrupted blocks that
either have invalid format or contain invalid transactions.
• Biased mining: A miner pretends to expend the needed resources to be
selected to extend the blockchain and collect the mining rewards.
• Chain freezing: The blockchain does not grow at a regular rate, but instead
freezes for several contiguous rounds. This threat category is a form of
DoS attack, and hence, we cover it under DoS against the communication
network asset.
Next we analyze the transaction asset as follows:
1. Security properties: Secure transactions can be characterized as correct,
tamper-proof, and source-binding, i.e., cannot be denied by the originator. In
addition, these transactions need to be accessible to the system users at any
time so they can send/receive/view transactions as needed. Moreover, these
transactions must not reveal any information about the source, destination,
and amount of transferred funds. Accordingly, we outline the following security
properties for the transaction asset: non-repudiation, integrity, validity, avail-
ability, and anonymity. Note that the validity property is already covered by
the correctness aspect of the blockchain, where a valid blockchain contains only
valid transactions. Furthermore, the availability property is covered under the
communication network asset.
2. Threat categories: Based on the previous discussion, and again by negating the
aforementioned security properties, the threat categories for the transaction
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asset would be:
• Repudiation: An attacker denies issuing transactions.
• Tampering: An attacker manipulates the fields of a transaction.
• Deanonymization: An attacker violates users’ privacy by exploiting the
public nature of the blockchain to link transactions and payments, and
use this knowledge to track the activity of these users in the system and,
possibly, reveal their real identities.
Next we analyze the currency asset as follows:
1. Security properties: The security properties of the currency asset are inter-
twined with the properties of the transaction asset. This is because the cur-
rency takes the form of digital tokens, which are the transactions exchanged in
the system. Thus, they inherit all the transaction security properties. What
remains is to deal with the currency ownership, meaning that only the owner
can spend these tokens.
2. Threat categories: Beside the categories outlined above for the transaction
asset, we have the following threat category for the currency asset:
• Currency theft: An attacker steals currency from others in the system.
This includes all currency theft attacks that are not covered by other
assets. For example, biased mining is currency theft, where a miner steals
others rewards indirectly, but it is already covered by the blockchain. The
same holds for the service payment related threats.
Finally, we analyze the communication network asset as follows:
1. Security properties: The communication network is the backbone of any cryp-
tocurrency system, and one that is unreliable can lead to numerous problems.
First, it can create delays in propagating newly mined blocks that could produce
an inconsistent blockchain. Second, it can cause delays in relaying transactions,
which could reduce the transaction throughput of the system and affect its avail-
ability aspect. Third, it can slow down setting up new miners who need a longer
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time to discover other peers and download copies of the blockchain. Fourth, it
opens the possibility of being controlled by external parties that could intercept
the communication links and isolate nodes in the network. Consequently, a se-
cure cryptocurrency system needs a reliable and robust communication network.
We merge all these aspects into one security property, namely, availability.
2. Threat categories: The communication network asset has one threat category,
which is DoS.
Table 2.1 summarizes all the threat categories derived in this appendix. As men-
tioned previously, this table is by no means comprehensive. Additional threats can be
added based on the asset types of the system, or more refined definitions of the asset
security properties. This detailed treatment was provided as a thorough example to
clarify the application of Step 2 in the ABC framework. Nonetheless, we found this
table sufficiently detailed when building threat models for the systems reported as
use cases in Section 2.5, including Bitcoin, Filecoin, and CacheCash, as well as for
the user study tutorial as reported in Section 2.4. For this reason, Table 2.1 can





This appendix introduces one of the performance optimization techniques utilized
in CacheCash, namely, batching client requests. That is, instead of replying to each
client instantly as explained earlier in the paper, the publisher responds to all requests
received within a predefined period as one batch. The goal is to reduce the computa-
tion cost of signing ticket bundles, where instead of signing each bundle individually,
the publisher will produce one signature covering all bundles within a batch. In what
follows, we discuss how a batch signature is generated and verified.
As shown in Figure B.1, for each request the publisher prepares a ticket bundle
in the same way as described in Section 5.3.4 without signing. After generating all
ticket bundles for all requests received within a batch period, the publisher generates a
batch signature. In this process, the publisher hashes each ticket bundle individually,
i.e., compute its hbundle. Then, it computes the Merkle hash tree of the hashes of
all bundles within the batch and signs its root to produce the batch signature σbatch.
Each ticket bundle will have a batch signature structure containing a copy of σbatch,
the membership path of the bundle in the batch Merkle tree, and the root of this
tree.
For the batch signature verification, clients and caches perform this process dif-
ferently. This is because a client receives the full bundle all at once but each cache
receives its tickets separately while serving the client. The client starts with comput-
ing hbundle of the received bundle. Then, it verifies the membership path over hbundle
to make sure that this bundle is part of the batch Merkle tree. Lastly, it verifies σbatch
over the tree root.
Each cache, on the other hand, receives a copy of the batch signature structure,







- Check its freshness.
- Select n caches.





At the end of the batch:
- Generate a batch 
signature over all bundles.
- Reply to clients.
Each client:
- Validate the received 
ticket bundle.




Figure B.1: Batching content requests.
hashes the request ticket and looks for an identical hash in hbundle. If found, it proceeds
with verifying the batch signature over hbundle in the same way as performed by the
client. This process is not repeated when receiving the lottery tickets. As mentioned
previously, the cache only hashes a lottery ticket and looks for identical hash inside
hbundle.
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